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ABSTRACT  
The purpose of this dissertation is to motivate, construct and test the suitability of the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in pricing equities listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Before this can be achieved, however, the existence of 
the size and the value effects needs to be established, and their resistance to risk 
adjustment with traditional asset pricing models needs to be ascertained. Once, these 
two empirical facts are documented, the three-factor model is built and tested.  
 
Results of Fama and French (1992) can be replicated on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in that a firm‟s size and its value-growth indicator have reliable power to 
forecast stock returns. However, the value effect and, in particular, the size effect, 
attenuate after market microstructure is controlled for. Both effects are found to be 
independent of one another and the book-to-market ratio is found to be the best value-
growth indicator. The static CAPM and an APT variant cannot explain the size and 
the value effects. This result is robust to time-series and cross-sectional tests.  
 
The three factor model of Fama and French (1993), and its variant, are constructed. 
The models can capture a substantial amount of time-series variation in most assets. 
When applied to the size and book-to-market sorted portfolios, they are not rejected in 
the vast majority of asset pricing tests. In tests on ungrouped data, the three factor 
model can explain the value effect, but not the size effect. However, in cross-sectional 
tests that use the size and book-to-market sorted portfolios as well as industry 
portfolios, the pricing errors of the three factor model are not substantially different 
from the ones obtained from the static CAPM.  
 9 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background 
  
The derivation of a parsimonious asset pricing model has been a central theme 
of financial economics for over half a century. While a substantial body of theoretical 
work has emerged
1
, no model has been accepted by the majority of academics and 
practitioners. It appears that the theory, which is set in the neoclassical tenant that 
people are rational utility optimizers, has difficulty capturing the actual behaviour of 
asset prices, as numerous persistent patterns in stock returns that contradict the 
rational models have been documented. In particular, two such asset pricing 
“anomalies” have attracted a considerable amount of attention: the size effect and the 
value effect.  
A faction of theorists began to fiercely question the fundamentals that underpin 
the neoclassical school (inter alia Black, 1986; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). In their 
view, investor irrationality, often dubbed “investor sentiment”, has an impact on 
security prices. However, until very recently, this new behavioural school of finance 
has not been popular as it provided little formal theory on asset price formation
2
.  
Consequently, for a number of years the focus of the discipline of asset pricing 
was shifted away from theoretical modeling towards empirical analysis. Financial 
practitioners have become reliant on statistical constructs with which they aimed to 
describe the behaviour of asset prices (inter alia Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; Connor 
and Korajczyk, 1988). One empirically derived asset pricing model appears in Fama 
and French (1993). The authors have formally incorporated the size and the value 
effects into an asset pricing equation and they have found the model to be particularly 
good at pricing many types of stocks. Since its inception, the model has become a 
staple tool in academic and professional practice (Brealey and Myers, 2000).   
                                                 
1
 The seminal work in the field consist of inter alia Markowitz (1952), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), 
Fama (1970), Black, (1972), Merton (1973), Ross, (1976) and  Roll (1977)   
2
 Formal behavioural theory of asset pricing began to form with the models of De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman (1990a, 1990b, 1991). However, this series of papers did not specify asset 
pricing formulas. Models which do specify asset prices appear in inter alia Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998); Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001); Hong and Stein (1999); Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003); Peng and Xiong (2006).   
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1.2 Purpose and objectives of the study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to motivate and assess the feasibility of the three 
factor model proposed in Fama and French (1993) for the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (henceforth, the JSE). Before the model is tested, however, a number of 
empirical stylised facts, which motivated Fama and French (1993) to build their 
model in the first place, need to be confirmed. In particular, the existence of the size 
and the value effects must be validated and the rejection of the rational models needs 
to be shown.  
Consequently, the empirical analysis of this thesis is broken down into three 
parts. In Part I, the size and the value effects are analysed. In Part II, poor ability of 
rational asset pricing models to explain these “anomalies” is confirmed. Once the 
rational models are rejected, the three factor model is built in Part III. Of course, if the 
empirical evidence does not support construction of the model, its formulation will 
not be undertaken.   
 
1.3 Formal Statement of the Hypotheses   
 
The hypotheses tested in Part I of the empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: The size and the value effect do not exist on the JSE, as 
returns of firms listed on the exchange cannot be predicted by their size or their 
value-growth indicator. If returns are predictable with these characteristics, it is a 
result of market microstructure effects.       
 
Hypothesis 1.2: The size effect is not independent of the value effect. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3: None of the value-growth indicators is a consistently better 
predictor of returns.     
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The hypotheses tested in Part II of the empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1:  Any predictability of asset returns with their size or a value-
growth indicator is due to risk and it dissipates after adjustment for risk.     
 
The hypotheses tested in Part III of the empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: The three factor model of Fama and French (1993), or its 
variant, can price assets that encapsulate the size and the value effect.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2: The three factor model of Fama and French (1993), or its 
variant, is not superior in explaining stock returns when compared to the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model or a model presented in van Rensburg and Slaney (1997). 
 
Hypothesis 3.3: The size and the value effects persist after an adjustment for 
risk with the three factor model of Fama and French (1993). 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
Applied econometric theory in finance has ballooned into a comprehensive body 
of knowledge and specific methods that relate to asset pricing have been developed. 
They can be broadly classified into three groups: portfolio tests, time-series tests, and 
cross-sectional tests; each of these methods will be applied in this thesis. Use of 
simulated portfolios is an informal, but intuitive, way to augment rigorous statistical 
procedure. All the time-series are performed with Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(henceforth, SURE) systems. The cross-sectional tests are conducted with the 
procedures developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) (henceforth, Fama-MacBeth test) 
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and in Chapter 12 of Cochrane (2001). All tests are undertaken in the “beta-return” 3 
format
4
. 
Throughout the empirical analysis an emphasis is made on statistical precision. 
In particular, since the Generalised Method of Moments (henceforth, GMM) 
methodology requires few statistical assumptions (Cochrane, 2001), many of the time-
series or cross-sectional regressions are mapped into a GMM system
5
. Although the 
coefficient estimates are identical to the ones obtained from the OLS and its variants, 
the standard errors computed with GMM are robust to virtually any correlation 
structure of the data.  
The emphasis on the statistical precision extends to tests that cannot (easily) be 
mapped into GMM. For instance, many of the standard errors in the cross-sectional 
Fama-MacBeth tests are computed with the correction proposed by Newey and West 
(1987), while some methods of risk-adjustment employ the powerful method in 
Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998).  
It must be noted that the dataset employed in the thesis is considered to be  
large, as it includes more than twice the data points than other studies that are similar 
to the one undertaken in this thesis (e.g. van Rensburg and Robertson, 2003a 2003b). 
A major weakness of the tests in this thesis is that the return data is not professionally 
computed, but is put together manually by the author
6
.  
 
1.5 Report Outline 
 
Apart from the introduction, there are five additional chapters in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 outlines the basic concepts of asset pricing theory, with an exclusive focus 
on linear factor models in the “beta-return” format. Subsequently, the efficient 
                                                 
3
 The more advanced stochastic discount factor approach is not used in the tests as it is new and rather 
complex, while, given that the three-factor model is linear, it does not add any efficiency in 
econometric estimation (Jagannathan and Wang, 2002).     
4
 Tests that simultaneously combine time-series and cross-sectional tests have been explored, and their 
results are available on request. They are removed from the formal discussion as it is deemed that 
microstructure of the JSE is, in particular case, not conducive to such complex econometric analysis.      
5
 The basics of financial econometrics are discussed in Cochrane (2001). It is suggested that readers 
familiarize themselves with these methods, as the literature review often refers to them. 
6
 In particular, it is believed that the set used in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a; 2003b) and Auret 
and Sinclaire (2006) is of higher quality, as these authors use high quality return data computed by the 
BARRA Corporation. 
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market hypothesis is presented and critiqued. Lastly, behavioural finance is 
introduced.  
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to show the anatomies of the size effect, the value 
effect and the empirical model of Fama and French (1993). The chapter also examines 
literature that links these phenomena to several theoretical frameworks that either 
assume total investor rationality or allow for irrational sentiment. The focus of this 
discussion will lean toward the value premium, as the size effect is smaller, is less 
robust, and has been largely explained. The value premium, however, continues to 
remain a puzzle. Throughout the review it is assumed that the reader has an 
understanding of concepts presented in Chapter 2. It is also assumed that the reader is 
familiar with the structure and the output of time-series and cross-sectional asset 
pricing tests. If this is not so, these methods are comprehensively detailed in Cochrane 
(2001). 
In Chapter 4, the formal motivation for the methodology and tests is put 
forward. The data collection and the methodology used in the study are also 
presented. Chapter 5 shows the empirical results. Chapter 6 summarises and discusses 
the results and outlines ideas for future research. 
  
1.6 Limitations of the Study  
 
The field of asset pricing is truly vast and it has many branches
7
. In addition, the 
model of Fama and French (1993), and the related “anomalies”, are well researched. 
Consequently, a complete review and exhaustive analysis of the topic is not feasible 
and certainly outside the scope of a single thesis. Thus, the study has to be limited in a 
number of ways.      
The literature review will briefly explore different types of “anomalies”. It, 
however, is primarily concerned with the size and the value effects, as these are 
germane to the model of Fama and French (1993). And, only these two “anomalies” 
are explored in the empirical results. Also, the underlining economics of the 
phenomena are discussed in review and some indicative tests that discern between 
                                                 
7
 Some examples are: consumption-based asset pricing, mean-variance-based asset pricing, empirical 
asset pricing, behavioural asset pricing, “microeconomic” asset pricing, studies on aggregate risk-
return, studies on “anomalies” and studies on market microstructure.          
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behavioural and rational explanations for the size and the value effect are undertaken. 
However, thorough tests of behavioural theories are not performed.  
In addition, the focus of the asset pricing tests rests exclusively with the three 
factor model of Fama and French (1993), the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the 
two-factor model of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997). Specifically, consumption-
based models of asset pricing are not reviewed or tested as they have met with poor 
empirical support
8
. Other empirical models, like the ones in Chan, Roll and Ross, 
(1986) and Connor and Korajczyk (1988), do not fare better than the rational models 
they try to replace. Thus, discussion and tests of these models are not undertaken. 
Also, a number of asset pricing specifications that seem to “work well” are omitted 
from the tests
9
, as assembly of these models is prohibitively difficult given the data 
constraints. Besides, the focus of this thesis is on the three factor model. It is not an 
exhaustive discussion of asset pricing on the JSE.   
                                                 
8
 Cochrane (2001) provides a discussion on the topic. 
9
 Some examples are: Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Acharya and Pedersen (2005); Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004), Brennan, Wang and Xia (2004) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), Petkova 
(2006), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). 
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CHAPTER 2: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
 
2.1 A Brief Outline of the Theory of Factor Asset Pricing Models 
 
2.1.1 Mean-Variance Efficiency and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (the 
CAPM) 
 
Arguably, the development of portfolio mathematics by Harry Markowitz in 
1952 is one of the initial breakthroughs that began the era of modern finance. He 
bases his argument on a premise that “the investor does (or should) consider expected 
return a desirable thing and variance of return an undesirable thing” (Markowitz, 
1952, p 77). He formally introduces the concept of the mean-variance efficiency: a 
combination of risky securities (share portfolio) is said to be efficient if it possesses 
the desirable property of yielding the maximum expected return while imposing a 
minimum level of risk (or variance) onto the investor. Consequently, he develops a 
concept of the efficient frontier, which is a locus of investment opportunities that a 
mean-variance optimising investor would consider optimal.    
Sharpe (1964), following Tobin (1958), extends the concept of the efficient 
frontier by including an asset (henceforth, the risk-free rate) that offers a constant rate 
of return in all states of the world. This asset allows investors to discard all but one 
portfolio of risky assets from their investment opportunity set. This portfolio is 
unique, because when it is combined with the risk-free asset, it creates yet another set 
of investment opportunities that supersede the efficient frontier of risky assets, as it 
allows for even higher returns given any level of risk. In effect, all rational investors 
who minimise risk and maximise return would hold a portfolio that would be a linear 
combination of the unique portfolio of risky assets (often referred to as the tangent 
portfolio) and the risk-free asset.        
A germane property of the tangency portfolio is that, of all the other portfolios 
of risky assets, it offers the highest expected return and excess of the risk-free rate at 
the lowest level of risk. Actually, since the ratio of an asset‟s excess expected return 
and its variance is often referred to as the Sharpe ratio, the tangency portfolio is a 
 16 
portfolio of risky assets that has the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio. More importantly, 
this analysis shows that the entire investment opportunity set can be summarised by 
two parameters: the risk-free rate, and the maximum attainable Sharpe ratio.  
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) extend the result discussed above into an 
equilibrium model for asset pricing. At first, they identify the nature of the tangency 
portfolio by noting that, since all investors hold the same portfolio of risky assets, 
market clearing prices require the tangency portfolio to be a composite of all risky 
assets in the economy and, that investors mix this portfolio with the risk-free rate to 
calibrate the risk they wish to bear. Then the authors posit that the risk of any asset in 
the economy is not its variance, but the amount of risk it adds to a person‟s total risk; 
and, that this incremental risk is measured by a given asset‟s co-variance with the 
market portfolio. Since the demand for an asset is determined by its risk, and risky 
assets are in fixed supply, any asset‟s price, and hence its return, is a function of its 
co-variance with the market portfolio (its incremental risk). Formally, Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) show that  
, 1
M
t i t f iE r r                   (2.1) 
Equation (2.1) is the static Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth, the static 
CAPM). It states that the expected return on an asset is exclusively a linear function of 
its market beta, βi, and the market premium, λM. Beta is the measure of the asset‟s 
market risk and is defined as the ratio of the asset‟s co-variance with the market and 
the market‟s variance10: 
,i M
i
M
Cov r r
Var r
                 (2.2) 
The market premium is the expected market return in excess of the risk-free rate.  
The result in Equation 2.1 rests on a number of assumptions. First, investors 
want to maximise their expected returns and are averse to risk. Second, variance of 
the asset‟s return is a sufficient parameter to summarise its risk - meaning that the 
distribution of returns is jointly normal. Third, investors have homogeneous beliefs, 
thus they all arrive at the same estimate of each asset‟s expected return and its 
variance structure. Fourth, investors can take large short and long positions in every 
                                                 
10
 The terms used in this thesis for asset‟s covariance with an asset pricing factor are: a “slope”, a 
“beta”, a “factor loading”, or simply, a “loading”. 
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asset. Fifth, there are no taxes or transaction costs. And lastly, that the investment 
horizon of all investors consists of a single period.   
Many of these assumptions do not hold in practice. However, relaxing some of 
them often does not materially change the implications of the model. For instance, 
Cochrane (2001) shows that CAPM still holds even if returns are not jointly normal 
under certain assumptions of investor preference for risk.  Also, Cochrane (2001) 
shows that, given that the efficient frontier is constant, the static version of the model 
prices assets in a multi-period setting. The effect of heterogeneous beliefs is studied 
inter alia by Williams (1977), and he notes that CAPM is valid as long as aggregate 
estimates of first and second moments of returns are not biased by differences in 
investor beliefs. Most importantly, Black (1972) develops a model that relaxes the 
most unrealistic assumption of limitless short positions. His version of CAPM, 
*
, 1
M
t i t z iE r E r                 (2.3) 
 is not much different from Equation 2.1. The risk-free rate is simply replaced by a 
portfolio of risky assets that has a market beta of zero, E(rz), and the market premium 
is defined as the expected return on the market in excess of the zero-beta rate.  
Nonetheless, the static CAPM provides a poor description of average realised    
returns. Fama and French (1992) show that there is only a weak positive relationship 
between average returns of a large cross-section of securities and their estimated 
market betas. However, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a), Kothari, Shanken and Sloan 
(1995) and Kim (1997) show that Fama and French‟s (1992) results occur thanks to 
the methodology they employ. Nonetheless, Brennan, Wang and Xia (2004) test the 
CAPM on a set of industry-sorted portfolios and do find a positive relationship 
between average returns and industry market betas. However, in their tests, the 
differences between the returns predicted by the CAPM and the realised returns are 
too large to validate the model.      
CAPM‟s poor performance can stem from a variety of reasons. For instance, 
Elton (1999) shows that tests may be misspecified because average returns are very 
poor estimates of expected returns. Kim (1997) argues that CAPM fails in empirical 
tests because of the error-in-variables problem, which arises because market betas are 
unobservable and cannot be estimated with high levels of precision. Alternatively, 
Roll (1977) argues that the market portfolio is unobservable and, as a consequence, 
the CAPM is untestable.  
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More importantly, some of the assumptions underlying the model are certainly 
violated in practice. In particular, the investment opportunity set is stochastic in nature 
and the moments of asset returns vary through time - both of these ideas are simply 
assumed away in the static CAPM. In addition, investors are not homogeneous: they 
may fail to hold the optimal tangency portfolio because of their beliefs or investment 
preferences (Fama and French, 2004).  
Consequently, the remainder of the discussion on rational asset pricing theory 
focuses on pricing models akin to the CAPM, but derived under more realistic 
assumptions. The distinguishing feature of these models is that there is more than one 
relevant variable that is included in the specification for expected returns. Thus, these 
asset pricing models are known as linear multi-factor models. Any variable that is 
thought to be important in determining asset prices is often referred to in literature as 
a state variable, or, more often, as a factor. However, the central predation of the 
CAPM and the mean-variance framework should not be lost on the reader. It states 
that the expected return of an asset is a function of its systematic risk; the additional 
factors simply pickup types of risk stemming from other sources than the market.  
 
2.1.2 The “Augmented” CAPM (the “A”CAPM) 
 
A portfolio comprised solely of equities may be a poor proxy for the true market 
portfolio, as it excludes two important asset classes. In particular, most of the income 
that an average individual receives in a lifetime is in the form of salaries or wages. 
Consequently, Mayers (1972) shows that omission of human capital from a test of the 
static CAPM, at least in theory, can falsely reject the model. The other important asset 
that is surely omitted from the market proxy is debt, which is untraded or is not 
directly observable (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003).  
Omission of assets from the market proxy does not invalidate CAPM. Roll 
(1977) shows that, given the assumptions of the CAPM, presented in the previous 
section, the model must hold. Put differently, the linear relationship between an 
asset‟s expected return and its beta with the tangency portfolio is a mathematical 
identity. Actually, Ferguson and Shockley (2003) derive a simple specification for the 
impact of omission of an asset class from the proxy of the market portfolio. They 
show that estimation of market betas with an imperfect proxy results in biased 
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estimators. The degree of error is positively related to the size of the true market beta 
of the asset, and its beta with the omitted assets from the market proxy. They also 
show that the CAPM can be restored if the omitted assets are known and return on 
them can be measured. Consequently, it can be shown that expected return on assets 
in the “Augmented” CAPM is a multifactor model: 
, 1
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In short, the static CAPM, represented by the first two terms on the right- hand 
side of the equation, is augmented with a number of variables. Each variable O 
represents an asset that is omitted from the equity portfolio and the associated betas 
are: 
,i oo
j
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Cov r r
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                  (2.5) 
The λo are the premia related to the missing assets, each being proportional to 
the true market‟s premium. Some tests of the model in this form can be seen in 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) and Ferguson and 
Shockley (2003). 
 
2.1.3 The Market Premium  
 
An assumption of the CAPM, which is surely violated in practice, is that the 
efficient frontier is non-stochastic. However, the inclusion of a time dimension into 
the mean-variance framework removes much of the simplicity that makes the CAPM 
so attractive. In order to keep the analysis palatable, theorists focused on three salient 
aspects of non-stationary asset moments, each with a progressively more profound 
impact on asset pricing. The first aspect is the time-variability in the market premium; 
the second considers the impact of variability in assets‟ market betas. Lastly, Merton 
(1973) shows that relocating the mean-variance analysis into continuous time 
introduces a source of risk, in addition to return variance, that a representative 
investor aims to unload.    
Over the last twenty years, American financial economists have unearthed a 
number of variables that can in fact predict the return of the aggregate equity 
portfolio. Consider a regression of a set of variables onto a lead of the realised market 
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return (excess of the risk-free rate). The series of values predicted by the regression 
would be interpreted as the market premium. Of course, any predictability of the 
market return can be a consequence of data mining and performance of any one 
variable may not hold outside the sample. Nonetheless, after extensive research, a 
consensus has been reached on the identity of factors that drive the market;  these 
variables are often known as instruments for expected market return. Some well-
known examples include
11
: 
1. The short-term interest rate. It is negatively related to market return (Fama 
and Schwert, 1973).  
2. The aggregate dividend yield, defined as the sum of all dividends paid by the 
stocks in the index in 12 months scaled by value of the index. It is positively 
related to market return (Campbell and Shiller, 1988).  
3. The default spread, defined as the difference between a yield on a long-term 
Treasury bond (or other „safe‟ bond) and a yield on low-grade long-term 
corporate bonds (or other „risky‟ bonds). The spread is positively related to 
market return (Fama and French, 1989). 
4. The term spread, defined as the difference between a long-term Treasury bond 
yield and a short-term Treasury bond yield. This spread is negatively related to 
market return (Fama and French, 1989). 
Algebraically, in order to estimate the market premium, the following regression 
is run:  
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The variables zj (j = 1,2,3…K) are the different instruments for the expected market 
return. For instance, Petkova and Zhang (2005) apply Equation (2.6) to model the 
market premium.  
In professional finance practice, however, the market premium is rarely 
estimated with this method, as its forecasting power wanes with horizons longer than 
one year. In addition, an estimated value of the market premium is a function of a 
                                                 
11
 This list is incomplete. For instance, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) construct a variable, cay, that has 
a strong ability to forecast returns. (Definition of cay is complex, but it can be stated as a deviation of 
consumption from wealth.) The return on portfolio of small firm with high book-to-market ratio 
(defined in Chapter 3) can forecast returns (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). While Kothari and 
Shanken (1997) show that aggregate book-to-market ratio of the market can also serve as an instrument 
of expected returns.      
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particular set of instruments used in a given predictive regression, and the exact 
specification of the model and the precise definition of the instruments appears to be a 
matter of taste, and not theory. Thus, the estimates for the premium can differ greatly.  
 
2.1.4 The Conditional CAPM (the CCAPM) 
 
The central idea behind the CCAPM is that assets‟ market betas vary through 
time. Chan and Chen (1988) were among the first to observe that market betas exhibit 
a considerable amount of time variation, and Ferson and Harvey (1991) show that 
market betas of portfolios formed with industries exhibit strong variation. In 
particular, Ang and Chan (2005), in a sample period spanning 75 years, show that the 
standard deviation of the time-series of estimated market betas may be as much as 
0.38. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) extend their analysis to include a large variety of 
assets, but in a shorter period, and find similar results
12
.  
Time variability of betas gives rise to serious concerns about observability of 
this risk measure and implementation of the CCAPM. However, Chan and Chen 
(1988) note that, if assumptions about the stochastic process behind betas is made, 
then the conditional model can be expressed and tested in an unconditional form. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) derive a robust unconditional representation of the 
CCAPM. They start by defining the Conditional CAPM, in a conditional form, with   
, 1 , ,
M
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where the true conditional beta of the model is   
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 There are theoretical reasons why market betas change with market conditions, and why this 
variability is not symmetric among firms. The central prediction of Modigliani and Miller‟s (1958) 
Proposition II is that changing leverage of a firm, measured at market values, will change the risk of its 
equity. Since a shift in market prices shifts market leverage, the risk (or the beta) of asset‟s equity will 
be correlated with market‟s movements. For example, Berk, Green and Naik (1999) show that market 
betas will exhibit variation with the business cycle. In particular, they argue that during periods of low 
interest rates, and thus low discount rates, firms, on average, would take on many risky projects, and 
thus exhibit high betas. However, opportunities for growth for these firms eventually run out, and few 
new projects can be taken. But, the exiting projects can be lost. Thus, this asymmetry between growth 
and decay would lead to mean-revision of firms‟ betas. In a similar model, Zhang (2005) derives a 
model where firms that have little assets in place (fixed assets) see their betas decline during market 
downturns. He points out that contraction in firm‟s productive capacity is more expensive than 
expansion of it. Thus, firms which have few fixed assets have the flexibility of cutting back on 
investment, a cheaper alternative to reduction of assets in place, which is a situation other firms have to 
face.   
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Equation (2.1) and Equation (2.2) are similar to Equation (2.7) and Equation (2.8), 
respectively, but now all the terms have a time subscript that emphasises time-
variability of the moments. 
This model, however, cannot be easily applied in practice, because an exact 
specification of the process underlying market betas is not known and it is often 
specified with an assumption. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) show evidence that the 
instruments for market premium have forecasting power for market betas. 
Consequently, Jagannathan and Wang (1996) assume that a conditional beta is a 
function of the market risk premium. The authors go on to show that the unconditional 
expected return of an asset is a function of the time-series mean of its market beta, 
denoted βμ,i, and a parameter υi which is a beta‟s sensitivity to market premium. Thus 
they define the conditional CAPM as: 
, 2
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One can interpret υi as “beta‟s beta”, meaning it is the sensitivity of the market beta to 
changes in the business cycle. All the terms with μ subscript represent time-series 
averages. Note that there are no time subscripts in the Equation (2.9); the model is in 
unconditional form. 
However, the parameters in equation (2.9) are not directly observable. Actually, 
as Petkova and Zhang (2005) show, a rather complicated econometric model and a 
long time-series of returns is needed to implement the model in this form. As a result, 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) use some algebraic shenanigans to derive:  
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The advantage of this model is that the βi is the familiar market beta of the static 
(unconditional) CAPM. The second beta in the equation represents sensitivity of the 
return of an asset to change in the market premium. The γ‟s are the new 
representations of the “premia”, which are specified in the Appendix of Jagannathan 
and Wang (1996).   
The model is rarely tested in such form. It has been discussed that the market 
premium is a function of many instrumental variables, thus, the CCAPM is usually 
specified as:  
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Equation (2.11) says that the expected return on an asset is a linear function of an 
asset‟s unconditional market beta and its betas with different instruments for the 
expected market return. The λj‟s are the premia associated with the different 
instruments for expected returns.   
 
2.1.5 The Intertemporal CAPM (the ICAPM) 
 
The models presented thus far offer a level of pragmatism, but fall short of 
theoretical purity advocated in Cochrane (2001). The intertemporal CAPM, derived 
by Merton (1973), has a stronger footing in economic theory, as it can be represented 
and tested in the linear “beta-return” method that is most readily applied in practice.  
In the ICAPM, the mean-variance analysis is extended as the “ICAPM 
investors” care, not only about the return they receive and the return variance they 
need to bear, but they also consider their long-term wealth (Merton, 1973; Cochrane, 
2001). As a result, a second type of risk, above that of variance, is included in the 
analysis. It is associated with changes in the instantaneous investment opportunity set, 
as its variation alters the expected risk-return trade-off in the future. For example, an 
increase in the volatility of market portfolio would force people, given their level of 
risk aversion, to lower the amount of equity they hold and thus accept lower returns. 
Investors dislike this uncertainty and are willing to hedge against it. In particular, they 
will pay a premium for stocks that move against unfavourable shifts in the mean-
variance frontier. Hence, keeping betas constant, the price of stocks that unload risk of 
unwelcome shifts in the efficient frontier will be higher and their expected returns 
lower (Fama, 1996; Cochrane, 2001). It follows that unexpected changes in any of the 
economic quantities that describe the investment opportunity set would constitute a 
source of risk to an average investor.  
                                                 
13
 In practice, a time-series regression of the conditional CAPM is:   
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It is a regression of asset‟s return onto the market return, the instrument for the market premium, and 
the interactions of the market return with the instruments for the market premium. Lattau and 
Ludvigson (2001a) and Ferson and Harvey (1999) are good examples for such a model.  
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More precisely, Cochrane (2001) and Campbell (1996) show that the expected 
return on an asset is:  
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E r r              (2.12) 
The first beta on the left-hand side of the equation is the market beta, essentially the 
same as the one in the static CAPM.  The premium, however, is not equivalent to the 
market premium, but is a function of the coefficient of risk aversion (the willingness 
of investors to bear risk) and the variance of the market portfolio. The betas in the 
summation term are: 
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The u terms are the innovations in the variables that trace out the path of the efficient 
frontier and are often referred to as news or shocks. The λhs are the premia associated 
with these risks.  
The ICAPM does not explicitly identify the state variables that are included in 
the model. Fama (1991) alluded to the ICAPM as a “fishing license”, meaning that 
researchers often add ad hoc variables into some multi-factor asset pricing equation 
and justify their choice of variables with the ICAPM. However, Cochrane (2001) 
notes that state variables of the ICAPM must themselves be able to forecast the shape 
of the mean-variance frontier, and this requirement restricts the universe of plausible 
factors in the multifactor ICAPM equation. Brennan et al. (2004) assume that the 
opportunity set can be exhaustively described with the risk-free rate, the variance of 
the market portfolio and the premium of the market portfolio, where the ratio of the 
latter two variables is the Sharpe ratio. Consequently, in simple terms, Equation (2.12) 
states that an asset‟s co-variation with unexpected shifts in either the risk-free rate or 
the Sharpe ratio must be included, in addition to the market term, in the pricing 
equation. 
One way of specifying factors that constitute Equation (2.12) is to use economic 
theory and solve for the factors algebraically. For instance Brennan et al. (2004) 
define the Sharpe ratio in terms of other observable variables and synthetically 
estimate its time-series. They use a similar procedure to compute the evolution of the 
risk-free rate. However, such an approach is seldom applied. Most researchers use the 
instrumental variables for expected returns, defined above, and insert the innovations 
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in those variables as the relevant pricing factors in the ICAPM.  This practice is 
motivated by the fact that these variables can forecast the return on the market, its 
variance, and the interest rate.  
Consequently, the specifications for the ICAPM in Equation (2.12) and the 
CCAPM in Equation (2.11) seem similar, as they both include the market beta and a 
host of terms that represent the co-variance of returns with variables that proxy for the 
market premium. The difference is that, in the CCAPM the additional pricing factors 
are lags of instruments for the market premium, but in the ICAPM the factors are 
innovations in them. At times, this difference is negligible, as the factors comprise of 
financial returns, which are unpredictable in nature and strongly co-vary with their 
own innovations. As a result, the empirical application of the two models may be very 
similar.        
The strong footing of the ICAPM in economic theory is an attractive feature of 
the ICAPM. Campbell (1996) shows that the size of premia in the ICAPM is linked 
by the coefficient of the relative risk aversion; and, the premium on each factor is 
directly related to the power the variable has to forecast the efficient frontier. Such 
restrictions are important as they guard against empirical specifications that support 
an asset pricing model, even if it is false.  
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2.1.6 A Final Note on Multifactor Models 
 
An astute reader will notice that the exposition of Ross‟ (1976) Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT) has been omitted; the APT simply states that 
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The first term is a zero-beta rate and the remainder of the pricing terms represent 
arbitrary specified asset pricing factors.     
 Two types of models have surfaced in the literature. The first is a statistical 
construct (“statistical” APT), where pricing factors are extracted from the return 
variance-co-variance matrix. The second includes macroeconomic variables in the 
pricing equation (“macroeconomic” APT).  
Although originally the model had strong footing in statistical theory, it has 
been losing popularity in the finance literature
14
 as it is used as a justification for 
including any factor (variable) into the asset pricing formula. Actually, Cochrane 
(2001) defined what ought to be a priced factor; it is a source of risk that an average 
investor does not wish to hold, but cannot unload
15
. However, it has become 
commonplace to empirically determine the suitability of each factor in an APT pricing 
                                                 
14
 First, it lacks a footing in the economic theory, which makes it convincingly unimplementable. 
Second, standard version of APT fails to “explain” the asset pricing anomalies. Any correct model in 
economics must be able to describe reality. Third, APT is based on an assumption that is almost 
definitely violated in practice. In particular it requires that the asset “being priced” does not exhibit 
unsystematic (asset specific) variation. Cochrane (2001) shows that if an asset does possess such risk, 
APT cannot accurately price assets.  
15
 To illustrate, consider a rise in prices of commodities such oil, gold, and other metals. It could be 
good news to some South Africans who work in, or profit from, the mining industry. Let‟s call them R-
investors. On the other hand, if the rise in prices of commodities fuels inflationary pressures, and the 
Reserve Bank decides to raise interest rates. Many other South Africans, the F-investors, may see their 
consumption fall and are made worse-off?. Now, consider asset A that co-varies strongly with a basket 
of commodities. And, by the intuition of the CAPM, everybody in South Africa holds this asset. Asset 
A is particularly valuable to the F-investors, because movements in the asset‟s price hedges to 
movements in commodities, and thus their consumption. They would continue to buy the asset until 
any decrease in consumption, brought about by increase in interest rates, would be offset by the 
increase in wealth caused by increase in price of asset A. The R-investors do not want asset A. If 
commodity prices fall, they lose out on their investment and their income, which stems from 
commodity cycles also declines. What can be said about the premium on the commodity factor? If 
there are more R-investors in South Africa than assets which co-vary with the returns to commodities 
will have low prices and high returns; the resource factor will have a positive premium. The opposite is 
true in the case where there are more F-investors in South Africa. If, on average, none of the groups is 
larger, the factor will not be priced, despite the fact that returns of many assets co-vary with it.    
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equation. The statistical significance, measured with a Student‟s t test, of a factor‟s 
premium, ascertains its importance.  
Recent evidence suggests that such methodology is seriously flawed. Kan and 
Zhang (1999) test a premium of a factor that is uncorrelated with returns. 
Astonishingly, they show that a factor that, by construction, ought to be omitted from 
the pricing equation is more likely to be considered “important” in tests that are 
thought to be more powerful. Jagannathan and Wang (1998) extend this analysis and 
show that t-statistics on premium of a factor that, by construction, yields zero 
premium, are much too large.  
Yet these statistical concerns abstract from the most damning property of asset 
pricing models derived with empirical methods. There is strong evidence that the 
second-moments of returns vary through time (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Fama and 
French, 1997; 2006). Therefore, even if a correct model works in a specific sample, it 
is almost sure not to work outside of it. Here is where the APT fails and the ICAPM 
can succeed. Only a model that is derived from the mean-variance analysis (or more 
consumption-investment problems of the investor) can show the finance practitioner a 
set of factors that have the best ex ante power to forecast returns.  
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2.2 From Market Efficiency to Behavioural Finance 
 
2.2.1 Market Efficiency  
 
All of the asset pricing theory described above rests on an assumption that 
investors in the real world are rational optimisers; they aim to maximise their returns 
and minimise their risks. Investors are rational in the sense that they correctly estimate 
the expected return and the co-variance structure of every financial asset, and, 
consequently, asset prices perfectly correspond to the prediction of the true asset 
pricing model. Fama (1970) dubs this situation the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
Most undergraduate finance textbooks follow Fama (1970) and discuss the three 
forms of the EMH: weak, semi-strong, and strong forms. The weak form of market 
efficiency states that risk-adjusted returns cannot be predicted with historical data. 
The semi-strong form states that these returns cannot be predicted with publicly 
available information. The strong form states that risk-adjusted returns cannot be 
predicted at all. In its purest form, the strong form is always false as much of the 
information pertaining to an asset is exclusively known to a group of “insiders” who 
can predict prices from their privately held knowledge. Nonetheless, the texts often do 
not emphasise the fact that Fama‟s (1970) argument applies only to risk-adjusted 
returns. The three forms are certainly violated if applied to raw returns. Variables that 
measure risk, such as market betas, or are correlated with risk measures, can, by 
definition, predict asset returns (Cochrane, 2001).      
  The central prediction of the efficient market hypothesis is that financial assets 
are always quoted at a “fair” price, defined as the stream of an asset‟s‟ expected 
cashflows discounted at the appropriate discount rate. Consequently, one of the 
implications of the EMH is that the price of an asset must change in response to new 
information about an asset‟s future cash flow or its discount rate (Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho, 2004); and, any adjustment in price occurs quickly, often within 
minutes of an informational shock. However, prices may not change if there is no 
news reaching the market.  
 Markets are efficient thanks to arbitrage, which, in its purest form, is defined 
as the simultaneous purchase and sale of a number of financial securities that costs 
 29 
zero to set up and results in a risk-less profit. Market efficiency is based on an 
argument that when investors spot a security that is, for instance, overpriced relative 
to its fundamental value, they will sell, or sell short, this security and cover their risk 
with the purchase of an asset that has a nearly identical cashflow to the mispriced 
asset. Of course, the idea of  two equities that offer the same cash flow may be a 
difficult one to believe. Thus, a more realistic version of arbitrage, dubbed risk 
arbitrage, occurs when investors sell, or sell short, overpriced assets. In such a way 
they expect to earn positive risk-adjusted returns (Shleifer, 2000).           
 Arbitrage would occur and, consequently, markets would be efficient only if 
all, or a sufficiently large number, of investors are rational. Friedman (1953) argues 
that although people, in general, are influenced by emotion and act on misinformation, 
investors, in particular, must be rational. He notes that people who irrationally buy 
overpriced assets and sell underpriced ones always find an investor who takes the 
opposite side of the trade. But, such trades are a zero-sum game. The rational 
investors profit at the expense of the irrational traders who cannot lose money forever, 
and, after a series of such trades, are eventually driven out of the market. In the 
literature, the rational investors are referred to as arbitrageurs and the investors who 
are irrational or misinformed are dubbed noise traders (Black, 1986).  
The evidence in favour of market efficiency is vast. Actually, many 
undergraduate finance textbooks list a plethora of studies that document the incredible 
speed of adjustment of prices to news, the poor profits earned from trading strategies 
based on historical price information and tendency of stock returns to follow a random 
walk (a statistical model that implies unpredictability of stock returns). Nonetheless, 
the EMH is not a paradigm that exhaustively describes financial markets and some 
salient examples of violation of market efficiently are presented next.          
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2.2.2 Four Tales of Market Inefficiency   
 
Impact of Public Non-News 
   Huberman and Regev (2001) study a situation where the appearance of an 
article describing the discovery of a cancer-curing drug resulted in a one-day return of 
330% to a stock that had the licensing rights to that medicine. This price change, by 
itself, is not too surprising. However, the news of this discovery had already been 
made public five months prior to the day of this exuberant return. In fact, Huberman 
and Regev (2001) note that the initial news had been announced by the company itself 
and a series of television segments had covered the story. Certainly, company press 
releases and pieces in the public media constitute the type of information that, 
according to the EMH, ought to be most readily used by investors. Thus, the semi-
strong version of the EMH had been grossly violated because market prices moved by 
a hefty amount in response to what Shleifer (2000) dubs “stale” information, which, 
by the intuition of the EMH, may not move prices. 
The violation of the EMH would not have been deep if the immense return, 
plausibly caused by irrational traders, was quickly reversed by the rational ones. 
However, the rise in the drug company‟s shares was permanent. In addition, many 
other firms, which had no claim on the drug, but were in the same industry, had seen 
their share prices rise at the same time.  
 
Market’s Appetite for Internet Stocks in the Late 1990s.   
The EMH predicts that share prices will only react to news that contains 
information about risk or expected cashflow of an asset. Consequently, it can be 
argued that an announcement of a change in name of a company would not be 
material to either parameter that determines prices. Actually, Bosch and Hirschey 
(1989) find that a small, but statistically insignificant, positive return is associated 
with a name change.  
Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) look at a specific type of name change: the 
addition of “.com” to a firm‟s name at the height of the internet bubble. The authors 
find that an average risk-adjusted return of a stock that is announcing such name 
change is about 53% in one day! Of course, the name change can signal a change in 
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company strategy to one that is (or is thought to be) more profitable. However, 
Cooper et al. (2001) sort firms in their sample into groups according to the line of 
business the firm is conducting at the time of the name change. They find that firms 
that are already involved in the internet exhibit the largest return on the day of the 
announcement and firms that are not primarily involved in e-commerce yield a risk-
adjusted return of 23% on the day of the announcement. 
This occurrence strongly rejects the EMH, as it seems that a firm can boost its 
share price by manipulating a characteristic which influences investor sentiment but is 
unrelated to fundamental value. Perhaps a reversal of the announcement returns in the 
months subsequent to the event would imply that the forces of arbitrage restored 
rational pricing. However, Cooper et al. (2001) find the opposite: a positive drift in 
prices after the name change.  
 
Market’s  Arithmetic   
Maybe the EMH does not hold universally in the market, but it is true for most 
assets most of the time. However, if arbitrage keeps an asset‟s price aligned with its 
fundamental value, then the EMH should never be violated in assets for which 
arbitrage is particularity easy or inexpensive. The purest form of arbitrage can be 
undertaken in situations where two assets, or a combination of assets, are known to 
yield identical cashflow in the future. In such cases, the price of these assets ought to 
be linked by the relation that governs the equivalence of the cashflow.  
Froot and Dabora (1999) study firms that have issued two kinds of shares, 
each with identical cashflow and ownership rights. For instance, Royal Dutch, which 
is listed in the Netherlands, and Shell, which is listed in London, are an example of 
such twin shares
16
. Both these equities are represented in the US markets with 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs). The efficient market hypothesis states that 
these shares must sell at the same price. If the parity is violated, such that the share 
price of Royal Dutch exceeds parity, then an arbitrageur would buy the cheaper Shell 
and sell short the dearer Royal Dutch. There is virtually no risk involved with such a 
trade, as these shares are perfect substitutes for one another.  
                                                 
16
 The cashflow and ownership rights are divided in the 60:40 ratio. Thus, in effect, one Royal Dutch 
share is equal to 1.5 Shell shares.  
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However, Froot and Dabora (1999) and Lamont and Thaler (2003b) examine 
price parity between Royal Dutch and Shell for 22 years. It rarely, if ever, holds. In 
fact, for more than two years Shell was 30% overpriced relative to Royal Dutch, 
while, during five years in the 1990s, it was 10% underpriced relative to its twin. In 
sum, two identical cashflow streams could have been brought at two different prices: 
a clear violation of the EMH. The hypothesis is even more strongly rejected given that 
a US investor can purchase ADRs of both shares, thereby circumventing currency risk 
and market microstructure effects (taxes, transaction costs, liquidity, etc.). 
 
A Part that is Greater than the Whole 
Probably the most interesting instance of a blatant violation of the EMH, studied 
by Lamont and Thaler (2003a) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002), occurs 
when a division in a firm has a larger value than the firm itself. In these situations an 
asset trades at different prices in the same market because an investor can buy the 
subsidiary directly or he can buy it bundled with the parent. Also, in such cases, the 
market implicitly assigns a negative value to a profitable firm: a situation coined a 
“negative stub”. 
Lamont and Thaler (2003a) provide a vivid example. In 2000, a company called 
3Com wanted to spin-off a subsidiary called Palm. Initially, it sold 5% of the stake in 
Palm to the public. The remainder of the equity of the subsidiary was going to be 
distributed directly to shareholders of 3Com, where 1.5 shares of Palm were to be 
awarded for every one share of the parent. At the end of the day of Palm‟s IPO, it had 
closed at $95; 3Com, on the other hand, had closed at $82. In effect, an investor who 
wished to purchase (say) 1500 shares of Palm, instead of paying its price, could have 
purchased 1000 shares of 3Com. It would have cost him less, included the 3Com‟s 
other profitable business, and given the investor claim to a substantive amount of cash 
on the parent‟s books. In fact, Lamont and Thaler (2003a) calculate that Palm‟s share 
price implied that 3Com was valued at a negative $22bn!   
Such a case of mispricing was not short-lived nor was it unique. Lamont and 
Thaler (2003a) show that the 3Com/Palm “negative stub” persisted for 48 days - up to 
the point where the Palm shares were awarded to the parent‟s shareholders. Actually, 
between 1985 and 2000, Mitchell et al. (2002) document 82 cases of “negative stubs” 
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and, they find that some of them persist for up to 7 years. In addition, they find that in 
30% of cases, this mispricing is never corrected by the market.    
 
2.2.3 The Case against Efficient Markets  
 
In each of the stories told above, forces of arbitrage failed to bring about market 
efficiency. If fact, few academics in modern finance would argue that the textbook 
definition of pure arbitrage occurs in equity markets and it is generally believed that 
arbitrage is limited. 
For instance, arbitrage may be limited because it is costly (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). Any form of arbitrage requires that traders know the fundamental 
value of the stock, which requires an unbiased estimate of future cashflow and the 
discount rate. However, in order to know the profitability of mispricing, a 
considerable amount of information needs to be gathered and processed such that the 
expected cashflows of the arbitrage strategy can be predicted. In effect, an arbitrageur 
needs to pay significant fixed costs associated with gathering of information but is 
unable to estimate profits the arbitrage would provide (Merton, 1987).  
Even in situations where the market suspects that an asset is mispriced and the 
expected return of arbitrage is high, the risk of the strategy can be difficult to estimate. 
For instance, a given trade might produce positive risk-adjusted returns against the 
CAPM, but this excess profitability may dissipate if ICAPM is used to adjust for risk. 
Since financial economists have not come up with an asset pricing model that is 
unequivocally supported by the finance community or, more importantly, the data, it 
is probably impossible to know what types of risk an arbitrage strategy involves. 
Fama (1970) dubs this situation the joint-hypothesis problem; Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003) call it bad model risk.    
In addition, it is not clear if implementation costs of an arbitrage strategy would 
not eliminate profits, even if the distribution of the arbitrage profits were known. 
Direct transaction costs, such as the bid-ask spread, are important of course, but the 
salient feature of arbitrage is that it often requires undertaking short positions. Lamont 
and Thaler (2003a) note that shorting of shares is not done at a centralized market, but 
requires borrowing of shares from large institutional investors. If shares of some firms 
are not held by these funds, finding shares to short can be difficult and expensive. 
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Actually, Fama (1991), following Grossman and Stiglitz, (1980), notes that the market 
price of an asset can diverge from its fundamental value, as long as the mispricing 
does not imply a profit after transaction costs are taken into account. 
Arbitrage would still be limited if the above-mentioned concerns are assumed to 
be of secondary importance as there is another type of risk that arbitrageurs face
17
. 
Consider a case of pure arbitrage. It can only be applied in situations where two 
securities exhibit the same cashflow and risk. Such perfect substitutes are very rare, 
thus arbitrageurs often settle for imperfect substitutes. It may be possible to match 
factor exposures of two different assets, but it is certainly not possible to match the 
idiosyncratic risks. In fact, Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue that a maximum 25% of 
return in a particular stock can be matched with a portfolio of other risky assets. 
Arbitrageurs are highly specialised, thus they cannot unload the idiosyncratic risks 
through diversification. They expect to be compensated for bearing this fundamental 
risk and will not eliminate mispricing that does not result in an adequately high profit 
(Shleifer, 2000). 
So far it has been argued that transaction costs, information costs and 
fundamental risk preclude arbitrage in markets that are virtually free of irrational 
agents. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that, assuming that irrational investors are 
present in the market and arbitrageurs have short investment horizons, arbitrage can 
be seriously impaired, even if the markets are close to being perfect. The authors note 
that arbitrageurs do not know the price at which they are forced to liquidate their 
positions. Of course, they hope that the mispricing they aim to profit from will correct 
before the end of their investment horizon. However, they face a serious risk of what 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) call a noise trader shock, which widens the mispricing and 
results in an unrealised loss to the arbitrageur. If traders are forced to liquidate their 
position before mispricing is corrected they have to realise this loss. This type of 
uncertainty is the noise trader risk and although this situation may seem far-fetched, it 
perfectly describes the implosion of the Long-Term Capital Management (Brealey 
and Myers, 2000). 
Also, it seems that the two assumptions behind the notion of noise trader risk 
are fairly realistic. For instance, the assumption that arbitrageurs have short 
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 This is true only if it is impossible for one arbitrageur to eliminate the mispricing (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).   
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investment horizons is supported by arguments in Shleifer and Summers (1990), who 
argue that transaction costs in long-term arbitrage strategies may be large and 
institutional considerations, such as margin calls, may act as an implicit truncation of 
the investment horizon (Mitchell et al. 2002). However, it is Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) who provide a strong theoretical reason why arbitrageurs are sensitive to their 
short-term returns. The authors note that arbitrageurs are agents of larger investors 
who wish to give funds to the trader with the highest skill. But the providers of capital 
are naïve and do not understand strategies that the arbitrageurs implement, and 
communication between the agents and the principals is difficult. However, the 
providers of capital think they can judge the skill of a given arbitrageur by observing 
his return. Consequently, the amount of funds an arbitrageur receives is a function of 
the short-term return he yields. In effect, according to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), 
this monitoring of arbitrageurs is tantamount to them having short investment 
horizons, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that arbitrageurs, who want to 
maximize the funds they have under management, may not make trades that can result 
in lower returns in the short-term, but do earn positive risk-adjusted returns in the 
long-run.     
The second assumption behind the noise traders‟ risk impeding arbitrage is that 
irrational traders are not eliminated by rational ones, and thus persist in the market. 
Actually, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991) show that noise traders 
can dominate the market. Irrational investors may systematically underestimate the 
risk of their trades because they are overconfident or optimistic (Daniel and Titman, 
1999). As irrational investors take on more risk they earn higher expected returns. De 
Long et al. (1991) show that the excessive risk noise traders take on does eliminate 
many of them from the market, but as a group they may end up with more wealth than 
the rational investors. In addition, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990b) show that it may be profitable for certain rational investors to trade in the 
same direction as the noise traders. 
  
2.2.4 Asset Pricing “Anomalies”  
 
In a world where arbitrage is limited there is no reason to believe that the four 
instances of the violation in the EMH discussed above are exhaustive. Actually, there 
 36 
is a plethora of evidence against efficient markets. Much of it constitutes cases of 
asset return predictability after adjustment for risk with the static CAPM. However, 
such predictability is not evidence of violation of market efficiency per se, as Fama 
(1991) notes that improper control for risk can lead to the false conclusion that 
markets are inefficient. In fact, his joint-hypothesis problem is a tried and powerful 
weapon against researchers who are too quick to reject the EMH.  
Some instances of predictability in returns are to be briefly discussed. They do 
not, per se, constitute a violation of market efficiently as risk-based theory can, in 
principle, explain each of these anomalies. Paradoxically, the most salient of them, the 
size effect and the value effect, are not discussed here, but are left to Chapter 3 where 
a thorough exposition of these effects is undertaken.  
 
Overreaction 
Does the stock market overreact? How would market overreaction manifest 
itself in stock prices? De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) show that stock returns 
exhibit a considerable amount of mean-reversion and interpret this evidence as 
investor overreaction. Specifically, each year they rank firms based on their prior 
three-year return, the bottom 35 stocks are placed into a “loser” portfolio and the top 
35 go into a “winner” portfolio. Next, they calculate returns for these two composites 
and find that the “losers” win and the “winners” lose. In fact, one outperforms the 
other by 25% in subsequent three years and risk adjustment with the CAPM has little 
effect on this profit.  
Of course, the idea of investor overreaction is furiously challenged. Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990b) show that cross-autocorrelation in returns can manifest itself as 
market overreaction, but it can exist in rational markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) 
explicitly test their theory and find that most of the mean-reversion in returns stems 
from overreaction. Chan (1988) explains the profitability of the mean-reversion in 
prices with the conditional CAPM and, according to Zarowin (1990), overreaction is 
an instance of another anomaly: the size effect (to be defined in Chapter 3). However, 
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1991) dispel both views and show that the 
overreaction effect persists after thorough adjustment for risk and removal of 
confounding effects of other anomalies. On other hand, Ball, Kothari and Shanken 
(1995) and Conrad and Kaul (1993) show that trading strategies that exploit 
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overreaction may not be profitable after adjustment for trading costs. Loughran and 
Ritter (1996) question this view by showing that in their tests, which they claim are 
superior, the anomaly is robust to trading expenses. 
A slightly different type of overreaction is shown by Ritter (1991), who 
documents poor long-horizon returns (up to five years) to firms that underwent an 
IPO.  This finding constitutes overreaction because returns to IPOs are very large on 
the first day of the offering (Brealey and Myers, 2000). In response to this finding, 
Fama (1998) invokes the joint-hypothesis problem. He follows the findings of Barber 
and Lyon (1997a), who show that results of “long-term studies”, such as Ritter‟s 
(1991), can be misspecified and risk adjustment is difficult. In addition, Brav and 
Gompers (1997) argue that the drift in prices after an IPO cannot be established 
independently of another well-known effect, the book-to-market effect (also to be 
defined in Chapter 3). However, these arguments are not sufficiently convincing and 
the puzzle of the poor performance in IPOs is left unanswered.              
 
Underreaction  
Underreaction in financial markets can take many forms. Generally, it 
constitutes a drift in prices after an event that, on average, moves prices. The drift can 
be measured over a few months or many years. The list of such “anomalies” has 
grown considerably. However, the most salient examples are: 
 Negative long-horizon returns following equity issues (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995). 
 Positive long-horizon returns following share repurchases (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995). 
 Positive price drift after surprisingly good earnings and negative price drift 
after surprisingly poor earnings (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). 
 Negative long-horizon returns following equity-financed takeover offers 
and positive returns following cash-financed offers (Loughran and Vijh, 
1997).         
In each of these cases, the average price reaction on the announcement day of 
these events is of the same sign as the post-event price drift. Hence, it appears that the 
market price moves “too little” on the announcement day, i.e. it underreacts.     
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Fama (1998) fiercely defends the efficient market hypothesis. He notes that 
adjustment of returns for risk is extremely difficult over long horizons (more than a 
few weeks). Barber and Lyon (1997a) and Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that 
calculating mean returns and the associated test statistics over long runs is extremely 
difficult. More importantly, Fama (1998) notes that the joint-hypothesis problem is 
vastly important in these studies since the modern asset pricing models have a 
particular problem in predicting returns of firms that exhibit underreaction. Lastly, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that statistical inference in these studies is 
erroneous due to a problem of cross-sectional dependence 
18
. Nonetheless, they 
continue to find evidence of underreaction after most of the statistical problems are 
resolved.   
 
Momentum 
The momentum effect dates back to De Bondt and Thaler (1985), but it is 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who are credited with its discovery. In short, the effect 
is an observation that over medium horizons (six months to one year) stock returns are 
predictable with their prior medium-term return. Specifically, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) sort stocks into portfolios based on their (say) one-year return. A decile of 
stocks with the highest return is coined “winners” and a decile of stocks with the 
lowest returns are “losers”. Unlike to De Bondt and Thaler (1985), the “winners” 
continue to win and the “losers” continue to lose. The magnitude of the disparity in 
returns is about 1% per month. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) go out of their way to 
reduce those momentum profits by adjusting for risk with the static CAPM, but the 
effect continues to persist. The evidence on momentum extends to industries 
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) and is confirmed in international data (Rouwenhorst, 
1999). Interestingly, the momentum “anomaly” can be a consequence of overreaction 
or underraction.   
The rational school has difficulty in explaining the momentum effect, as it 
survives most, if not all, adjustment for risk (Fama and French, 1996a; Brennan et al., 
1998). Nonetheless, Conrad and Kaul (1998) show that momentum strategies can be 
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 Cross-sectional dependence occurs when observations are correlated across securities in a given 
time. Thus, if many events occur as a result of single shock to fundamentals and an econometrician 
treats these events as independent he (or she) overestimates the importance of this particular shock.      
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explained with risk, as sorting stocks on past returns also sorts stocks on expected 
returns. Thus, prior winners continue to win because, on average, these firms are 
riskier and, by construction, must yield high returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
dispel the risk-based explanations for the momentum because the profits to a strategy 
that aims to profit from the momentum effect stops being profitable after one year. A 
risk explanation would predict high profits at any horizon. Nonetheless, Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006) show that returns to a momentum strategy can be linked to 
macroeconomic variables, and Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) show that profits for the 
momentum strategies are greatly reduced after adjustment for trading costs is made.  
 
2.2.5 Behavioural Finance    
 
In a response to the above-mentioned anomalies, a new branch of financial 
economics has been developed. It is a set of asset pricing theories that do not require 
investors to be fully informed and rational. This collection of theories has been 
dubbed behavioural finance
19
.  
Behavioural models offer a unified explanation for systematic investor 
underreaction and overreaction, by generally assuming that investors do not correctly 
(or instantaneously) incorporate new information into asset prices. Prices continue to 
move in the direction dictated by some informational shock (they underreact) and 
eventually the market value of an asset overshoots its fundamental value (prices 
overreact). Eventually, the prices correct back to the rational value, either as a result 
of rational arbitrage, additional news reaching the market, or a change in the 
behaviour of the irrational group. (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). More importantly, risk aversion precludes 
rational traders from trading against irrational investors. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Models do differ by the explicit specification of investors‟ irrational behaviour. 
Often the precise identification of the irrational sub-population is difficult
20
. Some 
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 For a complete survey of behavioural finance look at Barberis and Thaler (2003).      
20
 To illustrate, intuitively professional money managers may appear as the rational segment of the 
market. However, these investors are agents of individual investors, who may be less informed or 
rational, and thus, institutional investors, driven by the unsophisticated individual investors, are a 
source of noise in the market. Alternatively, investment professionals, who dominate the market, may 
exhibit irrational behaviour that is unique to them and cause mispricing. This lack of agreement is a 
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models offer insights from cognitive psychology to capture investor behaviour. In 
particular, they rely on investor heuristics
21
 to generate the pattern of overreaction and 
underreaction. Other models note that investor attention is scarce, such that they 
cannot process infinitely large amounts of information. This can manifest itself as 
categorization, which, according to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), manifests itself as 
overreaction and underreaction.  
A less formal type of irrational behaviour is positive feedback trading, which, in 
effect, can be seen as momentum trading (buy assets after prices increase and sell 
after prices fall). There are many reasons for such behaviour. According to De Long 
et al. (1990b) trend chasing is a consequence of investors forming their beliefs based 
on explorative expectations, and Black (1986) justifies momentum buying from a 
rational standpoint. If aversion to risk is negatively related to wealth, a rise in stock 
prices will translate into a willingness to bear more risk and a larger demand for risky 
assets
22
. Positive feedback trading can occur in individual stocks or groups of stocks - 
often dubbed styles (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003).  
 
2.2.6 The Characteristic Model 
     
The implication of behavioural finance for asset pricing is that the expected 
returns are a linear (or linearized) function of a firm‟s characteristics that are 
                                                                                                                                            
major task of the behavioural new branch of financial economics, many models exist but few unify all 
concepts into an integrated story describing financial markets. 
21
 Heuristics (as applied to psychological sciences) are cognitive “rules of thumb” that individuals use 
to form beliefs and solve problems. Commonly, heuristics are referred to as ”hunches” or “a gut 
feeling”. In many cases, use of heuristics leads to biased expectations. Barberis and Thaler (2003) and 
Shleifer (2000) present a comprehensive list of heuristics (and hence possible biases) pertaining to 
investment professionals. However, the extant behavioural theory focuses only on a subset of 
documented heuristics: representatives, conservatism, overconfidence and biased-self attribution. 
22
There are other reasons.  Stop loses and liquidation of a position due to margin calls is a natural form 
of positive feedback trading. Also, most forms of technical analysis can lead to positive feedback 
trading. Another rational expiation of trend chasing is based on informational cascades. It is easier and 
cheaper for some investors to trade based on actions of “smarter” professionals who have access to a 
large pool of information and computing power. Simply, if smart money pushes prices up, then 
individual investors will follow suit. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) point out that professional money 
managers can partake in momentum trading. Periodically they need to justify their portfolio decisions 
to their investors and it is easier to substantiate portfolio holdings of professionally managed funds if 
those funds consist of stocks with high ex post returns. Lastly, Barberis et al. (1998) note that positive 
feedback trading can be justified by the representativeness heuristic. Few consecutive up-ticks in an 
asset‟s price may indicate the beginning of a trend in a subset of the investing public. 
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informative about mispricing. Daniel and Titman (1997) and Daniel et al. (2001) 
define the characteristic model as:   
, 1 0
1
N
f f P P
t i t i
f
E r              (2.15) 
The second term states that an expected return can be a function of asset pricing 
factors that arise from investors trying to optimise their risk-return trade-off, but in the 
model there is a premium of θP for a firm‟s characteristic κP, which is informative 
about mispricing. In fact, Daniel et al. (2001) show that the importance of the κP in 
the pricing equation is a function of mispricing, which, in a limiting case, subsumes 
the importance of the risk factors.  
     In sum, a modern view of financial markets includes irrational investors, and 
it defines market efficiency where prices are not always at their fundamental values, 
but where eliminating mispricing is risky or costly. Thus, trading strategies that 
promise easy profits are as equally unlikely as if the markets were efficient. Perhaps 
the term behavioural efficiency would be more appropriate.                        
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CHAPTER 3: THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
3.1 The Size and the Value Premia  
 
The literature review starts with a definition, discussion and robustness of the 
size and the value effects. Evidence that introduces and quantifies the premia is 
presented. It is also shown how those effects respond to risk adjustment with the static 
CAPM and some variants of the APT. In addition, joint tests are shown, as there is an 
overlap and interaction between the different anomalies. The focus of the review is on 
more recent studies that use US data. These tests are considered more powerful 
because US financial markets contain a large cross-section of readily marketable 
securities that can be observed over long periods of time. 
The size effect, documented by Banz (1981), and often referred to as the size 
premium, can be defined as a positive relationship between firm‟s market equity and 
its ex ante return. A popular measure of a company‟s size is its market capitalisation, 
which is defined as a firm‟s share price multiplied by the number of shares it has 
outstanding. A related anomaly is the price effect, defined as a positive relation 
between the firm‟s share price and its ex ante return (Kross, 1985). A strong 
correlation between prices and market values confounds the size and the price effects. 
An important property of the size effect is that most of the high returns to small firms 
occur in the month of January (Keim, 1983). 
The value premium is a positive and monotonic relation between firms‟ F/P 
ratios and ex ante returns. A firm‟s F/P (fundamental-to-price) ratio is defined as its 
accounting measure of worth scaled by its market measure of worth. Companies with 
high ratios are “cheap” value stocks, while firms with low ratios are “expensive” 
growth (glamour) stocks. Some popular value-growth indicators are the earnings yield 
(earnings-to-price ratio, E/P), the cashflow yield (cashflow-to-price ratio, C/P), and 
the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (book-to-market ratio, 
BE/ME). This list is by no means exhaustive
23
. The discovery of the value premium 
                                                 
23
 Other examples are the divided yield and debt-to-leverage ratio. In principal, many F/P ratios could 
forecast returns. Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) provide evidence that, in univariate regressions, a 
wide array of ratios can predict returns.  
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can be accredited to inter alia Basu (1977, 1981), Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 
(1991) and Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), but the most convincing evidence of 
the effect appears in Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994). A related anomaly to the value premium is investor overreaction of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985, 1987). In fact, Fama and French (1996a) show that the value and 
overreaction effects are imputed to the same economic phenomena.   
 
3.1.1 US Evidence of the Size Premium 
 
Among others, Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992, 2006) show that, from 
1926 until the end of the 20
th
 century, the size effect has been significant in economic 
and statistical terms. An extract of their results is presented in Panel A in Table 3.1. 
Asness, Porter and Stevens (2000a) show that a trading strategy consisting of a long 
position in an equally-weighted portfolio of small firms, financed with a short position 
of an equally-weighted portfolio of large firms, has yielded a return of nearly 1% per 
month. This premium is indeed hefty, and is larger than the reward for bearing equity 
risk.  
The size effect seems to persist after a risk adjustment with the static CAPM. 
For instance, with a cross-sectional test, Fama and French (1996b) show that the 
firm‟s market equity continues to predict returns after its market betas are included as 
an explanatory variable. The effect is robust to inclusion of the “more precise” market 
betas calculated with annual intervals.  
The relationship between the size premium and CAPM warrants a further 
discussion. Banz (1981), among many, shows that a firm‟s market capitalisation is 
negatively related to its beta. Thus, if a firm‟s size is a better proxy for market risk 
than the imprecisely estimated beta, it ought to predict returns and the size premium is 
only a result of multicollinearity between the two variables. Actually, Berk (1995) 
argues that if beta is measured with imprecision then firm size must have power to 
predict returns even if CAPM holds perfectly. Consequently, Kim (1997) shows that, 
after the error-in-variables problem in cross-sectional tests of asset pricing models is 
corrected, the size variable becomes a poor predictor of returns.  
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Table 3.1 
Anatomy of the Size Effect in the US 
Period Mean t Reference Table  Correction Method 
Panel A: The size effect and the CAPM    
1936-1975 -0.52 2.91 Banz (1981)
1
 I β GLS 
1963-1990 -0.15 2.58 Fama & French (1992) III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1990 -0.17 3.41 Fama & French (1992) III β Fama-MacBeth 
1928-1993 -0.18 4.16 Fama & French (1996) III β Fama-MacBeth 
1928-1993 -2.75 3.63 Fama & French (1996)2 III β Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1993 -0.06 -1.55 Kim (1997)3 IV β Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1998 0.95%  3.68 Asness, Proter & Stevens (2000) III nothing One-Way Sort 
1963-1998 0.94%  4.07 Asness, Proter & Stevens (2000)
4
 III nothing One-Way Sort 
Panel B: The size effect in conjunction with the value premium    
1963-1990 -0.11 1.99 Fama & French (1992) III BE/ME Fama-MacBeth 
1963-2004 0.34% 1.47 Fama & French (2006)
5
 III BE/ME Two-Way Sort 
1966-1995 -0.14 2.7 Brennan, Chorid ia & Subrahmanyam (1998) III BE/ME, Momentum Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1990 -0.16 3.06 Fama & French (1992) III E/P Fama-MacBeth 
Panel C: The size effect during different periods     
1926-2004 0.24%  1.68 Fama & French (2006)
6
 I BE/ME Two-Way Sort  
1926-1963 0.23%  2.06 Fama & French (2006)
 6
 I BE/ME Two-Way Sort  
1963-2004 0.20% 1.23 Fama & French (2006)
 6
 I BE/ME Two-Way Sort  
1981-1995 -0.02 -0.31 Dichev (1999)
7
 III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1981-1995 -0.07 -1.04 Dichev (1999) III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1982-2002 0.20% 0.67 Schwert (2003) I β Time-Series 
Panel D: Finer adjustment for risk     
1966-1995 -1.50 4.6 Brennan, Chorid ia & Subrahmanyam (1998)8 III APT, Size, Momentum Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1989 -0.20 -4.41 He & Ng (1994)
9
 I APT, BE/ME Fama-MacBeth 
1
 The coefficient form Banz (1981) is multip lied by 1000; 
2 
These estimates are computed at annual frequently; 
3
 Kim (1997) ad justs for the error-in-variab les problem 
4
 These estimates from Asness, Proter & Stevens (2000) adjust for industry effects; 
5
 The estimates are only indicative; 
6
 Actually it ‟s the SMB; 7 The top estimate is for 
NYSE-AMEX firms, the bottom is for NASDAQ firms ; 
8 
APT is a five factor statistical model of Connor and Korajczyk (1988); 
9
 APT is a macroeconomic model of Chan, 
Roll & Ross (1986)  
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 However, Fama and French (1992) dismiss the argument that the CAPM can 
account for the size premium and show that it is independent of any premium 
associated with the market beta. They sort stocks into portfolios based on each firm‟s 
market equity and its CAPM slope. In a group of stocks with approximately equal 
betas, small firms continue to yield higher returns than large firms; a clear rejection of 
the static CAPM. According to Daniel and Titman (1997) this type of test is 
particularly effective in discerning between characteristics and factor loadings as 
predictors of returns.    
Evidence that a firm‟s size is correlated with its F/P ratio goes back to 
Reinganum (1981) and Basu (1983)
24
. Therefore, unavoidably, much of the high 
return to small firms reported in Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992, 1996b) can 
be imputed to the value premium. Consequently, Panel B in Table 3.1 presents results 
of some tests of the size effect after the influence of other anomalies are taken into 
account. The coefficient on the size variable in the cross-sectional test in Fama and 
French (1992) is reduced from 0.15 to 0.11 after BE/ME is included as a regressor. 
More importantly, the t-statistic falls from 2.58 to 1.99. However, multicollinearity 
may bias the cross-sectional coefficients, thus more weight should be placed on the 
two-way sorting test in Fama and French (2006). The size premium falls from 0.95% 
per month (reported in Asness et al. (2000a) to just 0.34% after adjustment for the 
book-to-market effect
25
. A similar pattern is found if the E/P is used as the value-
growth indicator (Asness et al., 2000a; Fama and French, 2006).    
The size premium may be period specific. As the second last panel in Table 3.1 
shows, Fama and French (2006) find that it has only been readily positive between 
1926 and 1963. In addition, Schwert (2003) and Dichev (1999) do show that the size 
effect has disappeared after its documentation by Banz (1981). Actually, in the overall 
80-year period studied by Fama and French (2006), the size premium is barely 
significant, statistically speaking. It should be noted, however, that their measure of 
the size effect in their study is very conservative and it is likely that a different test 
would yield a reliably positive premium.  
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 Although these authors focus on the relation between market equity and the E/P ratio, in a long 
sample, Fama and French (1992) show a strong positive relation between firm‟s book-to-market ratio 
and its size. 
25
It must be noted that the results of Fama and French (2006) are not directly comparable to the test in 
Asness et al. (2000), as the sample periods are different (1963–2004 vs 1963–1998) and the t-statistics 
in the table are only an indication. Importantly, data available from Ken French‟s website shows that 
markets in the US ware particularly unkind to small stocks between 1998 and 2004.  
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Table 3.2 
Anatomy of The Value Effect in the US 
Period Variable Mean   t  Reference Table  Correction Method 
Panel A: Univariate tests of the BE/ME effect    
1963-1990 BE/ME 0.50 5.71 Fama & French (1992) III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1969-1989 BE/ME 3.90 2.13 Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994)
1
 IV nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1981-1995 BE/ME 0.32 3.26 Dichev (1999)
9
 III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1981-1995 BE/ME 0.79 5.97 Dichev (1999)
9
 III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1940-1963 BE/ME 0.26 2.38 Davis (1994) II nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1964-1994 BE/ME 0.17 0.74 Lewellen (1999)
9
 III nothing Time-Series SUR 
1964-1994 BE/ME 0.27 3.38 Lewellen (1999)
9
 IV nothing Time-Series SUR 
1964-1994 BE/ME 1.02 3.52 Lewellen (1999)
9
 IV nothing Time-Series SUR 
1964-1994 BE/ME 0.51%  3.18 Asness (1997)
2
 II Industry One-Way Sort 
1963-1998 BE/ME 1.11%  6.71 Asness, Proter & Stevens (2000) III nothing One-Way Sort 
1963-1998 BE/ME 1.08%  8.80 Asness, Proter & Stevens (2000) III Industry One-Way Sort 
Panel B: Joints tests of the BE/ME effect     
1963-2004 BE/ME 0.55%  2.83 Fama & French (2006)
5,6
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1926-2004 BE/ME 0.40%  3.43 Fama & French (2006)
7
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1926-1963 BE/ME 0.35%  1.78 Fama & French (2006)
7
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1963-2004 BE/ME 0.44%  3.34 Fama & French (2006)
7
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1963-1997 BE/ME 0.68%  3.39 Asness (1997)
2,3,5,6
 I Momentum Two-Way Sort 
1966-1995 BE/ME 0.30 4.52 Brennan, Chordia & Subrahmanyam (1998) III Size, Momentum Fama-MacBeth 
1963-2004 BE/ME 0.54%  3.88 Fama & French (2006)
5
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1963-2004 BE/ME 0.25%  1.88 Fama & French (2006)
5
 I Size Two-Way Sort 
1963-1997 BE/ME 0.86%  3.97 Asness (1997)
2,5,14
 IV Momentum, Industry Two-Way Sort 
1963-1997 BE/ME 0.41%  2.02 Asness (1997)
2,5,15
 IV Momentum, Industry Two-Way Sort 
1963-1994 BE/ME 0.83%  5.02 Daniel & Titman (1999)
5,14
 I Size, Momentum Two-Way Sort 
1963-1994 BE/ME 0.32%  1.69 Daniel & Titman (1999)
5,15
 I Size, Momentum Two-Way Sort 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Panel C: Value effect after an adjustment for risk    
1926-1963 BE/ME 0.05%  0.31 Fama & French (2006) V β Time-Series 
1963-2004 BE/M E 0.57%  4.74 Fama & French (2006) V β Time-Series 
1982-2002 BE/M E -0.22%  0.67 Schwert (2003) I β Time-Series 
1963-1990 BE/M E 0.50 5.71 Fama & French (1992) III β Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1993 BE/M E 0.16 3.51 Kim (1997)4 IV β,Size Fama-MacBeth 
1966-1995 BE/M E 0.25 4.85 Brennan, Chordia & Subrahmanyam (1998)10 IV APT, Size, Momentum Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1989 BE/ME 0.27 3.70 He & Ng (1994)
11
 I APT, BE/ME Fama-MacBeth 
Panel D: Choosing the right value-growth indicators    
1963-1990 E/P 4.72 2.28 Fama & French (1992) III nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1969-1989 E/P 0.53 2.54 Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994)
1
 IV nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1994 E/P 4.35 2.31 Davis (1994) II nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1969-1989 C/P 0.36 4.24 Lakonishok, Shle ifer & Vishny (1994)
1
 IV nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1994 C/P 1.64 1.55 Davis (1994) II nothing Fama-MacBeth 
1969-1989 C/P 0.29 4.22 Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994)
1
 IV BE/ME, Size Fama-MacBeth 
1968-1989 BE/ME 0.01 0.57 Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1994)
1
 IV Size, CP Fama-MacBeth 
1940-1963 BE/ME -0.05 -0.35 Davis (1994) II CP, Sales Growth Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1990 BE/ME 0.33 4.46 Fama & French (1992) III Size, E/P Fama-MacBeth 
1963-1990 E/P -0.14 -0.90 Fama & French (1992) III BE/ME, Size Fama-MacBeth 
1
 At annual frequency ; 
2 
Value-weighted results; 
3 
Adjusted for industry effects ; 
4
 Kim (1997) adjusts for the error-in-variables problem ; 
5
 The estimates are only  indicat ive; 
6
 Fine Sort; 
7
 Coarse Sort; 
8 
The top estimate is for NYSE-AMEX firms, the bottom is for NASDAQ firms; 
9
 The First estimate is obtained when Industry portfolios are test 
assets, the second is obtained when size-sorted portfolios are test assets, the third estimate is obtained BE/ME-sorted portfolios are test assets; 
10
 APT is a five factor 
statistical model of Connor and Korajczyk (1988);  
11
 APT is a macroeconomic model of Chan, Roll & Ross (1983) ; 
12
 In s mall firms; 
13
 In large firms; 
14
 In low momentum 
stocks; 
15
 In high momentum stocks 
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Lastly, some authors argue that an APT model of Ross (1976) can explain the 
effect. For instance, Chen (1983) finds some evidence that a multifactor “statistical” 
APT can explain the size effect. In addition, Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) construct a 
“macroeconomic” APT model and claim that it can account for the return differential 
between small and large firms. The last panel in Table 3.1 shows how different, 
perhaps more sophisticated, methods for risk adjustment impact on the size premium. 
It can be unequivocally stated that the APT cannot explain the size effect, as the 
coefficients on size are reliably positive after the risk adjustment. Tests in Brennan et 
al. (1998) and He and Ng (1994) have power due to the use of long sample periods. 
Specifications in Chen (1983) and Chan et al. (1985) have less power to test whether 
the size effect persists after control for risk
26
.  
    
3.1.2 US Evidence of the Value Premium 
 
The anatomy of the value premium is presented in Table 3.2. The most popular 
value-growth indicator is the book-to-market ratio and thus most of the discussion of 
the premium will centre on that variable. It can be seen from Panel A that, taken on its 
own, the book-to-market effect is significant in both statistical and economic terms. 
For example, a cross-sectional regression of the book-to-market ratios onto realised 
returns yields a positive coefficient that is nearly six standard deviations from zero 
(Fama and French, 1992). In addition, a trading strategy based on the value effect can 
be enormously profitable. Asness et al. (2000a) show a long position in a portfolio of 
value stocks financed with a short position in a portfolio of growth stocks can yield a 
profit in excess of 1% per month. Also, the profitability of this strategy grows with the 
investment horizon and Lakonishok et al. (1994) show that after a five-year period, on 
average, value stocks outperform growth firms by nearly 100%. It must be noted, 
however, that use of value-weighted portfolios in univariate sorts decreases the 
magnitude of the premium (Asness, 1997).     
The value effect is robust to different methodologies. More specifically, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) capture the effect with annual regressions. This result is not 
vacuous, as the size effect vanishes in tests that use annual intervals. Lewellen (1999) 
                                                 
26
 These authors do not test if their factors can “price-out” size as an explanatory variable - a condition 
that is necessary for definitive test of a model (Cochrane, 2001; Jagannathan and Wang, 1998).       
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uses predictive regressions and finds evidence of the premium. In his regressions 
time-variation in portfolios‟ book-to-market ratio can significantly, statistically 
speaking, predict returns in nearly half of his test assets. It can be seen in Table 3.2 
that only returns of industry-sorted portfolios cannot be predicted with their book-to-
market ratios. Lastly, Loughran (1997) and Dichev (1999) show that the value effect 
is much stronger among the stocks listed on NASDAQ than the flagship NYSE and 
Amex
27
.  
Interestingly, it may be that Fama and French (1992) understate the 
pervasiveness of the value premium. Asness et al. (2000a) test for the value premium, 
but they measure a firm‟s book-to-market ratio relative to the firm‟s industry. An 
extract of their results appears in Table 3.2. The authors do not find a difference in the 
magnitude of the premia accruing to the traditional and the relative ratios. However, 
profits from a trading strategy that uses their industry-adjusted value-growth 
indicators are much less volatile. Actually, the t-statistic rises to 8.8 from 6.71 after 
they use a relative book-to-market ratio. Simply put, the industry-adjusted F/P ratios 
can predict returns with a larger degree of certainty.  
Recall that the firm‟s size and F/P ratios are correlated. Therefore, the 
magnitude of the value premium that is unrelated to the size effect needs to be 
established. Panel B in Table 3.2 shows some tests of the book-to-market  premium in 
conjunction with other characteristics that can predict returns. As expected, the value 
premium is greatly reduced after size effect is taken into account as it drops from 
approximately 1.1% per month to about 0.55% per month. However, unlike the size 
effect, the value premium continues to be reliably different from zero.  
Comparison of univariate and bivariate results in Assess (1997) indicates that a 
control for the momentum effect increases the magnitude of the value effect. To 
explain, this effect states that firms that fell in value over (say) 12 months continue to 
perform poorly for the following 12 months and vice versa. Note that Fama and 
French (1995) show that high BE/ME firms tend to perform poorly before being 
classified as such. Thus, in univariate sorts, a portfolio containing firms with a high 
book-to-market ratio should include many prior “losers” that yield poor returns ex 
ante. In short, the momentum effect acts against the value effect. Therefore, control 
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 These acronyms stand for, National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotations system, 
New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange, respectively  
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for the momentum with a two-way sort should increase the magnitude of the value 
premium. Actually, with a time-series test, Fama and French (1996a) do find that 
adjustment of the momentum effect with variables that capture value and size premia 
leads to an increase in the momentum premium. In sum, it can be said that the value 
effect is understated if a control for past returns is not performed.  
A deeper look into the interaction between the value effect and other anomalies 
reveals that the magnitude of the value premium is not the same among all types of 
stocks. Loughran (1997) criticised the results of Fama and French (1992) by noting 
that the value premium can only exist among small stocks that are listed on 
NASDAQ. Actually, he goes on to claim that the bulk of the value effect can be 
attributed to poor performance of newly listed growth firms. Put differently, he states 
that the value effect is actually a manifestation of the IPO effect of Ritter (1991). 
Thankfully, it can be seen in Table 3.2 that, according to the powerful test in Fama 
and French (2006), Loughran‟s (1997) claim is not entirety true. The value premium 
is twice as big among small stocks as larger stocks, but the effect is positive, albeit 
with weak statistical significance, among the large stocks. In addition, Fama and 
French (2006) do show that in their long sample period the value effect is reliably 
greater than zero. Actually, the value effect in large stocks was particularly strong 
before the NASDAQ exchange was opened.  
Also, the value premium is stronger among stocks with low medium-term past 
returns (Asness, 1997; Daniel and Titman, 1999). It appears that value firms with high 
past returns are good investments, but not that much better than “winning” growth 
firms. However, stocks with the low BE/ME and low past returns yield markedly 
higher returns than past “losers” with high BE/ME. The summary of results from 
Asness (1997) and Daniel and Titman (1999) are shown in Table 3.2 and it seems that 
the value premium is twice as large among “losers” than “winners”.  
Another important property of the value effect is that it persists after adjustment 
for risk with the CAPM or the APT. Panel C in Table 3.2 shows results of a small 
selection of tests that aim to explain the premium with one of these models. Fama and 
French (2006) and Schwert (2003) show that there are periods where CAPM appears 
to explain the value premium. However, between 1963 and 1982 (not shown in the 
table) the value premium has remained positive in spite of risk adjustment. Actually, 
Fama and French (2006) note that, after 1950, market betas of value stocks have been 
lower betas of growth firms. Nonetheless, Schwert (2003) shows that after the value 
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effect had been documented in the early 1980s, it may have vanished. His time-series 
tests are not sufficient however. Joint tests of the value premium and the CAPM in 
Fama and French (1992) and Kim (1997) show that the book-to-market ratio 
continues to predict returns after market beta is included in the cross-sectional 
regressions. Kim‟s (1997) test is particularly powerful as he adjusts for the bias 
resulting from imprecisely estimated market betas. More importantly, Fama and 
French (2006) show that even in the period when time-series tests support the CAPM, 
the book-to-market ratio is a better predictor of returns market betas. The APT fairs 
no better against the value premium. Both a “statistical” and a “macro economic” 
version of the model fail to “price-out” the book-to-market ratios. The tests in He and 
Ng (1994) and Brennan et al. (1998) have much power due to the long sample periods 
used in these studies.  
In addition, the value premium is reliably greater than zero if it is measured with 
F/P ratios other than the BE/ME. In particular, evidence in Panel D of Table 3.2 
shows that the E/P and the C/P ratios are also good predictors of returns. Actually, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that in their annual regressions the C/P and the E/P 
subsume the effect of the BE/ME. They also show that a univariate sort on C/P gives a 
wider spread in mean returns than a sort on the BE/ME alone. However, results of 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) may be specific to their methodology and sample. For 
example, Fama and French (1992) show that the earnings‟ yield cannot predict returns 
after the BE/ME ratio is included in the cross-sectional regressions, but the book-to-
market effect does persist after a control for the E/P ratio. Moreover, Kim (1997) 
finds that if more precise beta estimates are used, the earnings‟ yield effect can be 
explained with the CAPM. Evidence against the C/P ratio in favour of the BE/ME is 
less damning. Although, Asness et al. (2000a) use a univariate sort to show that a 
trading strategy that exploits the value premium is less profitable when measured with 
the cashflow yield instead of the book-to-market ratio, Hogan, Jarrow, Teo and 
Warachka (2004) find that profits from the C/P strategy are more certain. 
Nonetheless, although it may seem that the book-to-market ratio is a poorer predictor 
of returns than the C/P ratio, it has been vastly popular with researchers. 
Consequently, most of the literature review will treat the BE/ME as the “best” value-
growth indicator.  
There is a degree of disagreement of what the BE/ME ratio really measures. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) list many reasons for variations in book-to-market ratios 
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across firms. First, firms may operate with different amounts of intangible assets, 
which do not appear on the accounting statements, and the different book-to-market 
ratios can capture cross-sectional variations in intangibles. Second, most modern 
finance textbooks teach that a firm is a sum of its assets in place and unexercised 
growth opportunities. These options do not appear in the financial statements but are 
undoubtedly reflected in the share price. Therefore, a firm‟s book-to-market ratio can 
be an indicator of its growth prospects (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Third, all else 
equal, safer firms will have a higher price. As a result, the BE/ME ratio can be an 
effective proxy for risk (Ball, 1978; Berk, 1995). Fourth, Fama and French (1992) 
note that BE/ME can be understood as a measure of involuntary leverage, as it is a 
difference (if logs are used) between total leverage of the firm (debt-to-market equity) 
and debt levels chosen by the management (debt-to-book equity). Lastly, the BE/ME 
can be informative about mispricing. If a stock is overpriced, its observed book-to-
market ought to be small and vice versa. It is possible, however, that the ratio is of no 
consequence and the value, as well as size, effects are statistical illusions.  
 
3.1.3 Statistical Illusions  
 
 A considerable amount of time and money is channelled into unearthing 
profitable trading strategies. Also, financial researchers have an incentive to mine for 
results because the more interesting (and sometimes controversial) results are more 
likely to get published (Shleifer, 2000). It is inevitable that, by force of luck, a pattern 
in stock returns will be found that appears to have yielded easy profits (Black, 1993). 
In addition, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) note that a spurious anomaly is more likely to 
be found if research is continuously conducted on a particular dataset, and Cochrane 
(2001) humorously notes that there have been more regressions run using data from 
the leading US datasets like COMPUSTAT or CRSP than data points contained 
within them. It is thus possible that the size and value effects are just an instance of 
statistical illusion brought about by data mining or data-snooping.  
Berk (1995) notes that, by very construction, size and BE/ME should be able to 
forecast returns, as they can act as a proxy for expected returns. It is failure of the 
CAPM and APT to account for the effects that is puzzling. However, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990a) argue that if the size and value premia are a result of data-
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snooping, risk adjustment of this effect with a correctly specified asset pricing model 
will reject the model in favour of the anomalies.  
 At first, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) note that most adjustments for risk require 
grouping of securities into portfolios, where each security is sorted based on some 
discernable characteristic such as market capitalisation or the BE/ME ratio. 
Potentially, a subsequent correction for risk is done with a time-series test, where the 
intercepts are the pricing errors of the risk model. If the relationship between the 
characteristic used in the sort and returns is spurious, then, invariably, the correct 
asset-pricing model will yield these non-zero alphas.  
Unfortunately, Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) give little guidance regarding what 
role their data-snooping plays in the size and value effects. Conrad, Cooper and Kaul 
(2002) directly aim to ascertain the magnitude of the data-snooping bias for various 
asset pricing anomalies. Although they focus on a broader set of puzzles, their results 
are relevant for the size and value strategies. To test the impact of data-snooping, 
Conrad et al. (2002) simulate a history of returns and a set of random characteristics is 
assigned to each firm. By construction, these attributes have no relation to returns. 
Subsequently, with a simple portfolio sorts, they calculate what kind of mean return 
would be observed ex post, if researchers were to sieve through the data in order to 
identify a number of profitable strategies. Subsequently, they compute the return on 
the 15 most profitable strategies that were “mined” out of the data. Since Conrad et al. 
(2002) attach their simulated data to actual firms between 1965 and 1995, they can 
compare profitability of their data-mined strategies with the magnitude of actual 
anomalies observed during that time. The real anomalies the authors consider are 15 
strategies that use a combination of momentum, value and size effects. In sum, their 
results point out that about 50% of documented anomalous return from the various 
effects is a result of data-snooping. The magnitude of the bias is related to how finely 
the stocks are divided into portfolios and the correlation between variables that are 
used in two-way portfolio sorts.  
There is another statistical shenanigan that is likely to increase the magnitude of 
the size and the value premia. Banz and Breen (1986) are among the first to note that 
survival bias may be behind the value anomaly. They note that the leading provider of 
accounting data in the US, COMPUSTAT, does not include firms that delisted before 
the research was undertaken. The authors argue that the omission of these firms from 
the sample may bias results. To test if survival plays a role, they obtain a dataset that 
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is free of this bias. Next they compare the returns from portfolios formed from a 
complete database with the portfolios obtained from COMPUSTAT. In a formal 
statistical test, the return between these two portfolios is different at a one percent 
level. In their relatively short sample period, they show that the value effect (as 
measured by E/P) is completely explained by the survival bias.   
Kothari et al. (1995) study another instance of survival bias within the 
COMPUSTAT database. They note that, at a certain point in the past, the data 
provider underwent a major restructuring when it chose to widen its coverage of 
firms. As a result, five years of accounting data from (mostly large) companies that 
were listed at the time were added. Since a high BE/ME ratio may signal financial 
distress (Fama and French. 1995; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002), firms that had low 
book-to-market ratios in the five years prior to expansion, and were added to the data-
base, are likely to have been “turned around” and thus yielded high returns. On the 
other hand, many other firms that had a high BE/ME ratio during that time may have 
been delisted due to bankruptcy and never made it to the database. In sum, 
COMPUSTAT unintentionally biased the sample in favour of finding the value 
premium, as it may have included only high book-to-market firms that yield high 
returns. Similarly to Banz and Breen (1986), Kothari et al. (1995) quantify the 
magnitude of the survival bias by calculating returns on firms that are excluded from 
COMPUSTAT and comparing them to the ones in the database. In accordance with 
the bias, firms that are absent from COMPUSTAT yield much smaller returns than the 
surviving firms. They fail, however, to establish a concrete link between these low 
returns and the value effect (Fama and French (1996b)).  
How important are these statistical illusions to the size and the value effects? 
Survival bias per se seems to have only a trivial effect on the observed value 
premium. Since Banz and Breen (1986) published their results much of the 
subsequent research used a database that is free of the bias they study. More 
importantly, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) study the effect of the sample 
selection that arises from the COMPUSTAT expansion. They show that only a tiny 
portion (3.1%) of accounting data missing from the provider‟s database can be 
attributed to survival. Also, they directly measured the impact of the bias on the value 
effect. In particular, for a subset of the market, they hand-collected much of the 
accounting data that was missing from COMPUSTAT and found that the magnitude 
of premium associated with the book-to-market ratio is virtually unchanged after the 
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correction. Also, Barber and Lyon (1997b) provide further evidence against the 
survival bias story of Kothari et al. (1995). Chan et al. (1995) show that the alleged 
bias is more common among financial firms, as more of them seem to be missing 
from the COMPUSTAT database. However, Barber and Lyon (1997b) find no 
difference in returns of size-sorted and BE/ME-sorted portfolios constructed from 
financial and non-financial firms. Finally, Kim (1997) and Fama and French (2006) 
use data that is free of the survivor bias, as all data points missing from 
COMPUSTAT were filled with hand-collected information. Both studies find a 
reliably positive value premium.  
In order to refute the data-snooping explanation for the premia, similar tests to 
that of Fama and French (1992) need to be replicated in fresh data samples. For 
example, Barber and Lyon (1997b) estimate the magnitude of the size and value 
effects in a sub-sample of financial companies. Since many of the studies of size and 
value premia are conducted on non-financial firms, their sample has not been 
examined before. Contrary to the data-snooping hypothesis, they do not find any 
difference in magnitudes of the size and the value effects between financial and non-
financial firms. In addition, Fama and French (2006) conduct a powerful test, as they 
examine the anomalies at hand for nearly an 80-year period. In Table 3.2 it can be 
seen that their estimate of the value premium is virtually the same regardless of the 
sample period. Also, Table 3.2 summarises the results of Davis (1994), who used a 
wider range of F/P ratios to define what constitutes a growth or value firm. In his, also 
previously unexamined, data set he finds reliable evidence of the value premium.   
In sum, there is no denying that the data-snooping bias plays a role in the 
financial research (Black, 1993) and survival bias can manifest itself as a spurious 
anomaly (Banz and Breen, 1986). However, it has been shown that the size and value 
premium retain their magnitude across different samples drawn from US financial 
markets. A natural extension would be to examine the existence of the anomalies at 
hand in markets outside the United States.           
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3.1.4 Evidence from the Rest of the World.  
 
It is necessary to examine the magnitude and the persistence of the size and the 
value premia in international markets, as it is possible that these effects are sample 
specific to US financial markets. A study of the anomalies at hand in international 
markets is difficult however. In general, samples are much smaller. Total number of 
stocks listed in most countries constitutes only a fraction of firms listed in the US. 
Also, many international equity markets have not been active for as long as the ones 
in the US and some emerging economies modernised their financial systems only in 
the recent past. In addition, much of the listed equity does not trade frequently. The 
non-synchronous trading is a problem in financial research as it biases computed 
returns and leads to mismeasurement of risk parameters such as variances and market 
betas. Thus, it can be said that tests for the size and the value effects in international 
markets may lack power. A notable exception is the equity market in Japan. 
There have been many tests of the size effect in markets other that the US. For 
example, a comprehensive study of the premium in the Japanese stock market appears 
in Chan et al. (1991). Heston, Rouwenhorst, and Wessels (1999) test for the premium 
in many industrialised European markets, while Chen and Zhang (1998) study 
markets in South-East Asia. Rouwenhorst (1999) conducts his tests in the emerging 
markets. This list of studies is by no means exhaustive. An extract of results from 
some of these studies can be seen in Table 3.3: from 13 developed equity markets, in 
11 of them size effect is positive, but in only four countries is it statistically larger 
than zero. Although it may seem that the evidence for the size effect is weak, the 
premium is reliably positive in Japan and the UK, the two countries with the largest 
capitalisation of listed stocks after the US. These three largest markets account for 
nearly 60% of world equity. In addition, although it is not explicitly shown in the 
table, in the UK market, the size effect persists after control of the book-to-market 
ratio (Leledakis and Davidson, 2001). Nonetheless, Fama and French (2006) show 
that, after adjusting for the value premium, the size effect is relatively weak in the 
developed world, as it is, statistically speaking, barely different from zero. 
Rouwenhorst (1999), among others, studies the returns to small firms in emerging 
economies and he finds much stronger evidence of the size premium.  
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Table 3.3 
The Size Effect around the World 
Country Period 
Size  
effect t Reference Table  Correction 
Panel A: The size effect in the developed world 
Australia 1985-1996 0.49% 1.06 Liew and Vassalou (2000) III BE/ME 
Belgium 1980-1995 -0.10% -0.63 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Canada 1981-1995 0.57%  2.78 Griffin (2002) I BE/ME 
France 1980-1995 0.26% 1.63 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Germany 1980-1995 0.11% 0.92 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Hong Kong 1981-1993 0.38% 0.58 Chan & Zhang (1998) III BE/ME 
Italy 1980-1995 -0.02% -0.11 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Japan 1981-1995 0.64%  1.99 Griffin (2002) I BE/ME 
Netherlands 1980-1995 0.29% 1.47 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Spain 1980-1995 0.75%  2.27 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Sweden 1980-1995 0.34% 1.35 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Switzerland 1980-1995 0.14% 0.91 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
UK 1980-1995 0.39%  2.56 Heston, Rouwenhorst & Wessels (1999) VI nothing 
Joint
1
 1975-2004 0.19% 1.49 Fama & French (2006) IV BE/ME 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
Panel B: The size effect in the developing world  
Argentina 1982-1997 3.84%  2.54 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Brazil 1982-1997 1.76% 1.33 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Chile 1982-1997 0.31% 0.61 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Colombia 1986-1997 -0.68% -0.79 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Greece 1982-1997 0.04% 0.07 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Indonesia 1990-1997 -0.46% -0.80 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
India 1982-1997 -0.35% -0.89 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Jordan 1982-1997 -0.34% -0.79 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Korea 1982-1997 0.32% 0.51 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Malaysia 1977-1993 0.58%  2.11 Chan & Zhang (1998) IV BE/ME 
Mexico 1982-1997 2.39%  2.17 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Nigeria 1986-1997 -0.59% -0.62 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Pakistan 1987-1997 -4.20% -0.75 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Philippines 1987-1997 0.23% 0.29 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Portugal 1989-1997 -0.74% -1.61 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Taiwan 1986-1997 -0.24% -0.72 Chan & Zhang (1998) V BE/ME 
Thailand 1982-1997 0.37% 1.14 Chan & Zhang (1998) VI BE/ME 
Turkey 1989-1997 0.72% 0.59 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Venezuela 1986-1997 1.37% 1.41 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Zimbabwe 1982-1997 1.85%  1.95 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Joint 1982-1997 0.69%  2.88 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
1
 The test in Fama and French (2006) uses a longer sample and includes Singapore  
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Table 3.4  
The Value Effect around the World 
Country Period Value Effect  t  Art Table  Correction 
Panel A: The value effect in the developing world 
Australia 1975-1995 1.03% 2.41 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Belgium 1975-1995 0.37%  1.99 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Canada 1975-1995 0.42%  2.18 Griffin (2002) I Size 
France 1975-1995 0.62%  2.08 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Germany 1975-1995 0.23% 0.92 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Hong Kong 1975-1995 0.60% 1.35 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Italy 1975-1995 -0.50% -0.91 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Japan 1975-1995 0.82%  3.49 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Netherlands 1975-1995 0.19% 0.44 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Singapore 1975-1995 0.81%  2.36 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Sweden 1975-1995 0.67% 1.16 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Switzerland 1975-1995 0.29% 0.80 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
UK 1975-1995 0.39% 1.08 Fama & French (1998) III nothing 
Joint
**
 1975-2004 0.53%  2.63 Fama & French (2006) IV Size 
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Table 3.4 (continued) 
Panel B: The value effects in the developing world  
Argentina 1982-1997 1.68% 1.08 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Brazil 1982-1997 3.94%  2.34 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Chile 1982-1997 1.07%  1.74 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Colombia 1986-1997 -0.36% 0.40 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Greece 1982-1997 1.31%  1.68 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Indonesia 1990-1997 1.11% 1.57 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
India 1982-1997 0.50% 0.08 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Jordan 1982-1997 0.06% 0.15 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Korea 1982-1997 1.58%  3.99 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Malaysia 1982-1997 1.02%  2.37 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Mexico 1982-1997 1.39% 1.17 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Nigeria 1986-1997 0.25% 0.19 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Pakistan 1987-1997 -0.05% -0.08 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Philippines 1987-1997 0.51% 0.77 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Portugal 1989-1997 -0.60% -0.93 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Taiwan 1986-1997 1.01% 0.34 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Thailand 1982-1997 -0.31% -0.85 Chan & Zhang (1998) VI Size 
Turkey 1989-1997 2.86% 1.60 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Venezuela 1986-1997 1.27% 0.93 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Zimbabwe 1982-1997 2.31%  1.86 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
Joint 1982-1997 0.72%  3.35 Rouwenhorst (1999) II nothing 
**
 The test in Fama and French (2006) uses a longer sample and includes Spain  
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In his joint test of 20 markets he finds the size effect to be 0.69% per month and it is 
reliably different from zero. He does not, however, adjust for the value effect; thus his 
test may lack power.    
Evidence for the value effect in international markets is common. Chan et al. 
(1991) were among the first to present convincing evidence of the effect outside of the 
US. Fama and French (1998) study the value premium in many international markets. 
Rouwenhorst (1999) focuses on the emerging world, but he omits the economies of 
Eastern Europe. Lyn and Zychowicz (2004) fill this gap. Table 3.4 shows some of the 
evidence on the value effect in markets outside of the US. It can be seen that the 
premium is positive in all but one (Italy) industrialised country and it is statistically 
significant in six of them. Actually, the value premium in Australia, Japan and 
Singapore is greater than in the US. Fama and French (2006) jointly test for the value 
premium across the 14 markets, but they explicitly adjust for the size effect. 
Predictably, they reject the null hypothesis that the premium is zero. A similar pattern 
emerges from analysis of the emerging markets. Although Rouwenhorst (1999) 
reports that the value effect is significant, statistically speaking, only in 6 out of 21 
countries does the joint test of the premium spanning these markets reveal that it is 
significant in both economic and statistical terms. Actually, value investing appears to 
be more profitable in the emerging markets than in the developed world. In addition, 
Lyn and Zychowicz (2004) find that the firm‟s BE/ME ratio can predict its ex ante 
return in the very young equity markets of Eastern Europe. In sum, the value premium 
is pervasive internationally, thus its existence cannot be imputed to data-mining.  
Lastly, research on the size and the value effects conducted with South African 
data is shown. Although early studies of the subject date back to De Villiers, 
Lowlings, Pettit and Affleck-Graves (1986) and Plaistowe and Knight (1986), the 
focus here is on more recent results. Liquidity of the JSE has been poor prior to 1995, 
and thus the power of early tests is low. Table 3.5 reports some estimates of the size 
and the value premia on the JSE. In all cases univariate and bivariate sorting 
procedures are used to quantify theses effects. The documented magnitude of the size 
and the value effects are exceedingly large. For example, van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003) find the size premium to be 2.34% per month after they control for 
the value effect. It is nearly seven times larger than the size effect in the US reported 
by Fama and French (2006). Similarly, van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) estimate 
the E/P effect to be 3.24% per month after controlling for size. It is six times larger 
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than in the US. Curiously estimates in van Rensburg (2001) and Fraser and Page 
(2000) are smaller, but the bulk of their sample period falls within the “illiquid era” of 
the JSE. Consequently, it may seem necessary to repeat the study of the size and value 
effects is South Africa in a period of higher liquidity. 
 
 
Table 3.5 
The Size and the Value Effect in South Africa 
Panel A: The size effect in South African market      
Size 
1983-
1999 1.12% 3.88 van Rensburg (2001) II nothing 
Size 
1990-
2001 2.50% 4.05 van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) III nothing 
Size 
1990-
2001 2.34% 2.50 van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) III BE/ME 
Panel B: The value effect in South African market      
BE/ME 
1973-
1997 0.63% 
 
3.49  Fraser & Page (2000) II nothing 
P/E 
1990-
2001 3.33% 
 
7.38  van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) III nothing 
BE/ME 
1973-
1997 0.59% 
 
1.72  Fraser & Page (2000) II momentum 
P/E 
1990-
2001 3.24% 
 
2.31  van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) IV size 
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3.2 Market Frictions   
 
A strong assumption behind the efficient market hypothesis and the CAPM is 
that financial markets are perfect. In other words, trading in financial securities is 
costless, untaxed and investors can effortlessly, as well as instantaneously, obtain and 
process information. These assumptions are undoubtedly violated in practice. Thus, it 
is plausible that the size and the value effects vanish after costs associated with 
investing are taken into account, and thus are not anomalous at all.   
Markets can be imperfect in a number of ways. Direct costs of trading are often 
ignored in asset pricing studies, but they may be vastly important (Stoll and Whaley, 
1983; Alexander, 2000). According to Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the ease with 
which a share can be sold is a source of risk that is not captured by the static CAPM, 
and a proxy that captures assets‟ liquidity should reliably predict returns. Merton 
(1987) adds to this point. He notes that gathering and interpreting information is 
costly and since these search costs are not uniformly distributed in the cross-section of 
firms, a parameter that measures firms‟ recognition among investors should predict 
returns. Interestingly, Hou and Moskowitz (2005) show that the information cost 
hypothesis of Merton (1987) is separate to Amihud and Mendelson‟s (1986) 
illiquidity story, as these two market imperfections affect returns independently of one 
another. Consequently, in this section it is shown how recognition of transaction 
costs, information costs and illiquidity risk in asset pricing augments the 
understanding of the size premium. A brief discussion of the impact of market 
microstructure effects on the value premium is left to the end.  
 
3.2.1 Direct and Indirect Costs of Trading 
 
In efficient markets, mispricing can persist if its exploitation is not profitable 
after trading expenses are taken into account (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Stoll and 
Whaley (1983) are among the first to show that direct trading costs, measured by the 
bid-ask spread and the commission charged by brokers, are negatively related to 
market capitalisation.  
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With a wider array of instruments for transaction costs and a longer sample 
period, Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) show that trading in shares of small 
firms may be 17 times more expensive than those of large firms. Consequently, Stoll 
and Whaley (1983) calculate the magnitude of the size effect after trading costs are 
taken into account. Since calculation of net investment profits requires ex ante 
knowledge of investors‟ holding period, the authors compute the profitability of the 
size strategy for a number of investment horizons. The authors find that, if the 
strategy is implemented for two months or less, the sign of the premium reverses after 
the adjustment for costs and market risk.  
Nonetheless, direct trading costs cannot explain the size effect. Stoll and Whaley 
(1983) show that the long-term risk-adjusted out-performance of small firms 
continues to persist, but its significance, in both statistical and economic terms, is 
attenuated. In fact, using a large sample, Schultz (1983) shows that implementation of 
the size strategy for long investment horizons is much more profitable than shown in 
Stoll and Whaley (1983). In addition, Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that the actual 
costs of trading are about half
28
 of the quoted spread and commission measure used in 
Stoll and Whaley (1983). 
However, an investor can face a number of indirect trading costs. A large order 
placed on an infrequently traded stock may take time to implement. Also, the act of 
trading itself may move the price and this buying pressure diminishes the profitability 
of the trade (Ali, Hwang and Trombley, 2003). These indirect effects, along with 
direct trading costs, are often referred to as illiquidity
29
 and pose a genuine risk to an 
investor. Consequently, an asset‟s liquidity should help to predict its expected return 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
 
                                                 
28
 Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) note that adding the bid-ask–spread and broker‟s commission 
overestimates the magnitude trading expenses, as many trades occur inside the spread.  
29
 The concept of liquidity is not lucid. It can be broadly defined as “the ability to trade large quantities 
(of stock) quickly, at low cost and without moving the price” (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003, p644). In 
addition, illiquidity is not directly observable. A robust adjustment for some of the market 
microstructure mechanisms that preclude free trading requires a rich dataset that is unavailable for a 
wide range of assets for a lengthy period of time. Nonetheless, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) 
examine the ability of trading costs and illiquidity to forecast future returns. To their credit, they 
construct highly precise measures of illiquidity over a relatively long (8 year) sample period. They find 
that it can predict future returns, or, more precisely, they conclude firm idiosyncratic illiquidity is 
priced. Thus, the risks associated with the stock‟s ease of trade can, in principal, help to explain size 
and value effect. 
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Table 3.6 
Market Microstructure and the Size and the Value Effects in the US 
Period Effect Coefficient t Reference Table  Measure Control Method Freq 
Panel A: Size Effect Examined Jointly with Trading Costs  
1960-
1979 
Size 0.01 7.70 Stoll & Whaley (1983)
1
 VI Bid-Ask Spread, Broker 
Commission 
β One-Way Sort monthly 
1961-
1980 
Size 0.00 -1.12 Amihud & Mendelson (1989) II Bid-Ask spread β & Residual 
Variance 
GLS annual 
1963-
1991 
Size -0.07 -7.60 Datar, Naik & Radcliffe (1998) II Turnover Nothing Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1963-
1991 
Size -0.05 -4.50 Datar, Naik & Radcliffe (1998) II Turnover β, BE/ME Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1966-
1995 
Size 0.64 1.08 Brennan, Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) 
V Price, Turnover BE/M E, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1966-
1995 
Size 0.12 2.58 Brennan, Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) 
V Price, Turnover Risk
2
, BE/ME, D/P 
& Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1964-
1997 
Size -0.13 -3.50 Amihud (2002) II |Return| scaled by |T. 
Volume| 
β, D/P, Residual 
Variance & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
annual 
1964-  
1999 
Size -0.091 -1.18 Acharya & Pedersen (2005) VI I Aggregate liquidity 
 
  
β, BE/M E Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly  
1966-
2001 
Size 0.21 2.87 Hou & Moskowitz (2005)3 III Delay, T.Volume, 
σ(T.Volume) Zero 
Return, Price 
BE/M E, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1976-
1997 
Size 4.43 2.98 Ali, Hwang & Trombley 
(2003) 
IV Price, Turnover, Zero 
Return, Analysts' 
Coverage 
β, BE/ME, 
Residual Variance 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1981-
2001 
Size 0.17 1.58 Hou & Moskowitz (2005) 3 III Delay, T.Volume, 
σ(T.Volume),  Zero 
Return, Price, Analysts' 
Coverage, % Inst. 
Ownership 
BE/M E, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
Panel B: BE/ME Effect Examined Jointly with Trading Costs  
1963-
1991 
BE/ME 0.220  10.42 Datar, Naik & Radcliffe (1998) II T. Volume Nothing Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1963-
1991 
BE/ME 0.140  5.92 Datar, Naik & Radcliffe (1998) II T. Volume β, Size Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1966-
1995 
BE/M E 0.235  4.83 Brennan, Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) 
V Price, T. Volume Size, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1966-
1995 
BE/ME 0.181  3.74 Brennan, Chordia & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) 
V Price, T. Volume Risk
2
, Size, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1966-
2001 
BE/ME 0.002  3.93 Hou & Moskowitz (2005) III Delay, T.Volume, 
σ(T.Volume) Zero Return, 
Price 
Size, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1964-  
1999 
BE/M E 0.250   2.91 Acharya & Pedersen (2005) VII Aggregate liquidity 
 
  
β, Size Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly  
1976-
1997 
BE/M E 0.078  2.80 Ali, Hwang & Trombley 
(2003) 
IV Price, T. Volume, Zero 
Return, Analysts' Coverage 
β, Size, Residual 
Variance 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1981-
2001 
BE/M E 0.002  3.16 Hou & Moskowitz (2005) III Delay, T.Volume, 
σ(T.Volume),  Zero Return, 
Price, Analysts' Coverage, 
% Inst. Ownership 
Size, D/P & 
Momentum 
Fama-
MacBeth 
monthly 
1 These estimates are only indicative 
2 
APT is a macroeconomic model of Chan, Roll & Ross (1983) 
3
 The estimate is calcu lated by a 1000, for clarity   
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Studies of the size and the value premia employ long sample periods, thus data 
is often not available to precisely measure liquidity. As a result, many researchers 
proxy illiquidity with other easily accessible variables. For example, the bid-ask 
spread, at annual frequency, is used by Amihud and Mendelson (1989) to substitute 
for illiquidity. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) show that the share price is related to the 
bid-ask spread and broker‟s commission, thus it is often used to proxy for these costs. 
Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) use trading volume scaled by shares in issue 
(turnover) as a measure of illiquidity, while Lesmond et al. (1999) use the instance of 
zero return as a good proxy for direct and indirect costs of trading. Lastly, Amihud 
(2002) proposes a measure of illiquidity given by a daily return scaled by daily 
trading volume. Actually, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) argue that Amihud‟s (2002) 
measure is a best proxy for the actual direct and indirect costs of trading.  
Table 3.6 summarises a number of studies that jointly study the size effect and 
liquidity. The results are mixed. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) show 
that size effect disappears after the bid-ask spread is taken into account. Brennan et al. 
(1998) show that after adjustment for the BE/ME and momentum effects, the 
additional control for illiquidity actually reverses the size effect. An adjustment for 
risk with a five-factor statistical APT strengthens their finding. However, share price 
and the measure of illiquidity is highly correlated with market capitalisation, thus it is 
possible that the coefficient on size in the cross-sectional regressions is biased, as 
some of the explanatory power of market capitalisation is captured by the share price. 
Nonetheless, since Amihud‟s (2002) measure has been shown to be a very good proxy 
for illiquidity, his result, that size effect persists after illiquidity is taken into account, 
is probably most accurate.  
 
3.2.2 Illiquidity as a Priced Factor 
 
Up to now the discussion has focused on an asset-specific measure of liquidity. 
However, inter alia Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) argue that aggregate market liquidity ought to be a state variable that 
is included in a multifactor asset pricing model. Amihud (2002) documents significant 
time-variability in his measure of aggregate liquidity. He argues that it should be 
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related to average share returns
30
; a fact he confirms empirically. Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) extend his point and show that there are three distinct risks (factors) 
that stem from time-variability in liquidity. The first source of risk they explore, 
referred to as commonality in liquidity, is captured by the co-variance of the asset‟s 
idiosyncratic liquidity and market liquidity
31
. The second source of risk is the co-
variance of the asset‟s return and market liquidity32 . The third source of risk is 
captured by the co-variance of the asset‟s idiosyncratic liquidity with market return33.  
The empirical analysis of aggregate illiquidity risk unveils a strong relation 
between firm size and the three liquidity risks. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and 
Amihud (2002) show that returns on small stocks exhibit a larger correlation with 
aggregate liquidity than large firms. Their findings imply that when investors expect a 
fall in the ease of trading they discount small stocks the most. Amihud (2002) also 
documents a phenomenon, dubbed “flight to liquidity”, where small stocks are sold in 
favour of larger stocks during declines in market liquidity. Formally, Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) run a cross-sectional asset pricing test where the relevant factor 
encapsulates the three types of liquidity risks and the market risk. They find that this 
“modified beta” can explain 90% of cross-sectional variations in 25 size-sorted 
portfolios. More importantly, evidence in Table 3.6 shows that market equity loses its 
explanatory power after their factor is used to adjust for market and liquidity risks.  
 
3.2.3 Some stocks are just more popular than others 
 
Investing requires the ability to obtain and process a large amount of 
information. The cost of data acquisition and analysis may be large and deviations 
from market efficiency, such as the size and the value effects, may not be profitable 
after these search costs are taken into account (Merton, 1987; Grossman and Stiglitz, 
                                                 
30
 He notes that investors would bid prices down if they expect to increase costs associated with trading 
because the increase in overall illiquidity must be compensated with higher market-wide returns. 
31
 It would seem intuitive that stock that becomes easier to trade when market as a whole becomes 
more illiquid would be particularly valuable and would yield low returns. 
32
 Investors, all else equal, dislike when aggregate illiquidity increases. Thus they would particularly 
eschew stocks that yield poor returns when stocks on aggregate are more difficult to trade. In effect, 
relation between expected returns covariance of idiosyncratic return with market liquidity ought to be 
positive.? 
33
 Stocks with high covariance of this type should be associated with high return. Investors would 
dislike stocks that lose in liquidity when market is falling. 
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1980). Put differently, investing in firms with (using Merton‟s (1987) terminology) 
low investor recognition is risky and acquiring the necessary information is costly. 
Thus, in order to buy these neglected firms, investors need to be compensated with 
higher expected returns.  
As with illiquidity, a stock‟s investor recognition is difficult to measure and a 
number of proxies that capture this attribute have been devised. For instance, Ali et al. 
(2003) argue that breadth of ownership is a good proxy for investor recognition. 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) argue that the degree of coverage by investment analysts 
of a particular stock is a good proxy for the speed with which the market assimilates 
relevant information. An ingenious measure of a stock‟s recognition is devised by 
Hou and Moskowitz (2005). They devise a measure of speed with which information 
is impounded into a share. They call it delay. Subsequently, they show that their 
measure is highly related to a wide range of proxies for attention a particular share 
receives
34
, in that a regression of the delay measure onto a set of variables that 
measure a stock‟s investor recognition yields an R2 of 0.7.        
A priori, the amount of investor recognition a firm attracts should be related to 
its size. According to Hong et al. (2000), investing in a particular share may involve 
fixed costs associated with the initial information search. Investors would then aim to 
learn only about stocks that do not preclude large investments. In addition, 
institutional investors seem to eschew small capitalisation stocks (Falkenstein, 1996).  
In fact, Hou and Moskowitz (2005) show that a firm‟s measure of delay contains 
much of the same information about expected returns as its size. In particular, they 
show that residuals from a regression of market capitalisation onto the delay measure 
have no incremental power to predict returns
35
. Thus, the size effect seems to be 
subsumed by the delay measure - a proxy for risks that stem from poor level of 
investor recognition.    
It can be seen from Panel A of Table 3.6 that Ali et al. (2003) and Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005) perform a joint test of the ability of idiosyncratic measures of 
liquidity and investor recognition on the size effect. In sum, both of these studies 
show that an adjustment for these market imperfections unmakes the size premium. 
                                                 
34
 They use a comprehensive set of proxies: institutional ownership, number of analysts that follow the 
stock, number of shareholders, number of employees, advertising expenditure, difficulty of travel to 
company headquarters.   
35
 ? 
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Actually, both studies point toward a reversal of the effect. However, both of these 
studies control for price, which is highly co-linear with market capitalisation, thus 
there may be a bias on the computed coefficients on the size variable. Nonetheless, 
evidence presented above supports the view that the size effect is a result of market 
imperfections.  
 
So far the value effect has been unexplored. A summary of results from various 
studies that jointly test the anomaly with various measures of market frictions is 
shown in Panel B of Table 3.6. A significant component, both in the economic and 
statistical sense, of the value premium, is independent of risks associated with 
liquidity or investor recognition. The book-to-market effect survives the stringent 
control in Hou and Moskowitz (2005). They do note, however, that some of the value 
premium can be explained by their delay measure. Also, when Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) use their illiquidity model to price the 25 size and BE/ME sorted portfolios, the 
R
2
 of the cross-sectional test is 0.56, which is higher than the 0.26 obtained from a test 
with the static CAPM. However, in Table 3.6, the book-to-market ratio continues to 
reliably predict returns after control with their model.  
In sum, it appears that the size effect is a result of market frictions. It attenuates 
after trading costs are taken into account. Small firms are illiquid and load positively 
onto the liquidity factor. In addition, they tend to be neglected by investors. As a 
result, the high return to small stocks is a compensation for risk. On the other hand, 
after taking various market frictions into account, the value premium remains robust. 
As a result, much theoretical and empirical work in finance aims to explain this 
anomaly. Some believe that the F/P ratios are proxies for risk factors that are omitted 
from the static CAPM (Berk, 1995), while others argue that it is caused by irrational 
investor behaviour (Lakonishok et al., 1994). The remainder of the literature review 
joins this debate. 
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3.3 Irrationality  
 
Few would argue that market efficiency in the sense of Fama (1970) is the 
correct view of the financial markets. In Chapter 2, compelling evidence has been 
presented which illustrates that shares can be grossly mis-valued by the market. In 
addition, the contention of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), that arbitrage is risky, and 
consequently limited, is widely embraced as it is derived without too lavish 
assumptions of investor irrationality. However, the unequivocal link of behavioural 
finance with the size and the value premia is a subject of fierce debate. This section 
presents empirical evidence that the anomalies, and especially the value effect, are an 
outcome of investor irrationality.  
 
3.3.1 Limited Arbitrage and the Value Effect 
 
According to the limited arbitrage argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
prices are kept away from fundamentals because arbitrage is risky as it exposes the 
arbitrageur to noise and fundamental risk (Lamont and Thaler, 2003a). Thus, stocks 
that are difficult to value or those that are popular among noise traders would be most 
likely to be mispriced (Daniel and Titman, 1999)
36
. Consequently, Ali et al. (2003) 
argue that if the value effect stems from irrational behaviour, it should be the strongest 
among firms that are most risky to arbitrage. With firm specific noise as a proxy for 
risks associated with arbitrage, they find that the book-to-market effect is consistent 
with the mispricing theory. Particularly, in their cross-sectional regressions, the ability 
of book-to-market to predict returns increases with a firm‟s level of arbitrage risk.  
In addition, the theory of limited arbitrage implies that mispricing is most likely 
to persist in cases where it is difficult to communicate convincingly (Brav, et al. 
2004): surely, someone would know of the mispricing and would try to exploit it. 
Firm insiders, for example, would have private information regarding the firm and 
could estimate mispricing with less noise. Actually, Bem-David and Roulstone (2005) 
                                                 
36
 For example, Bem-David and Roulstone (2005) find that firms use mispricing to their lower cost of 
capital.? In particular, they show that there is a positive relationship between the firm‟s level of 
arbitrage risk and the magnitude of the price drift after a share repurchase. 
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show that insiders who buy shares when the firm specific noise is at its highest (thus 
when arbitrage is most limited) earn the highest return. Consequently, for the 
behavioural story to explain the value effect, insiders would buy more stock of 
(undervalued) value firms and less stock of (overvalued) growth firms. This is exactly 
what Rozeff and Zaman (1998) observe. They document a positive, near-monotonic 
relationship between a firm‟s book-to-market (or cashflow yield) and net purchases by 
insiders, whose trading does not eliminate mispricing because their access to capital is 
limited and the law prohibits them from using their private information to raise more 
funds.  
 
3.3.2 The error-in-expectations Hypothesis 
 
Arguably, no behavioural theory explicitly talks of the value premium. Instead, 
behaviourists believe it to be a natural consequence of investor overreaction in the 
sense of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). For example, a portfolio of value firms may 
contain many stocks that are erroneously expected to be less profitable than the 
market and once people learn of their error, they correct mispricing by bidding up 
prices. In general, the value effect is a consequence of market‟s systematic error in 
appraising future profitability of some assets; Lakonishok et al. (1994) call it error-in-
expectations hypothesis. Bias in expectation can be a consequence of either the 
representativeness heuristic (Barberis et al. 1998) or overconfidence on the part of 
investors (Daniel et al. 1998). To its credit, the theory puts forward a number of 
rejectable hypotheses. Specifically, according to Lakonishok, et al. (1994), there 
ought to be, given a positive relation between past and expected profitability, a 
negative relationship between an asset‟s ex ante profitability with its subsequent 
realised return.  
In order to test their theory, Lakonishok et al. (1994), need to measure 
expectations. Thus, they look to the Gordon formula: 
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Following Equation (3.1), they note that a firm with a high cashflow yield is either 
discounted at a high discount rate or it is expected to grow at a slow pace. Therefore, 
by assuming that growth and value firms are, on aggregate, equally risky, Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) rely on the earnings yield and the cashflow yield to act as proxies for 
expected rate in growth in future earnings. In addition, they use a sales-growth 
measure
38
 to quantify firm‟s past profitability.  
In line with the mispricing hypothesis, stocks that the market was too optimistic 
about turned out to be poor investments. In particular, assets with strong past 
profitability (a high sales-growth measure) and highest expected future profitability (a 
low C/P) give low returns in subsequent five years. Actually, these stocks perform the 
worst of the studied assets. On the other hand, stocks expected to have poor 
profitability and have low past profitability yield the highest return. The cumulative 
five-year difference between these two portfolios is about 100%! (Lakonishok et al. 
1994).     
Lakonishok et al. (1994) reveal further evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
the market was too optimistic (or pessimistic) in computing the ex ante profitability of 
growth (or value) firms. At first, they show that the differential in C/P ratios between 
the two types of firms implies that the market expects the earnings of growth firms to 
expand faster than that of value firms for about 11 years. However, although in the 
short-term earnings of growth firms do increase markedly faster than that of value 
firms, after only the second year, the actual growth rates in profitability of both types 
of firms are approximately equal.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that cashflow yield and earnings yield are poor 
proxies for expected growth in profitability. To address this concern, La Porta (1996) 
uses the forecasts of investment analysts to measure expectations. His findings are 
consistent with the error-in-expectations hypothesis. Following Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), he documents that stocks that are expected to grow the fastest underperform 
firms with low growth expectations by 20% in the first year. He also observes 
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 P is price, D is dividend, g is the growth rate, k in this equation is the payout ratio. Subscripts denote 
time.  
38
 For a detailed description see Lakonishok et al. (1994)     
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subsequent realised growth in earnings of firms that the market is pessimistic about 
and finds that the earnings of these firms, on average, grow particularly quickly, while 
the growth in earnings of glamorous firms tends to fall. In short, La Porta (1996) 
confirms the results in Lakonishok et al. (1994) with a cleaner measure for 
expectations.          
Another implication of the error-in-expectations hypothesis is that high returns 
of value stocks are a consequence of the market correcting its prior mistakes. Of 
course, the correction will be slow, as it takes more then one informational shock to 
change investors‟ perceptions (Barberis, et al. 1998; Daniel et al. 1998). In light of 
this, the hypothesis makes three tractable predictions: expected profitability of 
erroneously analysed firms must change as new information reaches the market, 
market is surprised with earnings of such firms, and it takes many years before 
investors completely reverse their prior, and incorrect, assessment of profitability.  
In effect, the three predictions of the error-in-expectation hypothesis have been 
confirmed in the data. La Porta (1996) shows that analysts revise upwards their 
estimates of growth in earning of the firms they were the most pessimistic about and 
cut growth forecasts of firms they most favoured. In addition, La Porta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that investors are systematically surprised by 
earnings of value and growth firms. More specifically, value firms have a high 
positive return around their earning announcements, while the returns to growth firms 
are particularity low when earnings are announced. Also, in line with behavioural 
theory, the high returns of value firms around earning announcements were higher 
than that of growth firms for up to five years.  
Lastly, it would seem prudent to ascertain how investment professionals 
understand a firm‟s market beta or its book-to-market ratio. Accordingly, Bloomfield 
and Michaely (2004) surveyed a sample of analysts to establish whether market 
participants think of these attributes as measures of risk or mispricing. The research 
covered both young and experienced analysts. Their finding supports the static CAPM 
and the behavioural view. Analysts think that market beta and future return are 
positively related, but it plays little role as a measure of mispricing. However, 
professionals exclusively see the book-to-market ratio as a measure of mispricing.         
 
It has been shown that behavioural finance offers plausible explanations for the 
value effect. However, it is important to remember that few behavioural economists 
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would venture as far as to dismiss the rational view of the markets. Undoubtedly, 
investors care about risk, estimate expected returns and aim to arbitrage away 
mispricing (Lamont and Thaler, 2003a). Additionally, some of the empirical facts 
discussed above have been thrown into question. For example, Doukas, Kim and 
Pantzalis (2002) cast doubt that the error-in-expectation hypothesis and the book-to-
market effect are linked, and Fama and French (1995) reinterpret findings in 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) in the rational paradigm. Consequently, the review goes on 
to show that risk plays a large role in the size and the value effects.  
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3.4 Are Small Stocks Riskier? Is Value Riskier than Growth?  
 
Proponents of efficient markets maintain that the asset pricing anomalies are 
consistent with rational asset pricing theories and are a direct consequence of 
erroneous adjustment for risk. A connection between size, the book-to-market ratio 
and risk is established inter alia by Berk (1995) and Ball (1978). Using the intuition 
of the Gordon formula, Ball (1978) noted that, after controlling for dividends and the 
growth rate, an asset with higher risk must trade at a lower price. Consequently, all 
else being equal, its market capitalisation is lower, while its F/P ratio is higher. Berk 
(1995) formally proved that, as long as the true expected return and the expected 
return predicted by an asset pricing model differ, the relationship between a firm‟s 
market size and the residual return must be negative (or the relationship between 
BE/ME and the residual return must positive).  
How to measure risk? Traditional finance theory states that risky assets increase 
the volatility of peoples‟ wealth39 (Brealey and Myers, 2000). A more precise way to 
look at risk is to follow Cochrane (2001), who states that “risky” assets vary “more” 
with some state variables that trace out the path of our aggregate long-term wealth. 
These shares would have lower prices because investors eschew assets that, during 
times when our long-term wealth is falling, are becoming even less valuable. 
Consequently, in order to quantify an asset‟s risk, all that is needed is to measure the 
co-variance of its return with variables that determine long-term wealth of an average 
investor. This is not easy! In order to uncover the identity of the state variables, one 
can turn to theory (such as the static CAPM), or empirically search for some candidate 
variables. However, a generally accepted theoretical asset pricing model has not yet 
been derived and, the finance academia warns emphatically against empirically 
deriving asset pricing factors (Fama, 1991; Kan and Zhang, 1999, Kandel and 
Stambaugh, 1995).  
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 This is imprecise. Cochrane (2001) noted that people care about their marginal utility of 
consumption. When our marginal utility is high, it is difficult (or expensive) to consume more; it is a 
“bad” state. Conversely, “good” states occur when our marginal utility is low. Cochrane (2001) notes 
that marginal utility of consumption is correlated with aggregate consumption. It is assumed that 
aggregate consumption is a direct consequence of wealth. So agents‟ concern about wealth is 
equivalent to peoples‟ worry about consumption. Thus, for simplicity in this dissertation, aggregate 
wealth is considered to? marginal utility of consumption.   
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A more pragmatic definition of a risky stock is given by Chen and Zhang (1998) 
and Fama and French (1995), who simply classify risky stocks as those with inter alia 
cashflow problems, poor profitability and high financial leverage. The two definitions 
can, of course, be equivalent, as investment in these weak firms may yield relatively 
low payoffs in poor economic states. However, if a strong firm, financially speaking, 
is a poor hedge for shifts in the efficient frontier (as in Merton‟s (1973) ICAPM), it 
can still be considered risky. 
In this section, evidence is shown that forges a connection of the size and the 
value effects with risk. In particular, Fama and French (1992) argue that small or 
value firms are risky as they are more likely to plunge into bankruptcy, thus, evidence 
for, and against, their distress risk hypothesis is shown. Also, by the strength of the 
APT intuition, if small or value firms co-vary “more” with some “widely-accepted” 
macroeconomic sources of risk, such as the level of inflation or interest rates, then it 
may prove satisfactory to assemble a macroeconomic APT model, and use it to solve 
the puzzle of the two premia.    
 
3.4.1 Size, BE/ME and the Financial Distress Risk Hypothesis 
 
A weak firm is a firm that has fallen on hard times; it has poor earnings and its 
market value has fallen. Such decline in value increases its financial leverage, which 
may indicate difficulty in raising capital. Often, management is forced to cut back on 
dividends, as the company is low on cash (Chan and Chen, 1991). Consequently, 
weak firms ought to be risky and weak firms ought to exhibit high ex ante returns. 
Actually, Chan and Chen (1991) show that a portfolio of firms that have cut 
dividends, or exhibit high leverage, does outperform the market index. Thus, showing 
that small and value firms are indeed in financial distress could explain their large 
return
40
.   
Chan and Chen (1991) are among the first to forge a link between the financial 
health of the firm and the size effect, and they argue that, at any given time, many 
small firms may be in financial trouble. In particular, at a given point in time, many 
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 More importantly, for the risk story to hold, a high BE/ME ratio must signal persistently low 
earnings in the future. Brief periods of high or low profitability should not be the driver of firm‟s book-
to-market ratio or its size (Fama and French; 1995), as investors would not bid down prices if they 
know that financial trouble is only temporary. 
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small firms used to be larger. In fact, they note that around two-thirds of small firms, 
become small as a result of a decline in their market value and only a fifth of small 
firms are permanently small. Conversely, half of big firms are persistently big. More 
importantly, Chan and Chen (1991) calculate that more than half of all firms that have 
significantly cut dividends, or have high financial leverage, are small. In addition, on 
average, smaller firms in each industry are less profitable and have high interest 
coverage ratios. Chen and Zhang (1998) document a similar pattern internationally. In 
addition, Chen and Zhang (1998) find a firm‟s size and its propensity to cut dividends 
are highly related. Since managers loath cutting dividends, a decline in a firm‟s 
payout is a particularly powerful indication of poor cashflow prospects or anticipation 
of difficulty in raising capital (Chan and Chen, 1991). It would thus appear that size 
effect might be closely linked to a risk that stems from a firm‟s inability to raise new 
funds.  
Fama and French (1995) provide similar evidence for the value effect. With a 
portfolio sort, they examine profitability, measured by the return-on-equity ratio, of 
value and growth firms. In accordance with the financial distress hypothesis, they 
show that, in the five years preceding their classification, profitability of value firms 
falls sharply, while it increases for growth firms. More importantly, the authors show 
that profitability of value firms is persistently lower than that of growth firms, as the 
return-on-equity ratio for high-BE/ME firms is smaller than that of low-BE/ME firms 
for five years before and after classification. Chen and Zhang (1998) replicate these 
patterns in Japan, Hong Kong and Malaysia.  
Chen and Zhang (1998) go on to provide stronger evidence that links the size 
and the value effect with measures of financial distress. They examine whether the 
information that predicts returns contained in market equity and the book-to-market 
ratio potentially exists in other firm characteristics that are explicitly linked to 
financial distress. The attributes they use are the decline in dividends paid, volatility 
of earnings and financial leverage. Chen and Zhang (1998) show that their distress 
characteristics explain the same amount of cross-sectional variation in returns as 
market equity and the book-to-market ratio.  
Nonetheless, a loose relation between the size and the value premia and 
financial risk is inadequate. It must be explicitly shown that the risk associated with 
bankruptcy causes high returns and that it underpins the size and the BE/ME effects. 
Consequently, for the distress hypothesis to be accepted, its two distinct perditions 
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must be supported in the data. First, it must be shown that distress risk is priced, i.e. 
there is a monotonic positive relationship between a firm‟s measure of distress and its 
realised return. Second, after controlling for financial distress, the market equity and 
the book-to-market ratio must not have any incremental power to explain returns 
(Dichev, 1998). In order to test these predictions, a stock characteristic that can 
predict actual bankruptcy needs to be constructed. One way to assess a firm‟s 
financial strength is to turn to an accounting measure that forecasts bankruptcy, such 
as Altman‟s (1968) Z-score and Olhson‟s (1980) O-score. Otherwise, probability of 
default can be obtained from an option pricing model, which has an advantage of 
being forward-looking. Incidentally, all of these models have found out-of sample 
success in forecasting bankruptcy. 
The contention that distress risk is priced meets with mixed empirical support. 
For example, using the Z and O scores, Dichev (1998) finds that firms that are likely 
to go bankrupt yield low returns; she finds a negative premium for distress risk! 
Dichev (1998) fails, however, to properly adjust for the size and the BE/ME effects. 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) repeat her tests with the O-score and a longer sample. 
They show the connection between a book-to-market ratio and measures of distress 
that Dichev (1998) missed. More specifically, they find that distressed firms earn 
higher returns than financially sound companies only if they also happen to have high 
book-to-market. However, on average, the relationship between the O-score and 
returns is found to be flat because default has a negative premium in low book-to-
market firms. Finally, Vassalou and Xing (2004) estimate default probability for 
individual firms with an option pricing model. They document a similar interaction 
between the book-to-market ratio and measure of distress as Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002). However, their cross-sectional test reveals that firms with high probability do 
earn higher returns; the default risk is priced
41
.      
The second prediction of the financial distress story for the size and the value 
effects is that a cleaner measure of distress should have a stronger predictive power 
for returns than market capitalisation or the BE/ME ratio. Here the results are in 
unison. The book-to-market ratio remains a reliable predictor of stock returns after 
controlling for measures of financial distress. Market equity, however, loses much, if 
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 Aretz et al. (2005) show inclusion of the other macroeconomic variables renders it indistinguishable 
from zero. 
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not all, of its importance to price assets. The result is robust to many measures of 
financial distress, such as the Z-score, the O-score (Dichev, 1998) and the ex ante 
measure of survival probability in Vassalou and Xing (2004).  
 
3.4.2 Macroeconomic Risks and the Size and Value Premia 
 
Given that small and value firms possess characteristics that, to the average 
investor, may be a sign of risk, the natural next step is to determine whether returns on 
these firms have larger co-variances with plausible variables that trace the path of the 
business cycle. Weak firms could have higher returns during upturns because they are 
“saved” from bankruptcy, while low during recessions, as more weak firms are 
pushed into liquidation (Dichev, 1998).  
Chen and Zhang (1998) link the size and the value effects to macroeconomic 
risks, by showing that the premia do not exist in certain developing countries. 
Consider an economy that is growing incredibly quickly and firms that are already 
positioned in the market stand to make high profits. If small or value stocks represent 
marginal firms, then in a high-growth economy investors may not aggressively 
discount prices of such firms because financial problems experienced by these weak 
firms are likely to be temporary. Consequently, size and value effects are moderate in 
countries with booming stock markets. This is the precise finding of Chen and Zhang 
(1998). They show that fast-expending economies, such as Taiwan and Thailand, are 
virtually free of the size and the value effects, while the medium growth economies of 
Japan, Hong Kong and Malaysia exhibit much smaller size premiums than the mature 
US market. There appears to be a near-perfect negative correlation (-0.977) between 
countries‟ stock market performance and the magnitude of the anomalies.  
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) argue that the stage of a business cycle, 
which indicates the ease with which firms obtain financing, must determine the 
returns of small firms. In particular, they note that, often, ample collateral is needed to 
secure financing. At times of increasing interest rates, asset values shrink due to 
higher discount rates and the promised cost of debt grows. Consequently, small firms 
would face difficulty in raising ample funds, as they have little collateral. In addition, 
at times of falling economy-wide liquidity, commercial banks, faced with reserve 
requirements, will be the first to stop lending. 
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Table 3.7 
The Spread in Factor Betas  
Panel A: Loadings of Small and Large Firms on a Set of Macroeconomic Variables      
 
Small Large 
Small less 
Large 
Ave Small 
less Large 
%  
Period Reference 
Δ E(industrial production) 5.770 5.583 0.187 3% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Unexpected Inflation -0.733 -0.107 -0.627 336% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ Aggregate p(survival) 2.477 1.260 1.217 73% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ level of the yield curve 3.420 5.410 -1.990 47% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ slope of the yield curve -1.610 -3.390 1.780 82% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ Forex 0.077 -0.063 0.140 202% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ price of oil -0.287 -0.317 0.030 10% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ default spread 2.852 -0.886 3.738 276% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
Δ term spread 0.738 0.271 0.467 118% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
Panel B: Loadings of Value and Growth Firms on a Set of Macroeconomic Variables   
  
Value Growth 
Value less 
Growth 
Ave Value 
less 
Growth %  
Period Reference 
Δ E(industrial production) 4.737 6.037 -1.300 24% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Unexpected Inflation 0.420 -0.520 0.940 202% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ Aggregate p(survival) 1.570 1.250 0.320 23% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ level of the yield curve 1.463 2.323 -0.860 48% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ slope of the yield curve -2.087 -3.927 1.840 68% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ Forex 0.013 -0.097 0.110 469% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ price of oil -0.340 -0.407 0.067 18% 1971-1998 Aretz, Bartram & Pope (2005) 
Δ default spread 1.622 0.361 1.261 214% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
Δ term spread -0.036 1.019 -1.055 1517% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
 82 
 Small firms often do not enjoy access to bond and cash markets because information 
acquisition costs for these firms are high (Hong et al. 2000). Consequently, these 
firms will be most dependent on private, mostly bank, financing and will experience 
the largest difficulty in sourcing new funds. In fact, Perez-Quiros and Timmerman 
(2000) show that the expected return of small stock and their variance grows sharply 
during recessions
42
. In addition, Liew and Vassalou (2000), in a cross-section of 
industrial nations, find that, in poor economic states, small firms do underperform but 
yield especially returns in good states. 
Chen et al. (1986) were among the first to analyse how macroeconomic 
variables affect stock returns
43
. The list of such variables is long. For instance, Perez-
Quiros and Timmerman (2000) note that default spread is particularly important in 
pricing of small firms, as it is a good proxy for credit conditions. In addition, Hahn 
and Lee (2006) argue that changes in borrowing costs, measured by the slope and the 
level of the yield curve, have a strong effect on firms with high levels of debt. 
Consequently, given that the book-to-market ratio is related to financial leverage, 
variables that describe the yield curve can be central in explaining the returns of value 
firms.        
It is clear from panel A in Table 3.7 that small firms exhibit different risk 
exposures to large firms. For example, low capitalisation stocks tend to co-vary more 
intensively with unexpected inflation, aggregate survival probability of Vassalou and 
Xing (2004), the term spread
44
 and the default spread. Also, loadings on the yield 
curve variables and foreign exchange are much different for small firms than for large 
firms.  
A similar pattern emerges if one looks at loadings of value and growth firms in 
panel B. They differ by their exposure to foreign exchange, unexpected inflation and 
the default spread. However, it is the term spread (as measured by Hahn and Lee 
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 Specifically, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) confirmed that small firms, on average, have 
larger loadings on default premium than large firms, but also they show that there is a very significant 
increase in small firm‟s sensitivity to the default premium during recessions. Also, they find that the 
sensitivity to movements in the short-rate is much more negative for small firms during recessions. 
Taken together, these results imply that, during market recessions, small firms become riskier.  
43
 The list of such variables is long, but it can generalised into: various inflation measures; variables 
that capture costs of borrowing; growth in GDP, or in its components; or measures of credit quality. 
44
 Of course, the Δ term spread and Δ slope of the yield curve are similar measures. However, Aretz, et 
al. (2005), as do Hahn and Lee (2006), estimated all of their loadings simultaneously. Thus, loadings 
on the yield curve measure in Aretz et al. (2005) captures the shifts in the yield curve that is 
independent of other state variables, while measure in Hahn and Lee (2006) is orthogonal only to the 
default spread.   
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(2006)) that emphasises the difference in the co-variance structure of the two types of 
firms. Curiously, the difference in exposure to the aggregate survival probability, after 
other betas are taken into account, is very low between firms with different BE/ME 
ratios.  
It is unlikely that exposure to change in industrial production or oil play a role in 
capturing the difference in returns to small and value firms. Actually, Aretz, Bertram 
and Pope (2005) test formally for difference in exposure to the various 
macroeconomic factors and find that loadings on the aggregate survival probability, 
the yield curve variables and foreign exchange differ reliably among the size-sorted 
portfolios. The only significant difference between loadings of different BE/ME-
sorted portfolios is in the yield curve factor.  
It may appear that the magnitude of the size and, partially, the value effects, are 
related to macroeconomic sources of risk. However, without analyzing the sign and 
the magnitude of the different premia, it is hard to establish that small and value firms 
command a higher return. However, the magnitude of premia to factors that are not 
expressed as equity returns can only be measured in a cross-sectional test (Cochrane, 
2001), and Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) show that the magnitude of an estimated 
premium is a function of the test assets the regressions employ. Also, Jagannathan and 
Wang (1998) show that in a standard cross-sectional test, a factor can appear priced, 
even if its true premium is zero.  
Nonetheless, some of the factors, when measured on the size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios and shown in Table 3.7, yield statistically significant premia. For instance, 
on its own, distress risk is priced, but Aretz et al. (2005) show that it contains the 
same information as other macroeconomic variables. Also, Hahn and Lee (2006) 
show that the asset‟s co-variance with the default spread seems to be a strong 
predictor of the cross-sectional dispersion in returns of size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios. Curiously, Aretz et al. (2005) show that only one of the macroeconomic 
variables, the exchange rate, is priced. However, co-linearity between the variables 
may be the culprit for the low statistical significance in their tests.  
 
In sum, the existence of a connection between the book-to-market ratio and 
financial distress is a subject for debate, and the interpretation of existing results may 
be a matter of taste. However, it seems that financial risk offers a credible explanation 
for the size effect. Also, if aggregate distress is a priced factor, then by virtue of the 
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high correlation between BE/ME and measures of bankruptcy, it plays a role for the 
value effect as well.  
More importantly, consistently with a risk-based story, small and value firms co-
vary “more” with plausible sources of business cycle risk. Also, some of these risks 
seem to be priced. In fact, the macroeconomic model of Aretz et al. (2005) can 
explain almost the same amount of cross-sectional variation in returns as a model that 
actually does explain the disparity between stock returns. In other words, it does 
nearly as well as the empirically derived three factor specification created in Fama 
and French (1993); to which the review turns next.      
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3.5 Enter the Fama-French Three factor Model.  
 
 It has been established that the size and value premiums exist, and possible 
explanations for these effects have been put forward. However, relatively little has 
been said on how asset allocation, performance appraisal of portfolio managers and 
the general adjustment for risk need to be modified in order to take into account these 
“anomalies”. In other words, it has not been made clear how to parameterise the size 
and the value effects into an asset pricing model.  
Fortunately, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French developed a linear three factor 
model (henceforth, the FF3F) that can, statistically speaking, explain the size and the 
value premia. In effect, their model is an extension of the static CAPM where the 
market factor is augmented with size and value factors. Algebraically, it is given by:   
, 1
Market Size Value
t i t f i i iE r r b s h               (3.1) 
The roman letters in the terms on the right side of Equation 3.1 represent risk 
exposures, while the λ‟s are associated with the premiums on the three types of risk. A 
more common (empirical) specification of the FF3F model is:  
 ˆˆˆ ˆit ft i i Mt ft i t i t itr r r r s SMB h HML              (3.2) 
Equation 3.2 represents a regression of realised excess returns of an asset on the 
market factor and two factor-mimicking portfolios. The SMB (Small minus Big) is the 
size factor, and is calculated as a return on a zero-cost portfolio that establishes a long 
position in a portfolio of small firms and finances it with a short position in large 
firms. Similarly, the value factor, HML (High minus Low), is constructed from a 
zero-cost portfolio that longs firms with a high book-to-market ratio and shorts firms 
with a low book-to-market ratio. Because market capitalisation and F/P ratios are 
correlated, Fama and French (1993) use a sorting procedure that results in portfolios 
that do not confound the size and the value effects. In sum, the HML factor captures 
the value premium that is independent of the effect of size and the SMB factor 
captures the size premium that is independent of the effect of the book-to-market 
ratio.  
The three factor model is not a magic bullet for asset pricing. Actually, it 
constitutes a mild embarrassment to the field of financial economics because it has not 
been derived theoretically. At the time of its development, there were few, if any, 
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discernable links between the model and formal asset pricing theory. However, its 
staggering success and relative ease of application led to growth in the model‟s 
popularity among academics and eventually practitioners as well. Perhaps the 
forceful, but unproved, arguments of Fama and French (1993, 1996a), that their model 
is consistent with a multi-factor version of Merton‟s (1973) ICAPM, are sufficiently 
convincing. Even though Fama and French (2004) begin to take behavioural finance 
seriously, they continue to maintain that the three factor model is a “good 
approximation to average returns” (Fama and French, 2004, p12). 
 
3.5.1 Does it do a good job of explaining Average Returns?  
 
Why is the FF3F is so good? Why is it so much better than the static CAPM? 
What makes any asset pricing model good? In short, since an asset pricing model‟s 
job is to predict returns, it should do just that; the pricing errors of a good model 
ought to be small. Also, premiums associated with factors of a well-specified model 
should exhibit the correct sign and be reliably different from zero. A model‟s pricing 
power must extend across different sample periods and different assets. Ideally, the R
2 
in time-series and cross-sectional tests that use well-diversified portfolios as test 
assets should be high, meaning that the model can capture systematic components of 
share returns. Lastly, the model ought to “price-out” firm characteristics that are 
thought to capture mispricing (Cochrane, 2001).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the ability of the competing models to predict returns on 
the 25 size and BE/ME sorted portfolios. Panel A shows the performance of the 
CAPM, while the last two panels present pricing errors of the three factor model. The 
figure was created from results found in Fama and French (1996a) and Lattau and 
Ludvigson (2001b), who have used data from 1963 to 1993 and 1998, respectively.  
The CAPM does not seem to be a good model. The pricing errors in the first 
panel are dispersed: some are highly positive and some are very negative. Although, 
portfolios of big firms (marked “S5”) seem to line up around zero, most of the other 
assets (where prefix “S1” indicates the smallest firms) are not well priced. Also, these 
pricing errors illustrate how dismally the model fails to adjust for the size and the 
value effects. In particular, note that as the size of the firm increases so does the 
dispersion of the pricing errors.  
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Figure  3.1  
The Pricing Errors of the CAPM and the FF3F 
Panel A: Pricing Errors of CAPM - Cross-section
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In fact, the portfolio containing small value firms (marked “S1B5”) outperforms the 
market by almost 6% annually! However, it is the value effect that is more evident. 
Within each size quintile, pricing errors of portfolios with low-BE/ME firms (suffix 
“B1” indicates growth) always plot below zero; errors of portfolios with high-BE/ME 
firms (“B5” indicates value) plot above. Mispricing, however, tempers off among the 
largest firms.  
Panels B and C in Figure 3.1 present the pricing errors of the three factor model. 
The cross-sectional test allows for a mismeasurement of the risk premia (Cochrane, 
2001)
45
. That is why the pricing errors in panel C are closer to zero
46
. The pricing 
ability of the FF3F model is much better than that of the static CAPM. Pricing errors 
of smaller firms are no bigger than those of large stocks. Some minor relation between 
the BE/ME and return persist, but its magnitude is nowhere near that of the static 
CAPM. It can be said that the three factor model accounts for the difference between 
returns of small and large stocks as well as value and growth firms. Actually, the R
2
s 
of cross-sectional tests are usually around 70% (Ferguson and Shockley, 2002; Hahn 
and Lee, 2006; Petkova, 2006) and it increases to 77% if quarterly frequency is used 
in the tests (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001b). By contrast, the coefficient of variation 
obtained from cross-sectional tests of the CAPM is usually around zero. In addition, 
the R
2
s from time-series regressions used to estimate the factor loadings are usually 
larger than 0.9, meaning that the factors in the FF3F absorb much of the variation in 
returns (Fama and French, 1993; Davis, Fama and French, 2000).  On a deeper 
thought, it should not seem extraordinary that factors that are formed from 
intersection of the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios can predict returns of portfolios 
that are constructed with a similar procedure. However, Fama and French (1995) 
show that the success of the three factor model is not driven by such endogeneity. 
They divide the entire sample of firms into two sub-samples. The first sub-sample is 
used to construct the factor portfolios, while the second is used to construct the test 
assets. A time-series test is run. Subsequently, the role of the samples is reversed, and 
                                                 
45
 On a deeper thought, for a single beta model, a time-series test is essentially a cross-sectional test, 
where the fitted SML joins the risk-free rate (the intercept) with a point with the x co-ordinate equal to 
one and the y co-ordinate equal to the time-series average of the realised premium. Every asset‟s 
pricing error is a vertical distance between its mean return and the fitted SML. A proper cross-sectional 
test allows for variation in the intercept and the slope that minimizes (the squared) pricing errors. (Once 
again Cochrane, (2001)) 
46
 The smaller errors can also be a consequence of the quarterly frequency employed in Lattau and 
Ludvigson (2001b)   
 89 
a second set of regressions is done. Amazingly, the explanatory power (measured by 
R
2
), as well as the magnitude and statistical significance of the factor loadings are 
virtually identical for portfolios in both sets of test.  
Can the FF3F model measure the value premium as measured by other F/P 
ratios? How about other anomalies? For example, Lakonishok et al. (1994) have made 
an observation that firms with ex post low growth in sales are likely to outperform 
firms with a healthy growth in sales. There is also the momentum effect of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) and the overreaction effect of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
Consequently, Fama and French (1996a) explore whether the explanatory power of 
their model is ubiquitous. To the credit of the FF3F, many of the above-mentioned 
anomalies are accounted for with the three factor model. In particular, Fama and 
French (1996a) use E/P, C/P, ex post sales growth and ex post return as sorting 
characteristics. The time-series intercepts in regressions of attribute-sorted portfolios‟ 
returns onto the FF3F factors are close to zero (Fama and French, 1996a). The notable 
exception is the momentum effect; actually it strengthens after adjustment with the 
three factor model. 
The ability of a factor model to capture variation in returns is important, but it 
has little to say about a model‟s prediction regarding expected returns (Cochrane, 
2001). As a result, it should be established whether the value and size factors are 
associated with positive premia, i.e. if they are priced. Panel A in Table 3.8 shows the 
results of a cross-sectional test of the FF3F model using the 25 size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios as test assets. In sum, regardless of the method employed, the HML is 
priced but the SMB is not. This can be seen by  the statistical significance of the 
factors. The market factor seems to be priced with the GMM in Aretz et al. (2005) 
and a cross-sectional regression in Brennan et al. (2004). Incidentally, the magnitude 
and the associated t-statistic of the estimated value premium are very similar to the 
time-series estimates of 0.46% and 4.24, respectively (Davis et al. 2000). At the same 
time, the mean realisation of the size premium has been 0.2% (t-stat is 1.78), which is 
larger than the cross-sectional estimate.      
Evidence presented in Panel B of Table 3.8 highlights one of the flaws of the 
three factor model. When a different set of test assets is used, the estimate of the value 
premium falls in magnitude and becomes indistinguishable from zero. Also, the size 
factor remains unpriced, even in tests that employ size-sorted portfolios as test assets 
(Jagannathan and Wang, 1996).  
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Table 3.8 
The Cross-Sectional Tests of the FF3F 
Factor  Mean  t R
2
 Table  Method Frequency Test Assets Reference Period 
Panel A: Tests of the FF3F model on the 25 size and BE/ME sorted portfolios        
Market  1.330  0.76 
SMB 0.470  0.86 
VMG 1.460  2.98 
77% I Fama-MacBeth quarterly 
25 Size & BE/ME 
sorted portfolios 
Lattau & Ludvigson 
(2001b) 
1963-
1998 
Market -0.650  -1.55 
SMB 0.160  1.00 
VMG 0.440  3.09 
71% V Fama-MacBeth monthly 
25 Size & BE/ME 
sorted portfolios 
Petkova (2005) 
1963-
2001 
Market 0.580  3.28 
SMB 0.080  0.62 
VMG 0.400  3.48 
-- II CS-Regression (no int) monthly 
25 Size & BE/ME 
sorted portfolios 
Brennan, Wang & Xia 
(2004) 
1952-
2001 
Market 0.006  3.21 
SMB 0.001  0.65 
VMG 0.004  3.25 
53% V GMM monthly 
25 Size & BE/ME 
sorted portfolios 
Aretz, Bertram & Pope 
(2005) 
1971-
1998 
Panel A: Tests of the FF3F model with various  test assets         
Market 0.750  4.18 
SMB -0.300  1.82 
VMG -0.380  2.51 
-- V CS-Regression (no int) monthly 30 Industry 
Brennan, Wang & Xia 
(2004) 
1952-
2001 
Market -0.450  -0.94 
SMB 0.330  1.51 
VMG 0.250  0.95 
55% IV Fama-MacBeth monthly 
100 Size-sorted 
portfolios 
Jagannathan & Wang 
(1996) 
1964-
1990 
Market 0.010  2.56 
SMB 0.001  0.53 
VMG 0.004  2.06 
-- XI GMM monthly 
27 Size,  BE/ME & 
P(Default) sorted 
portfolios 
Vassalou & Xing (2004) 
1971-
1999 
Market 0.650  3.63 
SMB 0.020  0.17 
VMG 0.120  1.03 
-- VII CS-Regression (no int) monthly 
25 Size & BE/ME 
portfolios & 30 
Industry 
Brennan, Wang & Xia 
(2004) 
1952-
2001 
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It is interesting to see how the FF3F model performs with regard to industry 
portfolios. Returns to industries do not puzzle financial economists in the same way 
the size and the value effects do. However, practitioners in the field do want to 
correctly calculate the cost of capital, as estimation errors lead to incorrect capital 
budgeting decisions. Fama and French (1997) conduct an experiment to see if the 
FF3F can improve on static CAPM‟s estimate of industries‟ cost of capital. Here the 
improvement over the CAPM is less emphatic. In sum, the FF3F model captures more 
variation in industry returns than the one-factor alternative (the R
2
s are higher), but 
the estimates of expected returns are only marginally more precise with the three 
factor model than with the CAPM. Also, a cross-sectional test in Brennan et al. (2004) 
shows that, although the FF3F model yields small pricing errors when industry 
portfolios are used as test assets, the premiums on the HML and SMB factors are 
negative and it is the market portfolio that has the most pricing power (Panel B in 
Table 3.8). Brennan et al. (2004) also show that, in a time-series test that uses both the 
size and BE/ME sorted portfolios and industry portfolios, the static CAPM and the 
FF3F are rejected, but the static CAPM yields slightly smaller pricing errors.  
 
3.5.2 Robustness Concerns  
 
Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (1999) explore the relationship between an 
anomaly, such as the BE/ME effect, and a factor that tries to capture it, such as the 
HML. With a simulation, they show that if a spurious anomaly is created and a factor 
that captures it is constructed, then the replication of empirical tests of Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996a) on this bogus anomaly yields results quantitatively 
similar to those extant in the literature. Like, MacKinlay and Lo (1990a), they 
emphasize the importance of out-of-sample testing. In addition, they note that 
repeating the tests on portfolios sorted on characteristics other than the BE/ME, such 
as the C/P or the probability of default, does not yield sufficient evidence that the 
power of the FF3F is pervasive because these alternative attributes are likely to be 
highly correlated with the book-to-market ratio.  
However, the three factor model does survive the attack from Ferson et al. 
(1999). Fama and French (2006) extend the sample period all the way back to 
1929and show that time-series estimates of size and value premia exhibit a similar 
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magnitude in different periods. Also, Davis et al. (2000) show that the three factor 
model does a similarly good job of explaining returns in the pre-1963 era. In 
particular, the model leaves relatively little residual variation, as all time-series 
regressions yield R
2
s above 0.90. The intercepts are mostly indistinguishable from 
zero and the others are of low economic significance. Curiously, the portfolio of small 
growth stocks remains overpriced by the FF3F model before and after 1963.   
International evidence on the performance of the three factor model can also 
provide evidence in support of the model. It has become customary to use the 
Japanese stock market as an appropriate setting where US findings are replicated. 
Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001) perform a test of the FF3F in Japan. Although they do 
not explicitly estimate the premia (with a cross-sectional regression), their time-series 
regressions of the three factors onto the returns of size and BE/ME sorted portfolios 
yields smaller pricing errors than those in US data. In fact, unlike in Davis et al. 
(2000), a statistical test for joint significance of the intercepts does not reject the FF3F 
and the small-growth portfolio is priced in the Japanese data. In addition, Griffin 
(2002), in a slightly simpler set-up, shows that the three factor model performs 
equally well in Canada and the United Kingdom. Specifically, the pricing errors are 
small and R
2
s in time-series regressions are large, but not as large as in the US. Lastly, 
although evidence from emerging markets is sparse, with a short sample, Drew, 
Naughton and Veeraragavan (2005) show that the model can explain the size and 
book-to-market effects in China.     
Perhaps stronger evidence for the existence of a discernable value premium 
would provide further support for the FF3F model. Although, it has been shown that 
mean return on the HML factor is positive, Elton (1999) puts forward a trenchant 
argument that measuring expected returns, thus premia, with realised returns, may be 
seriously misleading. However, Asness, Friedman, Krail and Liew (2000b) and 
Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) provide evidence that the HML factor is 
forecastable. Consequently, the predicted values from their regression can be 
interpreted as the expectation of the value premium. In turn, computing the mean of 
the predicted HML gives insight as to whether the premium is real. Sadly, Asness et 
al. (2000b) and Cohen et al. (2003) do not compute means or any test statistics, but, 
judging from the time-series of their forecasts, the value premium is reliably greater 
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than zero
47
. Actually, an attempt is being made to formally address the properties of 
the expected value premium. Chen, Petkova and Zhang (2005) preset a work-in-
progress annualized estimate of the expected HML of 5.1% with an associated t-
statistic of 40.89!  
However, there is a test that the FF3F model does fail. Fama and French (1997) 
show that factor loadings of industries change over time and, more recently, Ferson 
and Harvey (1999) provide formal evidence that loadings on the HML and the SMB 
are stochastic and cast doubt on the model itself. To explain, the success of FF3F is 
based on the model‟s ability to produce very small pricing errors (Fama and French 
1993, 1995, 1996a). However, the usual tests show unconditional pricing errors and 
say nothing about the magnitude of the time-variant alphas of the FF3F. 
Consequently, Ferson and Harvey (1999) test whether these conditional pricing errors 
of the model are indeed zero. The answer is no. The hypothesis that the time-series 
intercept for each of the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios is zero is rejected for all but 
one portfolio. However, in a similar test, CAPM fairs no better (Lewellen and Nagel, 
2006).   
In sum, the FF3F model does not meet all of the necessary requirements of a 
correctly-specified asset pricing model. However, its failures are far from dismal, 
especially given that the size and the BE/ME effects are very difficult to explain and 
the three factor model‟s pricing ability is certainly better than that of the static CAPM. 
Therefore, it can be said that the FF3F provides a good, but not perfect, description 
for expected returns. The model‟s adequate performance could be particularly 
puzzling if behavioural theory is to be taken seriously, as it predicts that one cannot 
price something that is mispriced. Thus, it seems fitting to differentiate between risk 
and non-risk expiations for the size, but mostly value, premiums - a topic that is 
presented next.  
                                                 
47
 Exhibit 9 in Asness et al. (2000) and figure 3 in Cohen et al. (2003).   
 94 
3.6 Fama and French Three factor Model against the Characteristics  
 
The explanation of success of the thee-factor model in Fama and French (1993) 
has been a contentious issue in financial economics. Proponents of the rational view 
argue that the FF3F factors, and particularly the value factor, capture the risks 
associated with distress, or proxy for relevant ICAPM state variable(s) (Fama and 
French, 1992; 1993; 1995; 1996a). The behaviourists posit that the three factor model 
“works” because the loadings on the FF3F factors are instruments for market equity 
and the book-to-market ratio; and, these characteristics predict returns because they 
measure mispricing (Lakonishok et al. 1994; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Naturally, 
the value, but mostly the size, effect can also be a consequence of illiquidity or the 
neglect premium. Consequently, included in this section is a survey of literature that 
aims to discern between risk and non-risk explanations of the three factor model.  
The rational theory is well developed and can make Sharpe predictions 
regarding the risk-return relationship. Daniel and Titman (1997) use it to distinguish 
between the stringent factor models and their, more general, characteristic model
48
. At 
first, they assume that the book-to-market ratio measures financial strength. Then they 
note that some firms become distressed because they co-vary “more” with asset 
pricing factors; but for some firms, it is the idiosyncratic component of profitability 
that drove them to the verge of bankruptcy. The rational pricing theory predicts that 
the book-to-market ratio would predict returns for firms that have high loadings on 
asset pricing factors
49
. However, in firms that are distressed due to firm-specific 
factors, the book-to-market ratio will not predict returns. The characteristic model 
does not distinguish between the reasons for distress. It simply states that there is an 
inverse relationship between the book-to-market ratio and return. Naturally, 
behavioural theory implies that the characteristic model, not a factor model, is the 
correct “story” for predicting returns. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) use a simple three-way portfolio sort to distinguish 
between the factor model and the characteristic model. Initially, they calculate 
                                                 
48
 A reminder: in the characteristic model, the expected  of an asset is exclusively a function of an 
attribute such as an F/P ratio, and not factor loadings.  
49
 This is true under the assumption that the factor realizations are mean-reverting and the premium to 
the factor is high, which is widely accepted to be true (Cochrane, 2001). 
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loadings on the HML for all firms. Subsequently, they sort stocks according to their 
BE/ME ratio, size and betas. This procedure creates an independent variation in the 
book-to-market ratio that is not related to size or the HML loading. If the 
characteristic model is correct, and thus the FF3F rejected, returns would not be 
related to factor loadings after control for the BE/ME. This is exactly what Daniel and 
Titman (1997) find.  
Davis et al. (2000) argue that a more rigorous test of the three factor model is to 
test the significance of the FF3F‟s pricing error of the characteristic balanced 
portfolio. A characteristic balanced portfolio is an arbitrage portfolio, which is a linear 
combination of the three-way sorted portfolios, and it longs firms with high, and 
shorts firms with low, loadings on the value factor. It captures the difference in 
loadings on the HML factor that is unrelated to characteristics. Davis et al. (2000) 
argue that, if the FF3F model is correct, a time-series regression of this portfolio‟s 
return onto the FF3F factors yields a zero intercept. In other words, the return 
differential between the long and short side of the portfolio is large enough to warrant 
the difference on the HML loading. If the characteristic model is true, however, then 
the time-series regression over-predicts return on this portfolio
50
. In accordance with 
the characteristic model, Daniel and Titman (1997) found that the FF3F model is 
rejected; the intercept is reliably negative.  
The findings of Daniel and Titman (1997), if taken seriously, undermine the 
foundations of the science of asset pricing. In effect, they show that the most 
successful linear asset pricing model fails to predict average returns after control for 
firm characteristics. Fama (1998) puts forward a trenchant argument that any model of 
behaviour of asset prices can only be discarded in favour of a better model. It is not 
clear if an ad hoc characteristic model is an acceptable alterative to the 
mathematically pure model of Merton (1973), represented by the intuitive FF3F. It 
seems imperative that the test employed in Daniel and Titman (1997) is repeated with 
another test that is more powerful
51
.  
                                                 
50
 The intercept is negative because the return spread between the long and short sides of the portfolio 
is too small, given the large spread in factor loadings. 
51
 Power is defined in statistical terms as the likelihood that the null was correctly rejected in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis.    
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Davis et al. (2000) are quick to repeat the analysis of Daniel and Titman (1997), 
but with a much longer sample period
52
. In contrast to Daniel and Titman (1997), they 
find strong support for the three factor model. More specifically, they show that, after 
controlling for size and the book-to-market ratio, a portfolio consisting of stocks with 
a high HML factor outperforms a portfolio with low loadings by 0.12% per month, 
which is much higher than 0.03% that Davis et al. (2000) report for the sample period 
used in Daniel and Titman (1997). Also, in their sample, the FF3F correctly predicts 
the returns on the characteristic balanced portfolio and the intercept of the regression 
is negative only during the sample period in Daniel and Titman (1997). On a closer 
look, however, it is apparent that Davis et al. (2000) fail to discuss that the book-to-
market effect still persists after control for the loading on the value factor. It can be 
calculated from Table III in Davis et al. (2000) that there is a BE/ME premium of 
0.5% per month that is independent of the betas on the HML. When the premium is 
calculated after adjustment for the FF3F factors it is still negative at -0.12%. Thus, it 
appears that a factor structure and characteristics play a role in prediction of stock 
returns.                      
Daniel et al. (2001) also test the predictive power of characteristics and factor 
loadings, but in the Japanese market. They show that the value effect in Japan is larger 
than in the US and the correlation between the BE/ME and loadings on the HML is 
lower in Japanese data. Consequently, Daniel et al. (2001) argue that Japanese data 
allows for greater power to distinguish between the factor and characteristic models. 
As in Daniel and Titman (1997), their findings are consistent with the characteristic 
model and they reject the factor model. In particular, they find a statically significant 
negative intercept of a regression of the characteristic-balanced portfolio on the FF3F 
factors and thus emphatically reject the factor model
53
.   
It seems peculiar that in order to discern between characteristic and factor 
models, this complex combination of portfolio sorts and regressions needs to be 
employed - especially, given that Fama and French (1992) provide an intuitive 
                                                 
52
 Daniel and Titman use 20 years, while Davis, Fama and French (2000) use 68 years.  
53
 A variant of the test in Daniel and Titman (1997) on South African data has been conducted by van 
Rensburg and Robertson (2004). Although South African data does not allow for well-specified 
characteristic balanced portfolios, the authors perform a two-way sort of a P/E and the loading on the 
value factor. Later, they repeated the sort with size and sensitivity to the size factor. The authors 
strongly reject the factor model in favour of the characteristic explanation. Their test does lack power, 
however, as they fail to adjust the portfolios with the FF3F. An examination of Tables III and V in 
Daniel and Titman (1997) clearly shows that such an adjustment is important. 
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method for a similar test: estimate the factor loadings, then plug them, along with 
characteristics, into a cross-sectional regression. The obtained t-statistics, or, at the 
very least, the R
2
, point toward the correct model for asset returns. However, in such 
tests, multicollinearlity between characteristics and loadings biases the coefficients, 
and the error-in-variables problem is large.  
Brennan et al. (1998) provide a possible solution to the error-in-variables 
problem and multicollinearlity in tests that pair up factor models against the 
characteristic alternative. They adopt a two-stage method. In the first step components 
of return not attributed to the factor model are computed. The second stage checks 
whether these pricing errors are predictable with characteristics. Since, the error-in-
variables manifests itself on the left-hand side in the second-pass cross-sectional 
regression, the predictive power of characteristics can be ascertained without a bias. 
With this procedure, Brennan et al. (1998) find that after correction for risk with the 
FF3F model, characteristics still reliably predict expected returns. Nonetheless, the 
book-to-market attenuates after control for risk with the FF3F.  
In addition, Lewellen (1999) shows that in a time-series test, the results of 
Daniel and Titman (1997) do not hold. He constructs regressions, where the book-to-
market ratio, and the FF3F factors are directly included in a time-series model. After 
showing that the book-to-market is a good instrument for expected returns, he finds 
that this predictability vanishes after the FF3F factors are included in the regression. 
In addition, Lewellen (1999) documents that many industry portfolios load on the 
HML and SMB unconditionally. This is at odds with the behavioural view, as it is 
highly improbable that assets will be mispriced for a prolonged period of time
54
.  
 
In sum, it is apparent that a decisive indication of whether the success of the 
three factor model stems from behavioural or rational theories does not appear in the 
literature. Although it seems important to distinguish between the two theories, it 
must be noted that they are co-integrated, because the unidentified risks associated 
with the anomalous assets are the very reason that makes behavioural explanations of 
these effects so plausible (Brav et al. 2004).  Nonetheless, proponents of the rational 
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 Most behavioural models factor-in the eventual correction to mispricng (Daniel et al. 1998; Hong 
and Stein, 1999), especially at industry level (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 2006). On 
the other hand, Fama and French (1997) found that industry portfolios did exhibit large time-variation 
in factor sensitivities on the HML and SMB loadings, and industries did behave like small or large 
firms and value or growth firms at different points in time.             
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school embrace the results in Davis et al. (2000) and they reach to Merton‟s (1973) 
ICAPM and the conditional CAPM as solutions to the FF3F puzzle.  
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3.7 The Size and the Value Effects and Modern Theory of Asset 
Pricing  
 
Fama and French (1996a) show that the mean return and variance on the SMB 
and HML factors are of comparable magnitude to the market return. Therefore, they 
imply that the factors serve as instruments for some state variables missed by the 
static CAPM. Actually, Aretz et al. (2005) find that exposures to macroeconomic 
risks vary between firms of different market capitalisation and BE/ME ratio. Some of 
this risk is priced. Therefore, in principal, it could be argued that the size and the 
value premia are explained with a risk model, an APT.  
However, it is always possible to find a factor structure that explains returns ex 
post (Roll, 1977; Fama, 1991; Cochrane, 2001). Also, it is easy to falsely document 
factors that price a set of portfolios constructed with information contained in 
previous empirical work (Ferson et al. 1999). Most importantly, a factor that does not 
explain the cross-section of returns may give an illusion of a priced factor 
(Jagannathan and Wang, 1998). Consequently, it is often argued that a concrete theory 
needs to identify priced state variables (Fama, 1998), and use of statistical constructs 
(Connor and Korajczyk, 1988; van Rensburg and Slaney, 1997), or ad hoc 
macroeconomic variables (Chan et al. 1986; Aretz et al. 2005; van Rensburg, 2000), 
is inadequate. Therefore, only models that can identify the nature of the priced factors 
offer a credible description for returns. The Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) of Merton 
(1973) is such a model. Conditional CAPM (CCAPM) in Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) and Cochrane (2001) is one as well. Also, the “Augmented” (“A”CAPM), 
formalised by Ferguson and Shockley (2003), can also play a role. 
 
3.7.1 The “A”CAPM  
 
The static CAPM may provide a correct description of average returns, but its 
practical implementation may be erroneous. In particular, a value-weighted portfolio 
of listed stocks may be a poor proxy for the market portfolio (Roll, 1977). It excludes 
human capital (Mayers, 1972), a substantial source of wealth for most people, and 
debt (Stambaugh, 1982). This section asks if accounting for these omitted assets is 
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sufficient to price the 25 “troublesome” size and BE/ME sorted portfolios created in 
Fama and French (1993).  
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) study the 
impact of omitting the human capital asset from the market proxy. They measure the 
realisation on this factor with growth in aggregate labour income. In sum, both studies 
found it an important factor in asset pricing. In particular, Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996), who focus exclusively on size-sorted portfolios, find that, in a cross-sectional 
test, the labour-income factor yields a reliably positive premium. Together with the 
market factor, it can explain 30% of variation in returns of the size-sorted portfolios. 
Although this R
2
 is much lower than FF3F‟s estimate of 55%, it is markedly higher 
than the 1% obtained from the static CAPM. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) extended 
the test to the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios and found stronger support for labour 
income growth as a priced factor. In their cross-sectional regressions, the R
2
 increased 
from 1% to 58% after the labour-income factor was added to the market proxy, 
although coefficient of variation is still smaller then 80% obtained form the FF3F.  
Human capital is an unobservable state variable, and needs to be substituted 
with another variable; measurement error is unavoidable. In addition, human capital 
may not be the only asset class omitted from the proxy of the true market portfolio 
and, some of these assets cannot be substituted with instrumental variables. Ferguson 
and Shockley (2003) show a potential solution to this conundrum. They argue that the 
divergence between an asset‟s true market beta and the one computed with the 
imperfect proxy can be captured by a firm‟s relative leverage, as an asset‟s return co-
variation with any state variable is a linear function of its leverage (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1958).  
Consequently, Ferguson and Shockley (2003) propose a factor model that 
captures relative leverage. In particular, with methodology of Fama and French 
(1993), they form a model in which the market factor is augmented with a debt factor 
and a distress factor. The second factor is necessary, as high level of debt does not 
signal high financial leverage, and vice versa. In their cross-sectional tests, Ferguson 
and Shockley (2003) show that the model does a good job in explaining average 
returns. Both their factors yield economically and statistically significant premia and 
the R
2
 in their tests exceeds even that of the FF3F.  
Unfortunately, although the ideas of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) are 
validated empirically, their results are not convincing. Not only are their model‟s 
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theoretical foundations weak, the success of the model can be explained in a variety of 
ways. For example, Fama and French (1993) have shown that the default spread and 
level of the yield curve can help to price debt. Thus, these variables are likely to co-
vary with the factors in Ferguson and Shockley (2003). However, if the default and 
the yield curve variables play a role in other models (as it has been shown in Chapter 
2 that they do), then the “missing assets” explanation of the empirical success of the 
debt and distress factors may not only be insufficient, but just plain wrong.           
 
3.7.2 The CCAPM 
 
The static CAPM assumes that loadings on the market factor do not vary 
through time; they are unconditional. Cochrane (2001) argues that, in principal, all 
multifactor models ought to be specified in a conditional form and, in most cases, 
unconditional tests of conditional models are misspecified. Berk (1995) argues that 
misspecification of the asset pricing model manifests itself as the size and the value 
premia, which would disappear if a conditional version of the CAPM is used to adjust 
for risk.  
In the CCAPM, loadings are assumed to vary with the market premium, and 
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) verify empirically that they do. Two types of empirical 
specifications of the model appear in literature: the market premium can be included 
into a factor linear model (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996); alternatively, the market 
factor is scaled (interacted) with instruments for expected returns. The scaled terms 
are included as factors in the pricing equation (Ferson and Harvey, 1999). Cochrane 
(2001) noted that the two methods are theoretically equivalent.  
Arguably, the first test of the CCAPM that aims to explain the size or the value 
premia appears in Jagannathan and Wang (1996). In their model, the default spread is 
employed as the instrument for the market premium. On a set of size-sorted portfolios, 
the authors show that there is a strong negative relation between a firm‟s market 
capitalisation and its loading on the market premium. This finding suggests that time-
variability of market betas of small firms is different to that of large firms. In addition, 
in a cross-sectional test of the CCAPM, Jagannathan and Wang (1996) show that the 
R
2
 jumps from 1% to 29% after the market premium factor is added to the static 
CAPM.     
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Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) and Ferson and Harvey (1999) test the CCAPM 
on the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) model the 
market premium with their cay variable, as it has been shown to be a good predictor 
of market returns in the US (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001a). Ferson and Harvey (1999) 
use a number of empirically derived instruments for expected returns
55
. Both studies 
found, as did Jagannathan and Wang (1996), that the market premium factor is 
positive and it is priced.  
Although Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) and Ferson and Harvey (1999) do not 
show how the betas of value and growth stocks vary with the business cycle, Petkova 
and Zhang (2005), with the aid of a GMM framework and long time-series, directly 
compute the time-series of market betas of the two types of firms. They show that, 
during deep recessions, the beta of a portfolio with value firms is 0.25 units higher 
than that containing growth firms, while at the peak of the business cycle, value 
stocks‟ betas are on average 0.31 units lower than growth stocks‟.  
 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) combine the 
“A”CAPM and CCAPM into one pricing equitation. In particular, the model of 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) explains the same amount of variation as the FF3F and 
the risk premia are reliably different from zero. Also, the authors show that their 
model captures the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables of Chen et al. 
(1986). In a formal test, however, the model is rejected. However, the model of Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2001b) is particularly apt at explaining the average returns of the size 
and the BE/ME sorted portfolios. In particular, they show that their scaled factors, 
which capture time-variability in lodgings on the market and the human capital 
factors, are priced, and that the pricing errors of the model are not statistically 
different form zero, which implies that it may explain the size and the value premia.     
Unfortunately, the puzzle conjured by the value effect cannot be solved with the 
CCAPM. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that the tests discussed above are 
misspecified, as the cross-sectional tests do not restrict the magnitude of the premia 
on the instruments for the market premium. However, the CCAPM theory predicts 
that the premium on each of these variables is dictated by how much information it 
                                                 
55
 In particular, Ferson and Harvey (1999) use spread between one and three month Treasury Bills, 
aggregate dividend yield, a variant of the default spread, the spread between one and ten year Treasury 
bonds and lag of the risk-free rate.  
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contains about variability of the market betas. They note that the premia in Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001b) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) imply the variance of market 
betas and the market premium is implausibly large.  In Lewellen and Nagel‟s (2006) 
view, less than half of the unconditional pricing error of the value strategy can be 
explained by the CCAPM. In addition, the average conditional alpha of the value 
strategy seems to be large - as large, in fact, as the unconditional estimate (Petkova 
and Zhang, 2005; Lewellen and Nagel, 2006). Nonetheless, the importance of the 
inclusion of the human capital factor into the pricing equation has not been disputed, 
and it is deemed a salient factor in asset pricing.    
 
3.7.3 Fama and French Three factor Model is an Intertemporal Capital 
Asset Pricing Model  
 
Fama and French (1993) have always argued that their three factor model is 
consistent with the ICAPM of Merton (1973) (in which investors price assets to hedge 
their unfavourable shifts in the efficient frontier.) Liew and Vassalou (2000) provide 
evidence that Fama and French (1993) may be right, as they show that FF3F factors 
have power to forecast growth in GDP in ten countries. Testing the equivalence 
between the three factor model and the ICAPM is difficult, however, as the ICAPM 
pricing factors are not known a priori. But Cochrane (2001) notes that, since the 
efficient frontier can be summarized with the risk-free rate and the market Sharpe 
ratio, any variables that proxy for innovations in these two parameters ought to be 
priced, and hopefully can resolve the size and the value puzzles (Campbell, 1996). 
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Table 3.9 
The Spread in Loadings on ICAPM State Variables  
Panel A: Loadings of Small Firms on Plausible ICAPM State Variab les   
  
Small Large 
Small less 
Large 
Ave Small 
less Large %  
Period Reference 
u 
Default Spread
 2.852 -0.886 3.738 276% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
u 
Default Spread
 -7.231 3.339 -10.570 231% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Dividend Yield
 -3.488 -4.853 1.365 34% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Rf
 -1.406 -1.437 0.031 2% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Term
 0.738 0.271 0.467 118% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
u 
Term
 1.113 -0.634 1.747 216% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Sharp Ratio
 3.673 0.547 3.126 328% 1952-2001 Brennan, Wang & Xia (2004) 
u 
Rf
 0.813 -0.182 0.995 335% 1952-2001 Brennan, Wang & Xia (2004) 
u 
CashFlow 
 0.295 0.264 0.031 11% 1924-2001 Campbell & Vuolteenaho (2003) 
u 
Discount Rate
 1.231 0.960 0.271 25% 1924-2001 Campbell & Vuolteenaho (2003)  
Panel B: Loadings of Value and Growth Firms on Plausible ICAPM State Variables      
 
Value Growth 
Value less 
Growth 
Ave Value 
less Growth 
%  
Period Reference 
u 
Default Spread
 1.622 0.361 1.261 214% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
u 
Default Spread
 -5.632 0.901 -6.533 421% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Dividend Yield
 0.925 -7.217 8.142 497% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Rf
 -2.721 -1.321 -1.400 79% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Term
 -0.036 1.019 -1.055 1517% 1963-2001 Hahn & Lee (2003) 
u 
Term
 -2.973 2.864 -5.837 200% 1963-2001 Petkova (2006) 
u 
Sharp Ratio
 3.030 1.417 1.613 84% 1952-2001 Brennan, Wang & Xia (2004) 
u 
Rf
 0.144 0.551 -0.407 178% 1952-2001 Brennan, Wang & Xia (2004) 
u 
CashFlow 
 0.307 0.217 0.090 35% 1924-2001 Campbell & Vuo lteenaho (2003) 
u 
Discount Rate
 1.146 1.131 0.015 1% 1924-2001 Campbell & Vuolteenaho (2003)  
The estimates are performed with a time-series OLS, with on the 25 (or 24) size and book-to-market sorted portfolios in Fama & French (1993). The figures reported in the 
table are averages across two size or BE/ME quintiles  
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The ICAPM specification can either be derived empirically or theoretically. The 
empirical method relies on the evidence that market premium and variance of the 
market proxy are predictable with a discernable set of instrumental variables. In 
effect, Campbell (1996) proves that correlation with innovation with these variables 
should be priced. The alternative method is to directly estimate the pricing equation 
from representative investors‟ optimisation problem and, with appropriate proxies for 
the model‟s state variables, estimate and test the specification. Both methods are 
intertwined, as the proxies for most state variables are often identical to the 
instruments for expected returns
56
.  
Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova (2006) adopt an empirical ICAPM. Hahn and 
Lee (2006) focus solely on two possible state variables: the default spread and the 
slope of the yield curve. They do not explicitly model innovation, but simply focus on 
changes in the absolute level of these variables. On the other hand, Petkova (2006) 
extends the set of instruments to include the innovations in the aggregate dividend 
yield and the risk-free rate and uses a multivariate VAR system to model innovations.  
Table 3.9 shows the differences in loadings on innovations in the instruments for 
the risk premium
57
. In general, small firms differ markedly to large firms in their 
loadings on the innovations term spread and the default spread. In addition, betas with 
innovations in the aggregate dividend yield, the term spread, and default spread, are 
vastly different among firms of various book-to-market ratio. Also, the magnitude of 
the difference in loadings on the innovation in the term spread between value and 
growth firms, emphasized in Hahn and Lee (2006), attenuates after addition of 
innovations in the dividend yield and risk-free rate in Petkova (2006). In addition, 
cross-sectional tests performed by the authors indicate that innovation in the risk-free 
rate and the term spread play a role in pricing of the 25 size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios. Although insignificant, other variables are also relevant in explaining 
returns, as both models produce R
2
s that are very close to that of the FF3F.  
The variables used in Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006) are validated 
empirically, but they do not offer an intuitive explanation as to what exact source of 
                                                 
56
 Invariably, ICAPM is linked to the CCAPM and the “A”CAPM, as instruments for the market 
premium that played a role in CCAPM (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996) are also central to ICAPM 
specifications. Also, since many of them price debt (Fama and French, 1993), they may proxy the 
missing factors in the “A”CAPM (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003). The ICAPM, however, may enforce 
a more rigorous structure on the asset pricing model then the other two specifications. 
57
 The loadings found in Hahn and Lee (2006) in Table 3.9 are identical to those in Table 3.6 as they 
can be read as “pure” macroeconomic variables or ICAPM state variables.    
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risk they proxy. Vassalou (2003), following Liew and Vassalou (2000), thought that if 
HML and SMB can predict GDP growth, they must capture the news regarding future 
economic activity. She goes on to build a two-factor model that consists of the market 
portfolio and the “GDP-news” factor. According to the GMM tests of Vassalou 
(2003), her factor contains similar information to the FF3F. In addition, it has a 
relatively low correlation with the HML and SMB factors, indicating that there may 
be a cleaner measure of the underlying sources of risk that lie behind the success of 
the three factor model. However, the construction of the “GDP-factor” uses a similar 
set of variables to what researchers use in modelling the market premium. Therefore, 
it is likely that the specifications in Vassalou (2003), Petkova (2006) and Hahn and 
Lee (2006) capture the same macroeconomic forces (Petkova, 2006).  
Empirically driven factor models are unconvincing tools for asset pricing, at 
least to the academic community. Consequently, theoretical models need to be 
constructed and tested. Brennan et al. (2004) derive one such theoretical version of 
the ICAPM. At first, they model the time-series pattern of the efficient frontier by 
assuming that its two germane characteristics (the risk-free rate and the maximum 
Sharpe ratio) follow a continuous mean-reverting first-order Markov (an AR(1)) 
process. Then, with a set of primary assets and the use of a Kalman filter
58
, they 
estimate a time-series of the instantaneous risk-free rate and the instantaneous Sharpe 
ratio. Subsequently, these factors are combined with the market portfolio to form a 
three factor ICAPM, which is then tested against the FF3F model by assessing its 
ability to price the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios.  
Table 3.9 indicates that the book-to-market ratio and market equity predict an 
asset‟s co-variance with variables that capture the innovation of the efficient frontier. 
In line with the ICAPM theory, the presumably riskier, small and value firms have 
high loadings on the innovations on the Sharpe ratio. Also, higher loadings on the 
innovation in the real interest rate for small stocks are consistent with the story in 
Brennan et al. (2004). However, value firms appear to be less sensitive to news about 
interest rates than growth firms.  
Theoretical ICAPM can make predictions about the sign of the premia.  A priori, 
co-variance with the innovation in the Sharpe ratio should command a positive risk 
                                                 
58
 In layman‟s terms, a Kalman filter is a procedure that species a position of a quantity from a series of 
incomplete or noisy measurements. In effect, the procedure can specify a time-series of a variable if the 
underlying stochastic process is known a priori.    
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premium, as stocks that pay poorly when the Sharpe ratio is falling are especially 
undesirable. Also, innovations in the interest rate should command a negative 
premium. Investors dislike when the interest rates go up because the return-variance 
trade-off worsens. Brennan et al. (2004), in a cross-sectional test, calculate that the 
premia on their three factor ICAPM are of the correct sign and their magnitude is 
similar in tests that use different sets of test assets. Also, Brennan et al. (2004) show 
that, when applied to the “anomalous” 25 portfolios, the composite pricing error of 
their model is smaller than that of the FF3F and, by merit of a statistical test, it is not 
different from zero!  
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) take a different approach. At first, they note 
that if the market risk premium is dynamic, then an asset‟s systematic return may be 
governed by innovation in two distinct state variables: news of aggregate cashflow 
and news of the aggregate discount rate. If Merton (1973) is correct, and most 
investors are in the market for the long haul, then the premia associated with the two 
sources of risk are not equal. For instance, if there is an increase in the market 
discount rate, all stock prices fall, but future returns are, on average, higher. Long-
term investors suffer contemporaneous decline in wealth, but also enjoy higher returns 
in the future. For this reason, all else being equal, investors may not discount stocks 
with strong co-variance with innovation in the discount rate as aggressively as assets 
that exhibit strong co-movement with innovations in the aggregate cashflow 
(Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). Since the market beta is equal to the sum of the 
cashflow beta and the discount rate beta, stocks with equal market betas may yield 
vastly different expected returns. For example, an asset with a market beta of 1 that is 
mostly comprised of the “risky” cashflow beta will yield a higher return to an asset 
with the same beta that mostly consists of the “passive” discount rate beta.  
Subsequently, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) construct a two-factor model. 
In Table 3.9, it is shown that value stocks do have higher loadings on the more “risky” 
cashflow factor, while small stocks exhibit only a marginally larger sensitivity to 
innovation in the aggregate cashflow. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) solve the 
investor‟s optimisation problem and, with the ICAPM intuition, formulate a 
theoretical relationship between the premium on the cashflow innovation and the 
discount rate innovation. Like Brennan en al. (2004), Campbell and Vuolteenaho 
(2004) show that, in cross-sectional tests and various sets of test assets, their 
theoretically derived two-factor model yields significant and positive risk premia. 
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Also, when tested on the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios, the model does yield an 
R
2
 that is nearly as high as that of the FF3F and its composite pricing error is not 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels.    
In sum, it appears that the FF3F is indeed an ICAPM. However, most of these 
models use a similar set of instrumental variables to model state variables important in 
the ICAPM
59
 specifications. Therefore, it is plausible that their predictive power is 
sample-specific. In addition, only one of the models is supported by the theoretical 
rigor stressed by Cochrane (2001); therefore the “fishing for factors” argument of 
Fama (1991) is still relevant for most ICAPM specifications discussed above. In 
addition, Brennan et al. (2004) show that their model fails to simultaneously price 
industry portfolios and the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios. Nonetheless, it does 
appear that the ICAPM framework is a useful tool for thinking about patterns in asset 
prices and it is more rigorous than the vacuous theory underpinning other multi-factor 
models.  
 
So far, the review surveyed some of the asset pricing models derived from the 
static CAPM. It would be prudent to directly test the competing models against the 
three factor model. Table 3.10 provides some evidence as to how different models 
discussed so far fare against the FF3F. Since not all articles conducted a joint test, 
only a sub-set of the studies is considered. In sum, it can be seen in the table that 
nearly all asset pricing models “price-out” the factors in the FF3F60. However, the 
distress-risk hypothesis is inadequate in explaining the value premium, as the HML 
factor continues to be priced in Vassalou and Xing (2004). Also, the CCAPM in 
Ferson and Harvey (1999) leaves a positive premium on the value factor. Nonetheless, 
the empirical ICAPM specification seems to capture the same information as the three 
factor model. This result, together with the finding that the theoretical ICAPM in 
Brennan et al. (2004) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) are not rejected, 
indicates that the FF3F is an ICAPM and not a CCAPM.           
                                                 
59
 Model of Brennan, Wang and Xia (2004) is an exception. 
60
 It must be noted that the SMB never did price the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios, thus the results    
of most studies pertain to the pricing power of the HML. 
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Table 3..10 
The Cross-Sectional Tests of the FF3F 
Factor  Mean  t R
2
 Table  Method 
Test 
Assets Period 
Panel A: Jagannathan and Wang (1996)   
Market -0.380  -0.800  
Market Premium  0.220  3.320  
Labour 0.110  0.160  
SMB 0.160  0.780  
HML 0.220  0.840  
64% IV 
Fama-
MacBeth 
100 Size 
sorted 
portfolios 
1964-
1990 
Panel B: Ferson and Harvey (1999)   
Market  0.153  0.491  
Market Premium  0.445  7.537  
SMB 0.092  0.631  
HML 0.237  1.715  
-- V 
Fama-
MacBeth 
25 Size 
& 
BE/ME 
sorted 
portfolios 
1964-
1994 
Panel C: Ferguson and Shockley (1999)  
Market  -0.670  1.510  
Leverage Factor 1.650  3.050  
Z-Distress Factor  1.020  2.330  
SMB
1
 -0.350  -1.340  
HML
1
 0.170  0.820  
81% III 
Fama-
MacBeth 
25 Size 
& 
BE/ME 
sorted 
portfolios 
1964-
2000 
Panel D: Hahn and Lee (2006) 
Market -0.590  -1.080  
u
Term
 0.270  2.630  
u
Default Premium
 -0.020  -0.460  
SMB
1
 -0.040  -0.170  
HML
1
 0.200  0.950  
76% IV 
Fama-
MacBeth 
25 Size 
& 
BE/ME 
sorted 
portfolios 
1963-
2001 
Panel E: Petkova (2006) 
Market -0.570  -1.100  
u
Dividend Yield
 -0.083  -0.940  
u
Term
 3.870  2.560  
u
Default Premium
 0.370  0.310  
u
Rf
 -2.900  -2.440  
SMB 0.420  1.400  
HML 0.410  1.560  
77% V 
Fama-
MacBeth 
25 Size 
& 
BE/ME 
sorted 
portfolios 
1963-
2001 
Panel F: Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
Market  0.010  2.155  
Distress Factor 0.010  4.479  
SMB -0.003  -0.692  
HML 0.006  2.662  
-- XI GMM 
27 Size, 
BE/ME 
& 
Default 
sorted 
portfolios 
1971-
1999 
1
 The FF3F factors are orthognelized with respect to other factors     
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3.8. Some Unanswered Questions   
 
The last section has shown some compelling evidence in favour of risk-based 
explanations for the size and the value effects. In addition, the FF3F model has been 
linked to discernable sources of economic risk, captured by the ICAPM. However, a 
slew of empirical facts contradict the rationalists‟ explanations for the size and the 
value premia
61
.   
 
3.8.1 Holes in Risk Stories can be Patched with Behavioural Finance 
 
   Some rationalists believe that the size and the value effects stem from failure 
to adjust for idiosyncratic or aggregate illiquidity risk (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). If the size characteristic is tantamount to a measure of 
liquidity, then a firm‟s loading on the SMB is a proxy of a stock‟s liquidity. Actually, 
Ferson et al. (1999) show that if a factor could be crafted from a liquidity attribute it 
would appear to be priced. However, according to Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996), the three factor model does not contain a sufficient amount of information on 
a stock‟s liquidity. They construct a sophisticated measure of direct and indirect 
trading costs with which they form 30 portfolios. Subsequently, they use a time-series 
test and compute the three factor model‟s pricing errors of the liquidity-sorted 
portfolios. The model is rejected. In fact, many of the intercepts are bigger than the 
largest absolute error in tests of FF3F on the size and BE/ME sorted portfolios. Also, 
the stocks that are most expensive to trade are the most severely mispriced.     
There are few, if any, joint tests of the FF3F model and the aggregate liquidity 
effect of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Since Acharya and Pedersen (2005) do show 
that this factor can explain about half of the cross-sectional variation in returns to size 
and BE/ME sorted portfolios, it is plausible that the three factor model does contain 
some information on aggregate liquidity. And, since size is correlated with loadings 
on the liquidity factor, it ought to be somewhat co-linear with the SMB. The snag is 
that there is little economic theory that identifies the determinants of the time-series 
                                                 
61
 The aim of this section is only to undermine the risk-based view of financial markets - a complete 
survey of behavioural finance is left to Barberis and Thaler (2003).     
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variation in aggregate liquidity. Baker and Stein (2004) propose a model where 
liquidity is a proxy for overvaluation, both at firm and aggregate level. They note that 
noise traders, faced with short-sale constraints, can enter the market only when they 
are optimistic. In effect, liquidity increases and shares become overpriced, and the 
observed negative relationship between the level of liquidity and the ex ante return 
stems from mispricing being arbitraged away. Therefore, any explanation for the size 
and the value effects based on illiquidity risk may actually be behavioural, not rational 
in nature.  
Another hypothesis the rationalists propose is that the size and the BE/ME 
premia are manifestations of systematic risk related to financial distress. They claim 
that firms that are near bankruptcy ought to have low prices to compensate investors 
for the added risk. This story is undermined by Dichev (1998), who finds that firms 
with a high probability of default have very low BE/ME ratios.  In addition, her tests 
were conducted in a period in US history when bankruptcy risk was high but size 
effect did not exist at all.   
In addition, the evidence in support of a separate distress factor is mixed. For 
example, Daniel and Titman (1997) note that if the factor exists, then as soon as a 
firm enters financial trouble (its BE/ME ratio rises) its loading on distress factor ought 
to increase. Because variance of a portfolio of firms that strongly co-vary with each 
other should be high, relatively speaking, the time-series of the variance of a portfolio 
with firms that are thought to be distressed is revealing about how within-portfolio co-
variance of stocks changes over-time.  Put simply, if a distress factor exits, variance of 
a portfolio of distressed firms ought to increase at some time prior to its formation. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) use these facts to see if the BE/ME measures distress, by 
investigating the evolution of the variance of a portfolio containing firms with high 
book-to-market ratios.  They find little evidence of a change. The co-variance of firms 
with similar BE/ME is equal five years before and after firms became distressed, and 
the authors interpret this finding as evidence that a separate distress factor does not 
exist. In a much simpler manner, Lewellen (1999) also provides evidence to suggest 
that financial distress does not drive the value premium. He shows that many industry 
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assets load unconditionally onto the HML. Thus, this factor measures distress because 
industries cannot be near default all the time (Lewellen, 1999)
62
.  
A formal illustration that the factors in the FF3F model have little to do with 
financial distress appears in Griffin and Lemmon (2002). They measure distress with 
Ohlson‟s (1980) measure of probability of bankruptcy (the O-score) and use this 
characteristic to form a set of test assets. When they run a time-series test, they find 
that firms that are most distressed are also most mispriced by the FF3F model. Most 
importantly, the pricing errors of firms with the highest O-score were larger in 
absolute value than any intercept in the time-series regressions in Fama and French 
(1993). In addition, the dispersion in loadings on FF3F factors in determined by an 
asset‟s BE/ME ratio and not by its probability of bankruptcy.    
It is difficult to disentangle the distress story and the behavioural story. Consider 
a number of firms, possibly across many industries, that experience a string of 
negative, factor or idiosyncratic, news. These firms are more likely to become 
distressed, see their BE/ME ratio fall, and load on a distress factor. If this factor is 
priced with a positive premium then high returns will be observed. At the same time, 
the extrapolation hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler, (1985) and Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), or the positive feedback trading story of Hong and Stein (1999) or Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003), predict that such firms are most likely to become underpriced. 
Their prices move together as valuations revert back to the “rational” level. This 
shared variation will appear like a common factor relating to firms that fall in value, 
i.e. a distress factor.  
In addition, evidence in Schwert (2003) of strong attenuation in the realised size 
and value premia after the 1980s does not sit well with risk-based theory, as the 
effects seemed to disappear after they have been discovered. Shiller (2003) stresses 
that the anomalies must wax and wane, as mispricing cannot be constant in time; 
while the behavioural model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) predicts that profitability 
of investment styles must go through cycles.  The fact that size effect re-emerged 
within the value segment
63
 in the last few years (2002-2005) strengthens their point. 
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 On other hand, Vassalou and Xing (2004) document stronger evidence for a distress factor. Recall 
that they construct a cleaner measure of a state variable that measures distress, and it does seem to be 
priced. However, the authors show that the HML contains information that is orthogonal to the distress 
factors. 
63
 Graciously shown by Chris Muller.  
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Lastly, Griffin (2002) shows that there is virtually no correlation between the 
HML factors found in the four most integrated stock markets of the US, Canada, 
Japan and the UK - even though macroeconomic variables are correlated between 
these countries. This finding is in line with the models of Peng and Xiong (2004) and 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), which assume that investors have limited ability to 
process relevant information, as they predict that correlation in returns of different 
asset classes will be much smaller than economic fundamentals.  
 
3.8.2 Multifactor Models cannot explain the Size and Value Premia  
 
Risk does not have to be associated with distress. Merton (1973) shows how 
intertemporal hedging concerns, which Fama and French (1993, 1996) so 
emphatically present as the economic explanation for their model, are a source of risk 
to investors. Although it has been shown that the ICAPM intuition goes far in 
explaining the successes of the three factor model, Chan (2003) dispels the hope that 
the book-to-market effect is exclusively driven by the ICAPM. Following Cochrane 
(2001), he argues that theory, not empirical work, must be used to specify the size of 
the premia of an ICAPM specification. Unlike most models presented thus far, Chen 
(2003) develops an ICAPM specification from representative agents‟ investment-
consumption problem. The high level of parameterisation of the model imposes two 
restrictions: a premia on a factor must depend on the amount of information the given 
variable contains for predicting market returns, and the premia on all factors must be a 
function of the aggregate risk aversion. When he tests the ability of his restricted 
ICAPM to explain the book-to-market effect, the model fails abysmally.    
In his view, the successes of other ICAPM methods in pricing the size and the 
book-to-market portfolios occurs because other methods do not impose the 
restrictions on their premia. To illustrate, consider innovation in the term spread - a 
variable that can forecast market‟s return and is a natural candidate for a state variable 
in an ICAPM model. Petkova (2006) shows that this state variable is priced, but its 
cross-sectional estimate of the premium is 11 times higher than that of the HML! In 
order to explain this large estimate, the term spread must be very volatile (this is not 
true (Hahn and Lee, 2003)) and it must very precisely forecast the market return (this 
is also not true (Ferson and Harvey, 1999)). 
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Table 3.11 
Asset Pricing Models against Characteristics 
Characteristic Mean t R
2
  Table Method 
Test 
Assets 
Reference  
BE/ME 0.226 2.282 n/a  VII Fama-MacBeth FF25 Ferson & Harvey (1999) 1964-1992 
BE/ME 0.070 1.760 76%  VIII Fama-MacBeth FF25 Petkova (2005) 1963-2001 
BE/ME 1.090 2.880 81%  IV Fama-MacBeth FF25 Lattau & Ludvigson (2001) 1963-1998 
Size -0.119 -2.393 n/a  VII Fama-MacBeth FF25 Ferson & Harvey (1999) 1964-1992 
Size -0.070 -1.300 65%  II Fama-MacBeth FF100 Jagannathan and Wang (1996) 1963-1990 
Size -0.070 -1.790 77%  VIII Fama-MacBeth FF25 Petkova (2005) 1963-2001 
Size -0.330 -1.930 76%   IV Fama-MacBeth FF25 Lattau & Ludvigson (2001) 1963-1998 
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Actually, it seems that the high premiums in Petkova‟s (2006) cross-sectional 
regressions are a consequence of the wide spread in mean returns of the size and 
BE/ME sorted portfolios
64
, rather than a reward for holding state variable risk.   
Nonetheless, it has been shown that, in principle, some linear asset pricing 
models can capture the same amount of variation in returns as does the three factor 
model. However, the critique presented in Daniel and Titman (1997) rings true to any 
multi-factor model. In particular, for the model to be accepted, it must be shown that 
the factor loadings, and not the characteristics, describe the cross-section of returns
65
. 
Table 3.11 shows some, admittedly limited, evidence on how different models fair 
against predictive power of market equity and the book-to-market ratio. In sum, no 
model can “price-out” the BE/ME ratio. Only the model in Petkova (2006) reduces 
the significance of the coefficient to just below 10%. The evidence concerning size is 
more encouraging, as none of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Curiously, the human-capital “Augmented” CCAPM of Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) completely removes the importance of size, but an essentially similar model of 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) does not. Since both studies use a different set of test 
assets, this puzzle illustrates the argument of Kendal and Stambaugh (1995), who 
showed that the premium obtained from a cross-sectional test is a function of the test 
assets employed.  
 
3.3.3 On the Profitability of the Anomalies 
 
The last point in this section centres on the conclusion of many studies which 
found that the returns on strategy implied by the size and the value effects are too 
large to be explained by a risk story. A long position in the value portfolio financed 
with a short on position growth, over a five-year horizon, always seems to generate 
positive profits (Lakonishok et al. 1994). Also, it has been shown that the value 
strategy outperforms the growth strategy during “bad” times, while it is significantly 
more profitable during “good” times. (Lakonishok et al. 1994). The finding is robust 
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 Imagine xy-plane where the variability in y is high and the variability in x is low. In this case the line 
of best fit must be steep. 
65
 For instance, Fama and French (2006) show that in a certain period the CAPM can perfectly explain 
the value premium. However, they show that portfolios of assets with different market betas but similar 
size and BE/ME ratio do not yield markedly different returns. 
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to different measures of economic state, such as growth in GNP or aggregate market 
return. Liew and Vassalou (2000) obtained similar results. In a broader case of ten 
industrialized countries, they found that the value firms outperform the growth firms 
in poor economic states in all countries but the Netherlands. 
Daniel and Titman (1999) test the profitability of a strategy that combines value 
with the momentum effects; they do not use size. Their finding is a trenchant 
illustration of how lucrative a strategy that uses both of these anomalies can be. 
Consider a purchase of stocks with high momentum and high book-to-market ratios, 
and a short position in stocks with low momentum firms and low book-to-market 
ratios. According to Daniel and Titman (1999), such a strategy yields a negative 
return only in 3 (out of 34) years. In comparison, Fama and French (1996a) show than 
the market return is negative about 30% of the time. In addition, this value-
momentum “super portfolio” yields an annualised mean return of over 12%, and a 
CAPM α of 14.04%, with a β of -0.258%!  
Even without resorting to momentum strategies, Fama and French (1993) prove 
that the time-series regressions of excess returns of the size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios onto the market factor produce large intercepts. MacKinlay (1995) was 
among the first to ask whether these intercepts are not perhaps “too large” to be 
plausible under any multifactor model. At first, he notes that the pricing errors (the 
intercepts) of any model are a function of the Sharpe ratios that the equity market 
implies. He then imposes a bound on any plausible Sharpe ratio by noting that 
traditional asset pricing theory states that the tangency portfolio has the highest 
attainable Sharpe ratio. Consequently, if a linear combination of securities (like the 
size and BE/ME sorted portfolios in Fama and French (1993)) yield a higher Sharpe 
ratio than one that is plausible for the tangency portfolio, then a risk-based 
explanation for these anomalies must be rejected. Next, MacKinlay (1995) calculates 
what Sharpe ratio can be achieved from the full exploitation of the anomalous returns 
to the size and BE/ME portfolios. In his view, it is close to one, and thus it implies 
that a market portfolio with a standard deviation of 18% (the historical estimate) 
should yield an ex ante excess return of 18%! Although, this estimate could be correct 
for South Africa (an emerging market) it is more than double the equity premium in 
the US; Brealey and Myers (2000) are “comfortable” with 9%. As a result, MacKinlay 
(1995) concludes that the returns earned by exploiting the size and the value effect are 
too large to be plausible under a multifactor model.  
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Hogan et al. (2004) follow MacKinlay (1995) and note that a strategy that offers 
returns that are too large cannot be consistent with market efficiency. They go on to 
introduce a concept of statistical arbitrage, which they define as a trading strategy that 
costs zero to initiate and provides a positive expected profit that eventually becomes 
risk-less as the length of the investment horizon approaches infinity. Intuitively, a 
strategy that offers statistical arbitrage, can be seen as “a very good deal” and, just 
like pure arbitrage in Ross (1976), it contradicts market efficiency. They develop a 
test, which does not specify a model for risk, to ascertain whether profitability of a 
strategy is “too good”. Hogan et al. (2004) find that value strategies based on ex post 
sales growth and cashflow yield constitute statistical arbitrage. Surprisingly, the 
evidence of the book-to-market effect contradicting the efficient market hypothesis is 
weaker and the size effect does not constitute statistical arbitrage.           
 
Brav et al. (2004) note that, by very definition, mispricing cannot be easy to 
prove. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that the precise reason why rational 
arbitrageurs do not fully offset noise-induced mispricing is because they cannot 
credibly communicate the profitably of doing so to the providers of capital - meaning 
that markets will never be fully rational, but the efficiency will proceed to the point 
where mispricing is difficult to unequivocally detect. Therefore, when one is asked 
which theory offers a better description of the process underlying variation in asset 
prices, a convenient “both” is the most likely answer. 
 
 
 118 
CHAPTER 4: THE DATA AND THE METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Motivation of the Research Objectives     
 
4.1.1 Part I: The Size and the Value Premia on the JSE 
 
Fama and French (1992) show that firm-level returns are forecastable with 
several easily measurable characteristics and Fama and French (1993) construct a 
model to capture this predictability. Thus, in order to construct their three factor 
model for the JSE, the existence of the size and value premia ought to be validated. 
Although inter alia van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a; 2003b) show that the two 
effects exist on the JSE, it is necessary to repeat the analysis of those studies to 
ascertain that the results carry over to other samples and remain robust after 
adjustment for trading costs. Also, the optimal value-growth indicator must be found 
with which the value factor in the FF3F is to be constructed.  
Analysis of the size and the value effect on the JSE is not novel. Although inter 
alia van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a, 2003b), Fraser and Page (2000) and Auret 
and Sinclaire (2006) provide compelling evidence in favour of these effects, it is 
believed that some tests must be replicated as there are a number of contradictory 
facts reported in the studies. First of all, there is some disagreement on the magnitude 
and independence of the size premium. Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a, 2003b) 
find that the effect is strong and independent of the value effect. However in the 
cross-sectional regressions of Auret and Sinclaire (2006), the size effect disappears 
after the book-to-market ratio is included as a regressor. This finding is particularly 
puzzling as one-way portfolio sorts in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) show that 
the premium is very strong at 2.5% per month, and their cross-sectional correlation 
coefficients between market capitalisations and their measures of value are small.  
A second puzzle is the extraordinary strength of the value effect documented by 
van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b), who show that, on a monthly basis, low P/E 
shares outperform high P/E shares by 3.3% per month. This return is more than six 
times larger than the excess (of the risk-free rate) return on the market portfolio 
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during the period. What is more puzzling is that the magnitude of effect attenuates 
only a fraction after van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) control for the size effect
66
.  
Lastly, the studies cannot agree on the optimal value-growth indicator to be 
used in the South African market. Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) favour the 
price-to-earnings ratio; Auret and Sinclaire (2006) show that the book-to-market ratio 
is a better predictor of returns (in the cross-section at least), but after they include all 
of the ratios in a cross-sectional regression the cashflow yield is the only significant 
variable. Interestingly, both studies find little correlation between the different value-
growth indicators. However, in cross-sectional regressions, one often “prices out” the 
other, indicating a degree of co-linearity between the variables.  
The methodology employed in this study may prove to be more conducive in 
resolving these questions. For instance, the sample size used in this research is larger 
then the one used in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a). In all likelihood, it is also 
larger than the sample in Fraser and Page (2000), who consider a long, but illiquid, 
period in the history of the JSE - thus adjustment of their data for liquidity would 
wipe out many usable data points from their sample. Also, the monthly portfolio 
rebalancing in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) (according to Conrad and Kaul 
(1993)) may bias the computed returns. It may also confound the size and the value 
effects with the short-term reversal effect of Jegadeesh (1990). More importantly, 
none of the studies do a thorough robustness test of the size effect. The JSE is an 
illiquid market and it is likely that much, if not all, of the premium can be explained 
by market microstructure effects. To their credit, prior studies do apply a liquidity 
filter, but these restrictions may be too weak. Lastly, few studies perform potentially 
more powerful portfolio tests that use value-weighting instead of the typical equally-
weighted portfolios.  
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 Nonetheless, Fraser and Page (2000) find a much smaller magnitude of the value premium and they 
use a similar, but longer, sample period to van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a). The test in Fraser and 
Page (2000) may lack power as their sample period stretches back to the period when the JSE was very 
illiquid. 
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4.1.2 Part II: The Static CAPM and the two-factor APT of van Rensburg 
and Slaney on the JSE 
 
A number of tests show that the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or a multifactor 
model built on the intuition of Ross‟ (1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory, is a reasonable 
specification of the risk-return relationship in the financial markets in the US (Black, 
1993; Brennan et al., 2004; Chen, 1983; Aretz et al. 2005). However, at the same 
time, the size and the value premia cannot be explained by these models (Fama and 
French, 1992; Fama and French, 2006; Brennan et al. 1998; He and Ng, 1994). It is 
the ability of the size and the value effects to survive risk adjustment with these 
“traditional” asset pricing models that presents the need for the FF3F. Consequently, 
the need for the construction of the three factor model may be demonstrated with 
evidence that the CAPM and the two-factor APT of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) 
(henceforth, RS-APT) cannot explain the size and the value premia. In addition, joint 
tests of the two models against the firm‟s characteristics are also undertaken. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1998) and Cochrane (2000) argue that such tests are most 
powerful testaments to the validity of any asset pricing model.   
Actually, van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) have 
undertaken similar tests. It is believed that no mistakes or misspecification of tests 
occurred in their analysis. However, the joint tests of the size and the value premia 
with other “traditional” risk models is repeated in order to, in part, address data-
mining concerns of Black (1993), who states that it is prudent to validate results of 
prior research in new samples.  
More importantly, tests in van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003a) are time-series in nature, which are, according to Cochrane (2001), 
restrictive, and a cross-sectional alternative seems natural. The importance of the 
restrictions may not be apparent in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), who use 
cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regressions. However, since the dependent variable in 
their tests is a sum of the residual and the intercept of a time-series OLS projection, 
their cross-sectional tests are subject to two important time-series restrictions 
(Cochrane, 2001). Implicitly the regressands are generated under the assumption that 
the risk-free rate is equal to the zero-beta rate and that the mean return on the factor is 
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an unbiased measurement of the true factor premium (Brennan et al. 1998). If these 
two assumptions are not true (actually Elton (1999) does show that the assumptions 
are false) a systematic bias into the dependant variable is introduced. Consequently, 
cross-sectional analysis is performed, which allows for free estimation of the risk-free 
rate and the risk premia.  
Nonetheless, the tests in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) are repeated as 
they have power because the error-in-variables problem is solved, and since the data 
need not be grouped, it resolves the data-snooping concerns of Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990a). However, the tests in this thesis will differ to the tests in van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003a) in two technical aspects. First, the Newey-West (1987) method is 
employed to correct for possible autocorrelation in the estimated coefficients in the 
Fama-MacBeth test. Second, Brennan et al. (1998) note that coefficients in a method 
employed in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) may be biased and propose a 
corrective measure which is employed in this thesis. 
 
4.1.3 Part III: the FF3F and the RS-FF3F on the JSE 
 
Fama and French (1993) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) show that the FF3F 
is a good descriptor of variation in stock prices. Although the model is often rejected 
with formal tests, it does capture a fair share of time-series and cross-sectional 
variation in returns. There is much disagreement concerning the economic phenomena 
that underpin the model‟s success. On the one hand, inter alia Fama and French 
(1993, 1996a) and Davis et al. (2000) argue that the model captures macroeconomic 
risks, which static CAPM and the APT model fail to pick up. Specifically, the 
construction of the model is motivated by findings of inter alia Aretz, et al. (2005), 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Petkova (2006), who show that the FF3F factors 
contain information regarding the macroeconomic state. More specifically, Petkova 
(2005) and Aretz et al. (2005) show that their macroeconomic factor models do as 
good a job of pricing assets across size and value spectrum as does the FF3F. 
Why not build these macroeconomic models instead? Construction of such 
linear factor models in South Africa is prohibitively difficult. For example, 
predictability of the market index has not been adequately documented, thus the 
pertinent ICAPM state variables have not been identified. Although international 
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studies provide insight into the nature of candidate factors, their construction in the 
South African market is not easy. Many of the state variables need to be constructed, 
often with data that is tainted by illiquidity. In particular, an undeveloped corporate 
bond market inhibits construction of the default spread and the lack of an “on-the-run” 
Treasury Bill market complicates construction of the yield curve, and other variables 
associated with it. In addition, researchers in the US often share data and the 
construction of a full set of certain variables from scratch in the South African market 
is a Herculean task. Good examples of important sate variables that are difficult to 
construct are the default factor of Vassalou and Xing (2004), the cay variable in 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), or even the aggregate dividend yield. Lastly, use of 
some of the data (growth in wages, for example) would force the data frequencies of 
the tests to change from monthly to quarterly intervals, thus considerably limiting the 
sample size. In sum, it is the opinion of the author that FF3F might serve as a good 
proxy for a linear factor model that is more theoretically justified.  
The construction of the FF3F can also be motivated by behavioural finance. 
Specifically, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that 
FF3F stems from the violation of perfect rationality on the part of investors and the 
HML and SMB loadings are correlated with characteristics that indicate mispricing. 
Ferson  et al. (1999) provide simulation evidence that misvaluation would manifest 
itself as a model in the spirit of the FF3F. Therefore, the model can price assets that 
do not possess characteristics that measure mispricing (such as investment funds). 
Lastly, Fama and French (2003) stubbornly maintain that their model is still a good 
model to use, even though they admit that behavioural finance does provide useful 
insight into asset pricing. 
Consequently, in the initial tests contained in Part III of the empirical analysis, 
the three factor model of Fama and French (1993) is constructed and tested. In 
addition, a version of the FF3F, which replaces the market portfolios with the two 
factors of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) is devised and tested as well. It is referred 
to as the van Rensburg-Slaney-Fama-French three factor model or RS-FF3F for 
short
67
.  
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 Although there are four factors in the model, a convention observed in the literature indicated that the 
fourfactor model is presented in Carhart (1997). And, van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) themselves 
allude to the fact that their two factors are just a better measurement of the one market.  
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There are few tests of the three factor model on the JSE. Van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2004) form factors akin to the SMB and HML, and Scher and Muller 
(2005) use the FF3F to test for investment performance of professionally managed 
funds. Their analysis is particularly clever, as their use of investment funds as test 
assets removes any influence of firm specific noise and makes their results relevant to 
the investment community. However, in spite of the fact that Scher and Muller (2005) 
do provide time-series intercepts of various assets, they do not test for the overall 
significance of the model.  
Nonetheless, to the best knowledge of the author, no study on South African 
data employs cross-sectional methods to test the Fama and French (1993) model. 
Consequently, initially in Part III of the empirical analysis, the model is subjected to 
various tests, in time-series and cross-sectional form, on several test assets. The 
emphasis is on the size and F/P sorted portfolios that static CAPM and RS-APT are 
most likely to misprice.        
In the latter section of Part III of the empirical analysis, the FF3F and the RS-
FF3F are tested jointly against characteristics. Besides being powerful indicators of 
the model‟s suitability (Jagannathan and Wang, 1998), these tests can shed light on 
the economics underpinning the FF3F, as they have power to discern between the risk 
and non-risk explanations for the size and the value premia.  
Although, van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) do perform a test where the 
characteristic-based view of asset pricing is paired against the three factor model, it is 
believed that there are a number of methodological shortcomings in their method. 
First, van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) use one-factor regressions in loading 
estimation. Gujarati (2002) shows that omission, from an OLS projection, of a 
variable that is correlated with one of the repressors, biases the estimated coefficient. 
For instance, van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) show a negative correlation 
between firm size and betas. Thus, the SMB factor is very likely to co-vary negatively 
with any omitted market factor and the loading on that factor would be biased.  
Second, the short estimation period used during computation of the factor 
loadings is seen as more problematic. van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) use 
between 12 and 36 months in their regressions, which is too short
68
 and may 
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 To explain, casual simulation shows that a typical standard error of an estimated beta that uses a 
twenty-four month period, with the standard deviation of the error close to that of the market portfolio 
(very conservative assumption), is about 0.5. Therefore, the length of the 5% confidence interval of a 
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exacerbate the error-in-variables problem. Berk (2000) provides a formal, and 
thorough, discussion on the subject.   
The third problem is that Van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) use a 
sequential, and not an independent, sorting procedure during their portfolio formation. 
It can be argued that sequential sorting on two highly co-linear variables yields very 
poor, within-group, dispersion of the second characteristic in the final portfolios, and 
if the dispersion in loadings is low the tests will have less power. In fact, the high 
correlation between factor loadings and characteristics is the very reason that led 
Daniel and Titman (1997) to use the independent sorting procedure.  
Consequently, portfolio sorts and short-term loading estimation is not used in 
the joint tests of the FF3F, or the RS-FF3F.Altogether different methodology, which 
is advocated by Cochrane (2001) and is akin to the one employed in Brennan et al. 
(1998), needs to be used to jointly test the three factor model against the characteristic 
model. In this procedure, the full listing period is employed during estimation and, 
since predictive power of characteristics is tested independently of the model, these 
tests may lead to more power.  
In sum, the aim of the empirical section of the thesis is to provide a series of 
tests that give the reader insight into the size and the value effects and general 
multifactor asset pricing. It is humbly noted that, apart from the formal test of the 
three factor model and its variant, the analysis replicates and builds upon the work of 
van Rensburg (2005), who pioneered this asset pricing research on the JSE.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
typical estimated beta is about 1.96. At the same time, international literature suggests that factor 
loadings on the FF3F factors are not excessively large (in absolute value). Typically, the coefficients on 
the HML fall between -0.6 and 0.9, and coefficients on the SMB fall between -0.3 and 1.4 (Fama & 
French, 1997). Therefore, in short, thus imprecise estimations, it would be very difficult to discern 
between large and small loadings, as the distribution of most factor loadings covers the bulk of the 
range the betas can be drawn from. Luckily, van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) form portfolios, 
which may attenuate the problem, as they hope that estimated factor loading will at least be assigned to 
the correct portfolio. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that many estimated betas of average value will fall 
into portfolios that represent high or low loadings, and vice versa. 
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4.2 Data Collection and Sample Characteristics  
 
One of the key objectives of this research is to perform the tests on a reasonably 
complete sample of firms. In South Africa, there is a deficiency of publicly available 
research-quality financial data; thus, a number of data sources are simultaneously 
used and these are often spliced together. Also, when compared with larger markets, 
the universe of monthly observations available to an econometrician is limited. Not 
only does data availability restrict the sample period, but number of listed (and liquid) 
stocks further constrains the usable sample. Power of test is directly related to sample 
size; therefore some statistical luxuries open to American researchers are dropped. As 
a result, all firms are candidates to be included in the sample, regardless of size. Also, 
rather lax liquidity requirements are imposed when choosing the sample. The liquidity 
criterion is similar to van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a ,2003b, 2004) 
Three types of variables are needed; namely, corporate action data, stock-level 
type data and accounting data. Corporate action data can be defined as a 
comprehensive list of companies listed in the sample period, corresponding dates of 
each firm‟s listing, de-listing, changing of its name, as well as information on any 
possible corporate actions such as unbundling transactions and certain capitalisation 
issues. Stock level data comprises stock prices, shares in issue and trading volume. 
Lastly, accounting measures of value such as earnings per share, cashflow per share 
and book value of equity are also needed.     
The primary sources of raw data used in the study are I-Net Bridge (henceforth, 
I-Net), The Buro of Financial Analysis/McGregor‟s database (henceforth, BFA) 
Bloomberg Professional Service (henceforth, Bloomberg), McGregor‟s Who Owns 
Whom Manual (henceforth, McGregor‟s Manuals) and finally the JSE monthly 
bulletin (henceforth, JSE bulletin).   
 
4.2.1 Primary Information 
 
The unrestricted sample comprises all firms listed on the JSE from December 
1989 to July 2005. The list of firms was compiled from companies catalogued in the 
December issue of the JSE bulletin.    
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Data and date of all-share listing, de-listing, unbundlings, suspensions, name 
changes and changes were obtained from the back pages of the JSE bulletins. The 
name change data are used to “string together” companies which changed their name. 
This procedure is similar to the work in Chan et al. (1995), who note that conventions 
on coding of firms that change names or restructure is often made independently by 
each data provider. In effect, using historical codes from JSE bulletins allows for un-
adjustment for name changes of data from each provider and then a consistent   
treatment of all such corporate actions.  
In total, between December 1989 and July 2005, 799 firms delisted, 428 firms 
listed and there were 422 name changes. Also, 125 unbundling transactions and 
special pay-outs were found in the sample period. In order to compile the list of 
relevant stock splits, consolidations and other capitalisation issues (hereafter, split 
list), information contained in the Bloomberg and JSE Bulletins is relied on, and 192 
such corporate actions are unearthed.         
Share prices, shares in issue and monthly trading volume data is obtained from 
I-Net. The actual (unadjusted) prices (henceforth, real prices) are not only a variable 
used to explain share returns, but are also required in the calculation of market 
capitalisation and the dividend yield. To their credit, I-Net factor-in many 
capitalisation issues, such as stock splits and share consolidations. However, it does 
not adjust for unbundling transactions and dividends. Hence, the data obtained from I-
Net cannot be directly used.  
The detailed description of the process behind obtaining real prices can be 
obtained from the author, however a short description of the method is in order. Each 
December, real prices are hand-collected from the JSE bulletin and the ratio between 
the captured price and the price supplied by I-Net calculated: it is the implied split 
factor. Generally, if a firm has the same split factors in two consecutive calendar year-
ends, then it is assumed that the split factor holds between two dates. If two 
successive split factors are not the same, then the split list (mentioned in the previous 
section) is used to determine the exact month of the share split or consolidation, and 
the time series of split factors is adjusted accordingly. In an extreme case, where there 
is no information suggesting the time of the corporate action, prices are manually 
captured from the JSE bulletins. Consequently, a spreadsheet that records each firm‟s 
split factor in the sample period is created. Finally, real prices are calculated by 
dividing the prices supplied by I-Net with a corresponding split factor.    
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Market capitalisation is calculated, using I-Net data, by calculating number of 
shares in issue by the price obtained from I-Net. Unfortunately, I-Net does not provide 
(in its terminal) shares in issue data prior to 1994. In order to calculate market 
capitalisation prior to 1994, shares in issue data is captured from JSE bulletins. For 
earlier periods, market capitalisation is obtained by multiplying captured shares in 
issue by the real price of a share, with an adjustment for certain capitalisation issues. 
If a firm has two types of shares (say, voting and non-voting) then the market 
capitalisation equals the sum of the value of the two types of shares.   
Trading in a firm‟s shares may be suspended. The JSE Bulletin often records the 
precise date of a firm‟s suspension and, if it exists, its reinstatement. All data time- 
series are adjusted for a firm‟s suspended trading. In spite of this, at times the trading 
volume data reveals that a firm‟s monthly trading volume falls to zero for a prolonged 
period of time. Since the JSE manual may not be exhaustive in terms of the firm‟s 
suspension dates, and, more importantly, reinstatement dates appear to be sporadically 
omitted, an additional list of suspensions is compiled. All firms that did not trade for 
six consecutive months were deemed suspended from the first month of no trading 
activity until the month where trading volume is not zero. In addition, if a firm does 
not trade prior to its discontinuation in I-Net price data, the firm is deemed suspended 
in the month where trading volume falls to zero. Cash shell companies are treated as 
suspended shares. 
 
4.2.2 Returns  
 
The holding period return of a given firm at time t is calculated with the 
textbook formula: 
 
*
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        (4.1) 
Trivially, pt is the share price (in cents) of the asset at time t, rt is the return and 
dt+1 is the dividend (in cents). Also, gt is the price appreciation of a stock, adjusted for 
corporate actions. In this case, d
*
t+1 is the value of all payouts to shareholders in 
interval t to t+1. It comprises dividend payments and other special payouts, denoted 
δt+1. In order to minimise effect of outliers in computation returns, any firm may not 
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yield a return of more than 200% and less than -66.66%. This procedure impacts 283 
or 0.27% data points.  
In the case of the JSE, the major component of δt+1 is the value of unbundled 
and distributed shares. The primary use of the gt variable is to “move forward” ratios 
of fundamental value to price. To illustrate, if one knows that the book-to-market 
value of a firm at some point is x, then its book-to-market ratio in the next period will 
be x/ gt.
69
 Although it is possible to calculate book-to-market value, by dividing the 
last known book value by market capitalisation in every period, this procedure may 
not be correct. If a firm issued new shares, (or repurchased them), then the observable 
book value will not correspond to the market value of the firm. The book value rose at 
the time of the stock issue.  
From (4.1) it is apparent that calculation of returns requires three components: 
prices, dividends and other payouts δt+1.  It is assumed that all price data provided by 
I-Net has been adjusted for stock splits, consolidations, capitalisation awards and any 
other corporate actions that do not directly influence market value of the firm. As a 
result, stock‟s price appreciation (or depreciation), calculated using I-Net data, is 
assumed to be reflective of a capital gain (or loss) of an investor. Dividends and the 
Last Day to Register (L.D.R.) dates are hand-captured directly from each December 
issue of the JSE Bulletin. Dividend yields were calculated by dividing the dividend by 
the real price at the beginning of the L.D.R month. Information on unbundlings, and 
other payouts are collected from the JSE Bulletin‟s corporate actions pages, and 
returns are appropriately adjusted.   
  
4.2.3 Fundamental Ratios 
 
All accounting data used in fundamental ratio calculations is obtained from the 
BFA and I-Net databases, with the McGregor Manuals being a supplement. Primarily 
the BFA accounting data is used. Alternatively, I-Net data is relied upon if BFA does 
not have the information. Surprisingly, I-Net dataset has good coverage of older firms, 
while BFA covers more recent firm with higher completeness. If data is not available 
in either database it is captured from the McGregor Manuals. In addition, at times, 
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data from the McGregor Manuals and the BFA database conflict. In such cases, the 
BFA database is used. For firms with financial statements denominated in foreign 
currency, the data from I-Net is used; if data form I-Net is not available the firm is 
dropped from the sample.   
Book-to-market ratio is defined as book value of the equity divided by market 
value of the equity at the end of the financial year-end. For book value, item 1 in the 
BFA balance sheet data is used (“Ord Shareholders Interest‟), or item LI05 in the I-
Net data (“Equity”) summed with item BI05 (“Intangibles: "Assets" excluded by 
analyst”). The definitions are nearly equivalent, as the correlation between book-to-
market ratio obtained from BFA and I-Net is 0.993 and is based on 4900 observations.  
Headline earnings per share (henceforth, HEPS) are obtained directly from the 
I-Net and BFA databases. It appears as Item 306 (“EPS-Headline”) on the BFA 
income statement data, and Item IS34 (“Headline Earnings as calculated”) in the I-Net 
data source.  Earnings yield is defined as headline earnings per share divided by price 
at the end of a financial year-end. The price used depends on the source of the 
financial data. If data is captured from BFA then BFA price is used, and so on. This 
procedure makes the ratios consistent among different data sources and different 
conventions regarding stock splits and consolidations.  Correlation between earning 
yield obtained from the I-Net and BFA databases is 0.986 and is based on 4767 
observations.  Since much of the data is captured, and the McGregor Manuals began 
to publish HEPS only from 2002, headline earnings are proxied with ordinary 
earnings per share or net earnings per share. The McGregor Manuals define earnings 
as profit attributable to shareholders being divided by the number of shares in issue at 
the financial year-end.  
Cashflow per share data is not provided by I-Net, therefore the BFA database 
and McGregor Manuals are relied on for the information. If the item is not available 
in the BFA electronic database it is captured from the McGregor Manuals. If it cannot 
be captured, I-Net data is used to construct the variable from the definition provided 
by the McGregor Manuals, which, in essence, adjusts headline earnings for non-cash 
items such as depreciation, deferred tax, minority interest and preferred dividends. 
This occurred very sporadically and represents less than 100 out of 7714 fiscal year-
ends of firms in the sample. Nonetheless, C/P is deemed a relatively poorly measured 
variable.         
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A keen reader will notice that use of the financial ratios will result in the look- 
ahead bias of Banz and Breen (1986): the above-mentioned ratios “come into effect” 
six months after the financial year-end. To bring the F/P ratio forward it is multiplied 
by six month buy and hold return beginning at the firm‟s financial year-end. The buy 
and hold return does not take into account dividends and can be seen as an adjustment 
for share movement between the fiscal year-end and the “effective” date. In this way 
it is assured that the effect of the accounting data being released into the market is 
reflected in the F/P ratio.     
On a technical note, all characteristics are represented as natural logarithms and 
are standardized. This procedure eliminates effects of inflation on variables in the data 
set and equalizes cross-sectional distributions - a property that is desirable in asset 
pricing tests (Chan et al. 1991).  
 
4.2.4 Sample Characteristics 
 
The sample period spans June 1992 to July 2005, yielding 156 monthly 
observations. Since factor estimation requires a minimum of 24 months of prior 
monthly price data, all stock level and corporate action data was collected from 
December 1989
70
. Also, it was necessary to capture accounting data prior to June 
1992 in order to ensure that accounting data was available to form an F/P ratio on 
June 1992.  
 
Table 4.1  
Sample Composition 
Total number of firms listed between December 1989 and July 2005. 1180 
less firms without sufficient data -30 
less foreign firms without I-Net accounting data -9 
less firms listed for less than 24 months -195 
less property trusts and property loan stock shares  -53 
Firms in the sample 893 
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 This ensures that return for January 1990 is available.  
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Table 4.1 shows the candidate number of firms and the resultant usable sample of 
firms. In order to conform to international studies, pure real estate investment trusts 
are excluded from the sample. The requirement that a firm has been listed for at least 
24 months is the largest cost to the sample. However, the effect is rather small, as 
these firms would not have an F/P ratio for at least six months - thus the impact on the 
sample is minimal. Cash companies are not explicitly excluded, but are marked as 
suspended. This procedure removes such firms from any subsequent tests. The total 
number of firms included in the sample (893) is somewhat misleading, as it does not 
show how many firms are listed in a given month.  
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4.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Test of Predictive Power of Characteristics 
 
Tests of the size and the value premia use portfolio sorts and the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Both these methods are standard practice in asset pricing tests (inter alia 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2006), van Rensburg (2001) and van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003a; 2003b)). They need to be replicated in order to achieve suitable 
comparisons with international and local studies. Table 4.2 defines the variables. 
 
Portfolio Tests  
In tests utilising portfolio sorting, the individual returns in the portfolios can be 
weighted equally or weighted according to the stock‟s market capitalisation. Although 
value-weighting decreases the impact of trading costs (Daniel and Titman, 1999), the 
equal-weighted results may be preferable as firm specific events are less likely to 
influence the results. As there is some disagreement among academics regarding the 
best weighting scheme, both types of results are presented. 
In tests utilising one-way sorts, five portfolios are made. The first group consists 
of stocks with the largest values of the characteristic and the fifth group consists of 
stocks with the lowest value of the characteristic. The premium associated with the 
sorting characteristics is computed by subtracting the mean return of portfolios 
containing stocks with the highest value of the characteristics from the mean return of 
the portfolio containing stocks with the lowest value of the characteristic. The number 
of portfolios formed in this way is arbitrary, and is chosen for historical reasons 
(Fama and French 1993, 1996a; Van Rensburg and Robertson 2003a, 2003b). All 
two-way sorts use independent sorting, i.e. the breakpoints of the second sort are 
determined using the entire cross-section of returns at the moment of rebalancing. 
Thus, the number of portfolios is not known a priori.  However, sorts are repeated 
until there are at least two stocks in each portfolio.   
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Table 4.2 
Definition of Variables and Symbols  
ir  
e
ir  
A vector of return series of asset i 1 2i i iTr r r  
tr  
e
tr  
A vector of a cross-section of N 
asset returns at time t 
1 2t t Ntr r r  
Superscript e denotes 
excess returns,  
e.g. 
e
ir or 
e
tr  
i  A vector of time-series residuals for 
asset i 
1 2i i iT
 
  
te  
A vector of a cross-section of N 
time-series residuals asset returns at 
time t 
1 2t t Nt
 
  
j
f
 
A vector of return series of a factor 
mimicking portfolio of factor j 
1 2
j j j
Tf f f
 
  
tf  
k
tf  
A vector of cross-section of K 
factor mimicking portfolios 
realisations at time t   
1 2 K
t t tf f f
 
A superscript k implies 
that the first element is 
one  
f  
A matrix of T observations on the K 
factors (K x T) 
1 2 K
f f f
 
the data matrix is 
NF f  
i
 
A vector of time series of pricing 
errors 
,1 ,2 ,i i i T
 
Often  
i T i
 
 
a  
A vector of pricing errors of N 
assets   
1 2 N
 
 
ib
 
A vector of loadings of asset i on K 
factors 
1 2 K
i i i
 
  
j
b
 
A vector of loadings of N on factor 
j   
1 2
j j j
N
 
  
b  
 
A matrix of loadings of N assets on 
K factors (K x N) 
1 K
N b b  A superscript 0 the first 
row of ones  
ic  A vector of L characteristics of 
asset i  
1 2 L
i i i    
k
c  A vector of loadings of N on factor 
j   
1 2
j j j
N    
c  
 
A matrix of L characteristics of N 
assets (K x N) 
1 2 Lc c c  
  
l  A vector of the zero-beta rate and K 
vector premia   
1
0
K
 A superscript 0 the 
zero-beta rate 
 
q  A vector of the zero-beta rate and L 
characteristic premia   
1
0
L
 A superscript 0 the 
zero-beta rate 
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During rebalancing, the adjustment for outliers is performed, but only after the first 
sort. Winzorising is performed by, at first, calculating annual buy and hold return for 
each stock. It is then standardized by the cross-sectional standard deviation of the buy 
and hold returns in the portfolio that the stock was assigned to. The stock is excluded 
from the portfolio if its standardised return is larger than the absolute value of three
71
.  
In order to account for market microstructure effects, stocks that do not conform 
to price or liquidity criteria are excluded from the analysis. The use of the share price 
to account for trading costs is substantiated by Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), who 
show a strong relation between prices and dollar cost of trading. Ali et al. (2003) also 
use price as a measure of trading costs. The choice of illiquidity variable follows Hou 
and Moskowitz (2005), who use a twelve-month average of trading volume scaled by 
number of shares in issue.   
All portfolios are rebalanced annually, at the end of June. The appeal of the 
simulated portfolio procedure is that it aims to mimic the experience of an average 
investor. Actually, Barberis and Thaler (2003) note that people evaluate their 
portfolios once a year, so annual rebalancing may be more aligned with reality. A 
more frequent rebalancing of portfolios may act against this intuition and it imposes 
very high trading costs on a representative investor. The potential loss of information 
caused by an annual portfolio reformation mentioned by van Rensburg and Robertson 
(2003a) is not present in multivariate cross-sectional regression tests, which also 
appear alongside the portfolio tests. It is noted that annual rebalancing confounds the 
value effect with the momentum effect. However, this is not a problem and it actually 
increases the power of the tests. Value stocks generally perform poorly before the 
classification date (Fama and French, 1995) and the momentum effect predicts poor 
return on these stocks. Therefore, for the value premium to manifest itself, it must first 
“beat” the effect of past price momentum.     
All the means and associated t-statistics are calculated in Excel. The sorts, 
restrictions and winzorising are programmed into the worksheet with Visual Basic for 
Applications.      
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 The unwinzorised results are available upon request.  
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Regression Tests  
The cross-sectional tests are performed with the Fama-Macbeth procedure
72
. 
The inclusion of shares into the regressions is selective, as firms with low share prices 
and low liquidity are excluded. Since the Fama-Macbeth procedure assumes that the 
coefficients are drawn from the same normal distribution in each time period, all 
characteristics are represented as natural logarithms and are standardized (Chan et al.  
1991). In short, the observation used in the regression will be the deviation from the 
mean divided by the cross-sectional standard deviation in month t. The mean and 
standard deviation for the F/P ratios are obtained from a distribution that excludes 
negative values (van Rensburg and Robertson 2001a, 2001b). This transformation 
brings the variables closer to the normal distribution.  
In order to adjust for outliers, all observations in the top and bottom 2.5% of the 
cross-sectional distribution will be set to values corresponding to the 97.5
th
 percentile 
and 2.5
th
 percentiles, respectively.  
Formally each cross-sectional regression in the Fama-MacBeth test is: 
1
ˆ
t t t tr c q a                   (4.3) 
The vector of regressors is: 
  / / / / /1t Size E P C P BE ME E P C Pc c c c c d d D  
and consequently the premia vector is: 
  0, , / , / , / , / , / ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
t t Size t E P t C P t BE ME t D E P t D C P t
q D  
The first four elements of the vector are the characteristics that are thought to forecast 
stock returns. In order to deal with negative F/P ratios, the technique of Fama and 
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 Econometric textbooks advise a number of panel data specifications to tackle estimation when the 
sample is a time-series of a cross-section. However, financial data is plagued with a number of 
statistical problems that invalidate the panel CS-TS approaches. Fama and MacBeth (1973) and, 
subsequently, Cochrane (2001) argue that standard errors of standard panel techniques are mis-stated 
due to cross-sectional dependence of residuals. This cross-sectional correlation occurs when, for 
example, a firm‟s i good return today translates into a firm‟s j good return - meaning that the unique 
risk of an individual asset (the error terms) will be correlated. Another problem with panel approaches 
is that time-series correlations of most regressors used in the study are very high. To illustrate, a firm‟s 
size and its P/E ratio will be, at times, perfectly correlated with the share price. Simply, if price goes 
up, so does the firm‟s equity and its P/E ratio. Surprisingly, these three variables may represent 
different fundamental attributes of a firm, and researchers are often interested in the incremental 
explanatory power of each of these variables. Too much multicollliniarity, makes the inference 
difficult. Last, a related problem is encountered where lagged F/P ratios are used in a time series OLS. 
Time variation of F/P ratios stems from changes in price, but the ratios are also highly auto-correlated, 
which leads to an endogeneity problem and biases the estimated coefficients (Lewellen, 2004). 
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French (1992) is used. Specifically, the natural log of the ratio itself is zeroed and a 
separate dummy variable is assigned a one for negative F/P ratios and zero otherwise. 
The last two elements in the vector represent these variables. The matrix D is a 
diagonal matrix of indicator variables and specifies the set characteristics applied in 
each regression. 
The vector of coefficients in the Fama -MacBeth regressions is:  
1
1
ˆ ˆ
T
T t t
t
E
T
q q q          
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for serial 
correlations with the Newey and West (1987) method, with a correction of up to four 
leads and lags, meaning that:  
4 4
2
, , , , , ,2
4 4 1
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Trivially: 
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j
t   
All the cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regressions are performed in Stata. 
Similarly, calculation of the coefficients and the standard errors is done with a sub-
routine programmed into Stata.      
 
4.3.2 Tests of the Asset Pricing Models 
 
Tests of asset pricing models will be conducted in two ways: in a time-series 
format and a cross-sectional format. The tests are always unconditional. Although 
there is a much evidence that most loadings in pricing models are time-varying (Fama 
and French, 1997; Fama and French, 2006), Ghysels (1998) notes that a badly 
specified process for the time-variation in betas leads to a much larger error than if the 
variation is ignored. Since little is known about the time-variation in factor loadings 
on the JSE, the error would be particularly severe if applied. At first, all asset pricing 
models are tested in a time-series format. Cochrane (2001) notes that in cases, as the 
one in this thesis, when the asset pricing factors are also returns, the time-series can be 
used to measure pricing errors. This setup is advantageous because it circumvents a 
number of statistical problems that plague more complex analysis. However, the time-
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series test does impose two restrictions on the data. The zero-beta rate is assumed to 
be equal to the risk-free rate, and the time-series mean of the factor mimicking 
portfolios is assumed to be equal to the true expectation of the premium it emulates. 
Both these assumptions imply that the intercept in the time-series tests is an unbiased 
estimate of the pricing error of the asset the model is asked to price. 
In each case, a time-series approach is used and it is followed by a less 
restrictive cross-sectional approach. Black (1972) argues that the equivalence of the 
risk-free and the zero-beta rates is violated in imperfect markets, while Elton (1999) 
gives a trenchant argument that time-series means of portfolios are poor instruments 
for expected returns. In a cross-sectional analysis, the factor premia are directly 
estimated and the set-up allows for some measurement error. The zero-beta rate also 
can be treated as a free parameter (Cochrane, 2001).  
To each cross-sectional OLS regression, a corresponding GLS regression is run 
for two reasons. First, Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) show that the method can check 
if the estimated premia are specific to the weighing-shame employed during 
calculation of the test assets. Second, Cochrane (2001) notes that the GLS regressions 
yield better estimates of the factor premia because the procedure “pays more 
attention” to information contained in observations (portfolios) which are subject to 
less statistical noise. In effect, the dependent variables are re-weighed where better-
measured regressors receive more weight.     
The GLS regressions require an estimate of a particular matrix of second-
moments. It is directly used to compute the coefficients; thus any measurement error 
in matrix elements creeps into the estimates of the factor premia. In order to minimise 
the imprecision of this estimate, the GLS estimation is only possible when the cross-
section of assets is not large relative to the length of the sample period. And, the 
method requires the use of liquid assets. Considering that moments of infrequently 
traded assets are measured with an error, the elements of the second-moment matrix 
can be mis-measured, particularly in an illiquid market such as the JSE. Consequently, 
the use of GLS estimation is a double-edged sword. It provides a robustness check on 
a re-weighed set of test assets, and has a stronger footing in statistical theory. But, it 
may yield biased estimates of the factor premia.  
In theory, asset pricing tests ought to be performed on individual securities, but  
statistical considerations force grouping of shares into portfolios. For one, many 
formulas used to compute standard errors cannot be applied in situations in which the 
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cross-section of assets is large relative to the length of the sample period. Thus, 
grouping allows for a decrease in the amount of test assets. In addition, running asset 
pricing tests on portfolios reduces, if not eliminates, the impact of firm specific risk 
on estimation of mean returns and factor loadings. However, the method of grouping 
data into portfolios is an arbitrary one, and since the estimated premia are a function 
of weights assets receive in the portfolios, the asset pricing tests are conducted on 
different sets of assets.  
Choice of Test Assets  
Statistical considerations require the test assets to exhibit wide dispersion in 
mean returns and factor loadings (Chen, Chen and Hiseh, 1986). For instance, 
Gujarati (2002) explicitly shows that the standard of errors of OLS estimates are 
negatively related to the variance of the independent variables. And, MacKinlay and 
Lo (1990a) prove that if the pricing errors of a model are correlated with some 
characteristic, using portfolios sorted with that characteristic will increase the power 
of the asset pricing tests.   
Consequently, the choice of test assets used in the empirical analyses follows 
Brennan et al. (2004), who use the 25 portfolios advocated by Fama and French 
(1993, 1995) and 30 industry portfolios constructed by Fama and French (1997). 
Inclusion of the industry portfolios ensures variation in CAPM betas and RS-APT 
loadings, while the size and F/P sorted portfolios ensure dispersion in SML and HML 
loadings.  
The test assets, which capture the size and the value effects, will comprise two 
sets of assets constructed as an intersection of the four size and three value-growth 
portfolios. The two-way characteristic sort is performed twice because Leledakis and 
Davidson (2001) note that more than one value-growth indicator may be relevant. The 
two value-growth indicators, which are deemed best predictors of returns, are used in 
the sort.  
 Stocks are also sorted into 22 industry portfolios. The identification of each 
firm‟s industry is made on the basis of the description of the line of business that 
appears in the McGregor Manuals. Industries used in the study can be seen in Table 
4.3. At times, the categorisation is similar to the one followed by the JSE, but at times 
new sectors are “created” for the purpose of this thesis, and thus, this categorization is 
somewhat subjective. In order to remove the influence of firm-specific noise, some 
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industries are merged together, while portfolios with few stocks in them (e.g. 
Telecommunication) or industries with highly heterogeneous companies (e.g. 
Healthcare) are dropped altogether
73
. It needs to be stressed that industry 
classification is necessary to obtain a sufficient variability in factor loadings, and it 
need not be exact. All in all, the industry assets consist of four portfolios of financial 
firms, five portfolios of resource firms and 14 portfolios of industrial firms.   
Table 4.3  
Industry Portfolios 
Panel A: Industrial  
Construction & Construction Suppliers  IT Services 
Electric Hardware & Electronics  Light Manufacturing – Consumer 
Food Light Manufacturing – Industry 
General Serv ices Packaging & Printing 
Hoteling, Touris m & Leisure Retail – Consumables 
Industrial Suppliers Retail – Durables 
Investment Trusts  Transport 
Panel B: Financial 
Banks 
L-term Insurance 
Non-Bank Financial Services 
S-term Insurance 
Panel C: Resources 
Gems 
Gold 
Mining Houses 
Other Metals & Minerals   
Construction of CAPM and RS-APT Factors  
Because the entire universe of listed shares is captured, it is possible to 
calculate the Market return from the primary data. Therefore, the market proxy is the 
value-weighted return of all shares in the database. The correlation between the 
synthesized market index and the actual “all-share” index published by the FTSE is 
0.99. The average outperformance of the synthesized index is 0.312% per month 
(3.74% annualized). It is closely in line with the average market dividend yield. Also, 
the synthesized index includes more small stocks than the published index as the all-
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 For the interested reader, General Services includes, among other service and consulting firms, the 
Staff Services & Education sector of the JSE. Food and Beverages sectors are merged. Light 
Manufacturing - Consumer includes Textiles, while Other Metals & Minerals includes Coal & Energy. 
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share does not include all shares listed on the JSE.
74
 This means that the synthesized 
index will include “some of the size effect”.    
The Resource and the Findi factors are calculated in a similar way. The 
resource factor is the value-weighted return of all mining shares in the dataset, while 
the Findi factor is the value-weighted return of all Financial and Industrial shares.  
Construction of Fama and French (1993) Factors  
In their seminal article, Fama and French (1993) constructed their (in)famous 
factors by initially forming six elementary portfolios and with a linear combination of 
these composites they formed their factors. To be more precise, these elementary 
portfolios were obtained from an independent two-way sort of two size portfolios on 
three value portfolios. They form the SMB factor by subtracting the average return of 
three portfolios containing small stocks from the average returns of three large stock 
portfolios. Similarly, they construct the HML factor by subtracting the average return 
of the two most-value portfolios from the average return of the most-growth 
portfolios.       
The construction of HML and SMB factors (FF3F factors) follow Fama and 
French (1993) very closely, and consequently differ from the factors of Van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2004). The constructed factors are re-balanced annually, not monthly. 
It has already been discussed why the monthly balancing method may overstate the 
observed size and value premiums. Second, only a subset of stocks is used for 
determination of the breakpoints for the six element portfolios. This point merits 
further explanation. Fama and French (1993) formed their six portfolios using 
breakpoints of the NYSE and did not include NASDQ and Amex shares. In other 
words, they foresaw that the use of the entire cross-section in the determination of the 
breakpoints would actually result in a portfolio containing “very small”, not “small”, 
stocks. Simply put, cutting the cross-section of listed shares in half culminates with 
one of the portfolios being filled with many tiny capitalisation shares. This problem 
would be particularly severe for the JSE, as there are many vary small, and few very 
large, firms listed on the exchange. In order to address this problem, each June, all 
listed stocks are ranked according to their liquidity. A stock‟s measure of liquidity is 
its twelve-month average of its monthly trading volume scaled by the number of 
shares in issue. Consequently, the breakpoints for the six portfolios of Fama and 
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 A point made by Chris Muller.  
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French (1993) are derived using the 200 most liquid stocks.  Also, stocks included in 
the elementary portfolios are subject to the usual restrictions on price and liquidity.     
A possibly more preferable method of factor construction would take into 
account the segmentation of the JSE into Resource as well as financial and industrial 
shares (i.e. constructing separate HML and SML factors for Resource and Findi 
stocks). However, such sub-division will induce firm specific variance into the factors 
and will escalate the endogeneity problem already present in the FF3F model. 
Although Cochrane (2001) provides thorough theoretical reasons why residual risk in 
factors is a problem, it can be said intuitively that it is difficult to measure exposure to 
a risk factor, if the factor itself is measured with an error. In addition, if FF3F factors 
are indeed instruments for true innovation in state variables (inter alia Petkova, 2005; 
Aretz et al. 2005), unnecessarily large factor variance strongly opposes Fama‟s (1996) 
argument that the variance of ICAPM factor mimicking must be as small as possible.  
It is not a foregone conclusion that the separation of FF3F factors into the two 
asset classes is theoretically correct. Why would the value and size premiums be 
different for Resource and Findi stocks? A growing amount of literature (Hahn and 
Lee, 2006; Vassalou and Xing, 2002) documents that FF3F factors capture risk related 
to distress and access to finance. Therefore, at any point in time, the composition of 
factors will change as firms in different industries go into, and climb out of, distress 
(Daniel and Titman, 1997). The weighting of different asset classes in the SML and 
HML will adjust automatically. Alternatively, the behavioural view suggests that 
small and value firms are underpriced. However, as different industries become 
underpriced due to fickle investor sentiment, so will their relative weights in FF3F 
factors. Nonetheless, the power of industry adjusted FF3F factors to price assets on 
the JSE is left for future research.  
As a matter of notation, the SMB factor is referred to as SML factor (“Small 
minus Large”), while HML is referred to as VMG (“Value minus Growth”). This 
notation distinguishes factors derived in this thesis from the original factors of Fama 
and French (1993). Although Eugene Fama and Kenneth French did not copyright the 
names of their factors, the alterative naming system is introduced out of courtesy.    
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Time-Series Tests  
All time-series asset pricing tests will be conducted with the time-series SURE 
system that is mapped into the GMM system
75
. This procedure yields test statistics, 
which are robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation in residuals, but 
incorporate the efficiency gain provided by the SURE methodology.  
In all the regressions, a lag of the Market, Resource or Findi factors is included 
in the specification. This ensures that microstructure effects, such as infrequent 
trading and slow diffusion of information, are, admittedly imperfectly, taken into 
consideration. According to Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson (1997), omission of the 
lag can capture a portion of the size effect. Dimson (1979) provides theoretical 
justification for this procedure, but he also advocates inclusion of lead terms as well. 
In initial tests of the models, the lead terms were rarely significant and, at times, large 
in value; thus, in order to avoid a possible bias in estimated betas, it was decided to 
exclude them from the analysis.  
Formally, regression of factors on a asset i is:  
ˆe
i i iir fb  for i = 1, 2, 3… N                (4.4) 
The superscript e suggests that the dependant variable is the realized return net of the 
risk-free rate. In all time-series regression tests it will be assumed that the risk-free 
asset exists and it is represented by the three-month T-Bill rate, which is obtained 
from the website of the South African Reserve Bank. Cochrane (2001), following 
Jensen (1968), notes that the intercept αi is the pricing error of an ith asset. The vector 
of the factors is: 
M M lag R R lag I I lag SML VMG
f f f f f f f ff D  
The f
M
 represents the Market factor, which is the return series on the value-weighted 
return of all securities in the dataset in excess of the risk-free rate. The f
R
 is series of 
the Resource factor, which is the value-weighted excess return of all mining shares in 
the dataset. The f
I
 is series of the Findi factor, which is the value-weighted excess 
return of all financial and industrial shares in the dataset. The series with the (lag) 
subscript are the factors lagged by a month. The f
SML
 and the f
VMG 
 are the size and the 
value factors. The matrix D is a diagonal matrix of indicator variables that specifies 
the factors in each regression equation.      
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 For more detail see Greene (2003).  
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Financial assets do not exist in isolation and there is much correlation between 
residuals of individual assets, and often can be presented as a SURE (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions) system - which Greene (2003) recommends for application in 
financial markets. The SURE method simultaneously estimates factor loadings for a 
number of assets and it takes cross-correlation of returns into account and improves 
the precision of estimates of bi; estimates are more efficient. 
Portfolio returns are stationery, but exhibit a non-negligible auto-correlation 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997; Cochrane, 2001). Furthermore, 
heteroskedasticity (or conditional heteroskedasticity) may be present in monthly data. 
Meaning standard OLS (and SURE) time-series regressions will not yield efficient 
estimates, and thus some adjustment to standard errors is often necessary.  
Consequently, the standard errors are calculated by mapping N time-series 
regressions into a GMM system: 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, 0k eT T t t tg Ea b f r a b f                (4.6) 
This procedure ensures that the standard errors are heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent. MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) formally advocate use of 
this method.  
According to Cochrane (2001), a non-zero asset pricing error of a single asset 
does not lead to a rejection of the asset pricing model. However, a good model will 
yield asset pricing errors that are on average small. In fact, the time-series test 
validates a candidate asset pricing model if the estimated intercepts are jointly zero. 
Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) develop a statistical test (henceforth, the GRS 
test) for simultaneous significance of a group of intercepts. It assumes that errors are 
uncorrelated over time, and homoskedastic. Their GRS-statistic follows an F-
distribution, and is given by: 
1
1 1
, 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 ( ) ( )T t T t N T N
T N K
E E F
N
f f a a              (4.7) 
the Σ matrix in the formula often needs to estimated with: 
1
ˆ
T
t t t t
i
E e e e e  
The parameter ˆ  in the equation is the variance-co-variance matrix of factor 
deviations:  
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1
1ˆ
T
t T t t T t
t
E E
T
f f f f  
Trivially: 
  
1
T
T t t
i
E f f  
The GMM estimation of the SURE system is performed with the EViews 
statistical package. The calculation of the components of the GRS statistic is done in 
an Excel worksheet, except the matrix, Σ, which is calculated from a GMM system by 
EViews.   
Cross-Sectional Tests  
The two-pass cross-sectional tests can be conducted with the cross-sectional 
regression shown in Chapter 12 of Cochrane (2001) (henceforth, the CCSR 
regression) or the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Cochrane (2001) proves that the Fama-
Macbeth and the CCSR regressions produce identical estimates of the factor premia, 
if, as is done in this thesis, the betas are estimated with all the available time-series 
data points.   However, the two procedures do differ in two important aspects. First, 
unlike the Fama-MacBeth tests, the CCSR method is easily modified for GLS 
estimation, which is ideal, statistically speaking. Second, the standard errors 
computed with the Fama-MacBeth procedure are not misstated if a large cross-section 
of test assets is used.   
The long estimation period makes sense in light of the findings of Fama and 
French (1997) that most loadings are mean-reverting and full-period estimates and 
when compared to ones obtained with rolling regressions, yield very similar estimates 
of expected returns. In other words, the gain in precision from the longer estimation 
period is offset by the loss in precision due to ignoring of time-variability of betas - 
especially, given that betas change less frequently in portfolios (Cochrane, 2001). All 
the dependant variables are summations of the loadings computed with the 
contemporaneous factor return and its lag
76
.  
Formally, the cross-sectional regressions in the CCSR method are:  
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 An alternative would involve the use of rolling betas with a Fama-MacBeth test and, possibly, 
individual securities as test assets. However, the rolling procedure would decrease the amount of 
sample periods usable in the study. Since, as Bradifield? (2003) points out, it is usually suggested to 
estimate betas over a five-year period, the data series of betas would start only five years after 
December 1989. In addition, test statistics that test asset pricing models become much more 
complicated when applied to the Fama-MacBeth procedure. 
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ˆ
tE r b l a                    (4.8) 
The dependant variable is the time-series average excess return of asset i, and 
independent variables are the factor betas. The loading vector is:  
 Market Resource Findi SML VMGNb b b b b b D  
The estimated coefficients are the premia:  
  0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Market Resource Findi SML VMGl D  
can be estimated with the OLS, or GLS, method. The OLS premia are calculated by:  
1
ˆ
tEl bb b r  
The vector, a, contains N pricing errors of the asset pricing model that is mapped into 
D, a diagonal matrix of indicator variables.  
  The t-statistics associated with the premia in the OLS CCSR tests are obtained 
with the cross-sectional regression being mapped into a GMM system. Cochrane 
(2001) shows that a GMM regression of:  
ˆ ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ, , 0
ˆ0 ˆ ˆ
e
T t t tN
T
T t
EI
g
E
f r k b f
b k l
b r b l
             (4.9) 
yields identical estimates of the factor premia, as does the CCSR method
77
. The 
standard errors estimated in GMM are corrected for heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional 
dependence, auto-correlation, cross-correlation of cross-sectional residuals with time-
series residuals and cross-correlation of residuals and the factors. In addition, the 
correction proposed by Shanken (1992) for the bias in the t-statistics that arises from 
the error-in-variables problem is also taken into account. At times, for comparative 
purposes, the unadjusted OLS standard errors are also shown.  
Following Cochrane (2001) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1995), nearly all the 
asset pricing tests are also conducted with a GLS cross-sectional regression. In those 
cases, the risk premia vector is:   
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 To see this, note that  the second set of moments in Equation 4.9 is:    
1
. 0
. . 0
. .
T t
T t T T
T t T
E
E E E
E E
b r b l
b r b b l
b b b r l
 
which is the formula for the risk premia in a cross-sectional regression. 
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1
1 1ˆ
tEl b b b r  
and the variance-co-variance matrix of residuals: 
1
2 1 11 1 f f
T
l b b l l    
The variance-co-variance matrix of the factors, Σf , is:  
1
ˆ
T
f t t t t
i
E f f f f  
These standard errors are not as efficient as the GMM estimates, but the correction for 
the cross-sectional dependence and the Shanken (1992) correction for the error-in-
variables problem are incorporated into the formula.  
In each cross-sectional regression that uses the CCSR method, a formal test of 
the pricing model is conducted. Cochrane (2001) derives the correct statistical test, 
which ascertains the cumulative size of the model‟s pricing errors. The general 
formula for the test statistic is:    
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) N KCova a a                (4.10) 
In order to make the formulas for the variance-co-variance matrix palatable, it is 
necessary to make an assumption that the time-series residuals of each asset are 
homoskedastic, as well as not serially correlated time and independent of the asset 
pricing factors. If these assumptions hold, Cochrane (2001) shows that the second 
moment matrix use in Equation (4.10) in OLS tests is: 
1 11ˆ( ) ( ) ( )N NCov I I
T
a b bb b b bb b                            (4.11) 
the matrix in the GLS setting becomes: 
1
1 11ˆ( ) 1 fCov
T
a b b b b l l             (4.12) 
The last term in the expression above corrects for the fact that the loadings are 
estimated.  
In pricing tests where the cross-section of assets is large relative to the sample 
period, the Fama-MacBeth regressions are employed. The regressions are:  
1
ˆ
t t t tr b l a                 (4.13) 
The loading vector is:  
 Market Resource Findi SML VMGN t t t t tb b b b b b D  
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The estimated coefficients are the premia:  
  0,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Market Resource Findi SML VMG
t t t t t t tl D  
The vector of coefficients in the Fama-MacBeth regressions are:  
1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ
T
T t t
t
E
T
l l l  
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are adjusted for serial correlations 
with the Newey and West (1987) method, with a correction of up to four leads and 
lags. Meaning that:  
4 4
2
, , , , , ,2
4 4 1
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) cov ,
T
i T i t i t l i t T i t i t l T l i t l
l l t
E E
T T
 
The standard errors computed in this form are not as robust as the GMM estimates but 
do correct for the cross-sectional dependence across assets.  
 In Fama-MacBeth tests, models are not formally tested because it is deemed 
that the second-moment matrix cannot be precisely estimated
78
.    
In all the cross-sectional regressions, calculation and the adjustment of the 
coefficient of determination follows Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Gujarati 
(2002); respectively:  
,2
,
T i t T i
T i t
Var E r Var E
R
Var E r
             (4.14) 
and:   
2 2 11 1
n
adj R R
n k
              (4.15) 
Unlike “textbook” definitions of the coefficient of determination, it can be negative 
for very poorly fitted models.  
The asset pricing tests are performed with an array of statistical software. The 
cross-sectional regressions, both OLS and GLS, with the CCSR method are computed 
manually in Excel. However, the second-moment matrix of time-series residuals is 
taken from GMM estimation with EViews. At times, Stata can be used to check for 
computational errors. Fama-MacBeth regressions are estimated with a sub-routine 
programmed into Stata, which is also used to compute the Newey-West (1987) 
adjusted standard errors. All the test statistics for formal tests of the asset pricing 
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 In preliminary tests, the computed Student‟s t and the χ2 statistics were of implausible magnitudes. 
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models are calculated with Excel. The coefficients of determination are calculated 
with either Excel or Stata. Function and sub-routines programmed with Visual Basic 
for Applications support all Excel calculations.      
  
4.3.3 Tests of the Models against Characteristics         
 
Cochrane (2001), among many others, notes that a correctly specified asset 
pricing model needs to explain all predictable variations in asset returns. Hence, the 
unexpected part of asset returns (pricing error) should not be predicable with stock 
characteristics such as size or the BE/ME ratio. Alternatively, in the presence of 
irrationality in the market, the ability of stock characteristics to explain asset prices 
should still occur. In order to augment the evaluation of an asset pricing model an 
additional test is required that will pair the predictive power of the model against the 
asset‟s characteristics.  
Brennan et al. (1998) and van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) advocate the 
following approach for testing the importance of characteristics. Cochrane (2001) 
justifies the methodology within the GMM framework and shows that an OLS cross-
sectional regression of pricing errors on characteristics is equivalent to a GMM/SDF 
estimation that includes characteristics as explanatory variables
79
.  
Given that:  
ˆe
i i iir fb  for i = 1, 2, 3… N              (4.17) 
each period‟s pricing error of asset i is: 
 
1
K
i ti ti ij tj
j
r b f  
Time-series regressions include a lag on the market (or Resource and Findi) 
factors, which, according to Dimson (1979) and Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson 
(1997), corrects for thin trading.  However, this correction is not applicable to all 
firms in the sample, as not all firms suffer from the problem of thin trading. Inclusion 
of unnecessary factor lags in regressions will affect the time-series of estimates of 
pricing errors (αi + εi); thus the lags of factors are not included in the top 20 percent of 
largest firms. Also, there is an additional lag (for the total of two) included in the 
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 This is true only if the specification takes the form of a stochastic discount factor model.       
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estimation of residuals for the smallest 20 percent of firms. The leading term is not 
added as, in the preliminary tests, it was rarely (if ever) significant and sometimes 
quite large. Hence, its inclusion would result in significantly biased errors. 
Fama-MacBeth regressions are run on the pricing errors of each candidate asset 
pricing model with asset characteristics as independent variables. Inclusion of 
individual assets into the Fama-MacBeth tests will be subject to standard restrictions 
on price and liquidity. 
Formally, regressions:  
1
ˆ
t t t ta e c q a                (4.18) 
are run. The vector of repressors is: 
  / / / / /Size E P C P BE ME E P C Pt Nc c c c c d d D  
and consequently the premia vector is: 
  / / / ( / ) ( / )0,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Size E P C P BE ME D E P D C P
t t t t t t t tq D  
Brennan et al. (1998) warn that if the error in the factor loadings is correlated 
with the characteristics, the Fama-MacBeth estimates of characteristic premia may be 
biased. If such dependence exists, Brennan et al. (1998) note that the time-series of 
estimated premia is correlated with the factors of the asset pricing model that is used 
to adjust for risk; and, the coefficient estimate is biased by a proposition of the mean 
of the factor. The bias is particularly important for the JSE, as it is plausible that for 
small firms, the estimated loading is biased thanks to illiquidity.  
Consequently, Brennan et al. (1998) propose the estimator that corrects for the 
mis-measurement. They estimate a premium to characteristic j, q j
 
, as:  
ˆ ˆˆ
j jj jq ufk                (4.19) 
In effect, the Equation (4.19) is a time-series regression of factors of a given model 
onto the time-series of the characteristic premia computed in each cross-sectional 
regression in the Fama-MacBeth procedure. The unbiased premium to the 
characteristic is the intercept term of regression above. Trivially, kj is a vector of 
estimators and uj is a series of disturbance terms.  
The t-statistic associated with the intercept is used for inference, but the 
variance-co-variance matrix of the coefficients computed in regressions of the genus 
shown above are estimated with the Newey and West (1987) method. Thus, the 
effects of serial correlation of up to four lags are removed.    
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On a technical note, all of the tests of pricing models against the characteristic 
models are done in Stata. The capacity of the program to easily handle panel datasets 
made it particularly easy to estimate the pricing errors in time-series regressions and 
compute the characteristics premia in a cross-sectional analysis. Stata‟s regressions 
can also easily handle Newey-West (1987) corrections.       
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CHAPTER 5: THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
5.1 Part I: The Size and the Value Effects on the JSE, Magnitude and 
Persistence  
 
The purpose of this section is to formally analyse the size and value premia on 
the JSE. More specifically, it is necessary to establish that these effects survive 
(admittedly imperfect) adjustment for trading costs. In addition, in order to construct 
the three factor model of Fama and French (1993), it is necessary to identify the 
appropriate F/P ratio that has the strongest power to predict future returns. Lastly, a 
set of test assets, which forms the basis of subsequent asset pricing tests, needs to be 
ascertained.  
A correlation matrix of stock characteristics is shown in Table 5.1. Most 
strikingly, the correlation between a firm‟s size and its price is very high at 0.8017. It 
is re-emphasised that Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) found a strong negative relation 
between trading costs and share price. Consequently, it is likely that the apparent high 
returns earned from investing in small stocks do not survive trading costs. Another 
important feature of the data is a very high correlation between the E/P and the C/P. 
Also, the BE/ME is strongly related to these yields. The magnitude of these 
relationships is to be expected, as all these variables proxies are either proxies for risk 
or misevaluation. However, it must be noted that the correlation is less than perfect; 
therefore it is likely that more than one variable is necessary to account for the value 
effect
80
. 
Predictably there is a negative relationship between the F/P ratios and the 
absolute measure of market value. The correlations are not large, however, and only 
BE/ME seems to exhibit a relatively strong relationship with size and price.  
                                                 
80
 There is an unexpectedly low correlation between size and trading volume (liquidity). It is likely that 
the relationship between size and liquidly is non-linear. More specifically, it is believed that all but few 
large firms are “liquid” and the rest of the listed firms suffer from non-synchronous trading. Since 
correlation is a measure of a linear relationship, the strength of the relationship can be mismeasured. 
Actually, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that the relationship between illiquidity measures 
and returns is non-linear, thus it may also be non-linear with variables that predict returns.  
Nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to parameterize the relationship between a firm‟s 
market capitalisation and its trading volume; thus this point is left unexplored. 
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Table 5.1  
Characteristic Correlation Matrix  
Correlations pool time-series and cross-sectional observations between July 92 and Ju ly 05, for the 
total of 76643 month-firm points. Size is the natural logarithm of stock‟s market capitalizat ion, which  
is a product of the number of shares outstanding and the share price. E/P is earnings per share scaled by 
a price. C/P is cash flow per share scaled by a price. BE/ME is the book value of equity scaled by 
market capitalizat ion. Liquidity measure is a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled 
by shares in issue. Price variable is the actual price, and thus is unadjusted for share splits and 
consolidations. All accounting data becomes effect ive five months after the financial year-end. 
Negative values of the F/P are rep laced with a zero.  A ll variab les are standardized and winzorised  at 
2.5% and 97.5%.  
 Size E/P C/P BE/ME Price Liquidity 
Size  10000  -0.2905  -0.2952  -0.4580   0.8017   0.2202  
E/P -0.2905   1.0000   0.7650   0.5728  -0.2516  -0.0100  
C/P -0.2952   0.7650   1.0000   0.5980  -0.2433  -0.0337  
BE/ME -0.4580   0.5728   0.5980   1.0000  -0.3962  -0.0998  
Price  0.8017  -0.2516  -0.2433  -0.3962   1.0000   0.1397  
Liquidity  0.2202  -0.0100  -0.0337  -0.0998   0.1397   1.0000  
 
Thus, any tests that use the BE/ME as sorting or explanatory variables need to account 
for its possible co-linearity with size.  In addition, the correlations in Table 5.1 are 
similar to findings in the international literature. For example, Brennan et al. (1998) 
show that the correlation of size with the BE/ME is -0.24, and with price is -0.79 
81
.       
Figures in Table 5.1 differ from similar tables in van Rensburg and Robertson 
(2003a) and Auret and Sinclaire (2006). These researchers find the magnitude of 
correlations to be significantly lower. For example, in the table in their appendix B, 
van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) show that the correlation between C/P and P/E 
is -.12. However, in unreported results, it appears that the correlation between the 
cashflow yield and the P/E ratios (an inverse of the earnings yield) collected for this 
dissertation is about -0.03. In other words, correlations of F/P ratios with other 
inverted F/P ratios are meaningless. Consequently, it is stressed that when measuring 
correlations between F/P ratios, the accounting measures of value must be 
consistently kept in the denominator or the numerator of the ratio, otherwise, this 
linear measure of relation leads to erroneous inference
82
.  
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 Brennan et al. (1998) define their price variable as a logarithm of the inverse of the actual price.  
82
 Also, unreported analysis shows that if Table 5.1 was to be constructed with inverted F/P ratios then 
magnitudes of correlations would be lower. This is to be expected because the inverted F/P ratios 
exhibit larger variation. These ratios are larger in magnitude (say, 10 vs. 0.1) and changes in price 
result in larger absolute changes (10 to 20 vs. 0.1 to 0.05). 
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5.1.1 Univariate Results  
 
Shares are sorted into five portfolios. In order to control for market 
microstructure effects, during re-balancing stocks must conform to certain 
requirements on price and liquidity in order to be included the portfolio. A size 
premium is the mean return of an arbitrage portfolio that comprises a long position in 
a portfolio of smallest stocks and a short position in a portfolio of largest stocks. In 
order to determine the effect of the two restrictions on price and liquidity, the sort is 
repeated 15 times with different sets of restrictions being imposed each time. A 
similar procedure is repeated during calculation of the value effect. In this case, 
however, the premium is calculated with a mean return of an arbitrage portfolio that 
comprises a long position in a portfolio of high F/P stocks and a short position in a 
portfolio of low F/P stocks. Subsequently, the premiums are calculated 16 times for 
the three value-growth indicators. All means are computed with monthly returns. 
The restrictions are chosen to exclude a sufficiently high number of marginal 
stocks. Imposing the 0.5% restriction on liquidity reduces the average number of 
stocks in the portfolios from 488 to 310. Similarly, excluding shares priced below 200 
cents lowers the average number of stocks in the portfolios to 300. Imposing both of 
the harshest price and liquidity restrictions lowers the number of usable stocks to an 
average of 190.  
The results of the univariate sorts appear in Table 5.2, and the existence of the 
size and value premia are confirmed. Generally, the value-weighted estimates are 
smaller than equally-weighted estimates. In addition, the restrictions on liquidity and 
price have a profound impact on the magnitude and persistence of the effects, 
especially the size premium. Also, restrictions on price have a much stronger impact 
than restriction on liquidity.  
As per Panel A of the table, generally, the size premium is positive. The equal-
weighted estimate of the effect varies between 0.82% per month to 1.48% per 
month
83
. The t-statistics for the means of the different estimates are always above two, 
and most of the time the effect is greater than zero at the 1% level. 
                                                 
83
 All cases where the restriction on price is not applied are excluded from the calculation. 
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Table 5.2 
Size and Value Effects on the JSE and Sensitivity of the Effects to Price and Liquidity Restrictions. (Fixed, Cheated) 
The table displays the magnitudes of the different effects between July 1992 and July 2005. Also, the impact of restricting the population of firms used to measure the effects 
with  liquidity  and price is shown. Size effect  is the mean d ifference in the returns of a portfolio  containing stocks in the largest quintile and a portfolio  of stocks in the 
smallest quintile. Value effect is the mean difference in the returns of portfolio containing fifth of stocks highest F/P ratios and return on portfolio containing fifth of stocks 
lowest F/P ratios.  All returns are adjusted for dividends and other payouts. Portfolios are rebalanced annually; at the end of June. The portfolio returns are computed after 
adjustment for outliers. Liquidity measure is a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled by shares in issue. Price variable is the actual price, and thus is 
unadjusted for share splits and consolidations. Size is the natural logarithm of stock‟s market capitalizat ion , which is a product of the number of shares outstanding and the 
share price. E/P is earnings per share scaled by a price. C/P is cash flow per share scaled by a price. BE/ME is the book value of equity scaled by market capitalization. All 
accounting data becomes effective five months after the financial year-end. 
Minimum Liquidity Minimum Price  Minimum Price 
  0 50 100 200   0 50 100 200 
Panel A: The Size Effect and its Sensitivity to Price and Liquidity Restrictions      
 Equal-Weighted  Value-Weighted 
0.00% 3.96%
***
 1.40%
***
 1.48%
***
 0.82%
**
  0.11% 0.70% 0.77%
*
 0.78%
*
 
 6.923 3.200 3.449 2.039  0.206 1.486 1.708 1.670 
0.02% 3.88%
***
 1.38%
***
 1.10%
**
 0.96%
**
  0.11% 0.79%
*
 0.78%
*
 0.94%
**
 
 6.483 3.173 2.618 2.397  0.197 1.669 1.699 2.013 
0.10% 3.50%
***
 1.39%
***
 1.08%
**
 1.05%
***
  0.00% 0.83%
*
 0.71% 0.91%
**
 
 6.477 3.291 2.575 2.697  0.004 1.768 1.555 1.965 
0.50% 2.79%
***
 1.24%
***
 1.20%
***
 1.07%
***
  0.17% 0.80% 0.99%
**
 0.87%
*
 
  5.642 2.788 2.759 2.782   0.313 1.585 2.035 1.855 
Panel B: The BE/ME Effect and its Sensitivity to Price and Liquidity Restrictions      
 Equal-Weighted  Value-Weighted 
0.00% 2.81%
***
 1.77%
***
 1.71%
***
 1.51%
***
  1.10%
**
 1.57%
*** 
1.50%
***
 1.48%
***
 
 5.666 4.683 4.393 3.808  1.981 2.824 2.613 2.596 
0.02% 2.86%
***
 1.71%
***
 1.65%
***
 1.48%
***
  1.02%
*
 1.52%
***
 1.45%
***
 1.46%
***
 
 5.804 4.536 4.230 3.650  1.855 2.781 2.544 2.555 
0.10% 2.54%
***
 1.65%
***
 1.69%
***
 1.36%
***
  1.09%
**
 1.58%
***
 1.62%
***
 1.45%
***
 
 5.352 4.227 4.213 3.328  1.982 2.842 2.864 2.403 
0.50% 2.43%
***
 1.71%
***
 1.83%
***
 1.36%
***
  1.06%
*
 1.56%
**
 1.61%
***
 1.32%
***
 
 5.105 3.917 4.072 3.028   1.672 2.433 2.577 2.352  
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level 
Panel C: The C/P Effect and its Sensitivity to Price and Liquid ity Restrictions  
 Equal-Weighted  Value-Weighted 
0.00% 1.58%
***
 1.30%
***
 1.25%
***
 1.31%
***
  1.00%
*
 0.97%
*
 0.87%
*
 0.95%
*
 
 4.132 3.729 3.569 3.535  1.750 1.862 1.712 1.838 
0.02% 1.83%
***
 1.37%
***
 1.15%
***
 1.29%
***
  1.03%
*
 0.91%
*
 0.84% 0.91%
*
 
 4.685 3.855 3.244 3.459  1.797 1.728 1.624 1.745 
0.10% 1.55%
***
 1.20%
***
 1.18%
***
 1.22%
***
  1.16%
**
 0.97%
*
 0.94%
*
 0.89%
*
 
 3.959 3.277 3.188 3.085  2.055 1.851 1.819 1.669 
0.50% 1.45%
***
 1.20%
***
 1.11%
***
 1.27%
***
  1.26%
**
 0.95%
*
 0.82% 0.88%
*
 
  3.335 2.896 2.838 3.020   2.165 1.772 1.524 1.658 
Panel D: The E/P Effect and its Sensitivity to Price and Liquid ity Restrictions  
 Equal-Weighted  Value-Weighted 
0.00% 1.41%
***
 1.00%
***
 0.83%
**
 0.80%
**
  0.93% 0.85% 0.78% 0.80% 
 3.442 2.764 2.273 2.166  1.157 1.355 1.252 1.318 
0.02% 1.51%
***
 1.02%
***
 0.85%
**
 0.82%
**
  0.94% 0.86% 0.83% 0.80% 
 3.646 2.800 2.338 2.220  1.412 1.374 1.336 1.312 
0.10% 1.27%
***
 0.90%
**
 0.82%
**
 0.72%
*
  0.94% 0.86% 0.87% 0.80% 
 3.146 2.431 2.181 1.864  1.408 1.345 1.381 1.292 
0.50% 1.17%
***
 0.92%
**
 0.77%
**
 0.93%
**
  1.37%
**
 1.19%
*
 1.12%
*
 1.00% 
  2.685 2.371 1.986 2.229   2.005 1.821 1.728 1.569 
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If it is assumed that shares that trade for more than 100 cents and exhibit liquidity 
greater than 0.1% per month (henceforth, 100; 0.01%) are within an investment set of 
a representative agent, the estimate of the equal-weighted size effect is approximately 
1.1% per month. The value-weighting estimates are much lower and less significant, 
in both economic and statistical terms. Only nine of the estimates are reliably greater 
than zero. The value-weighted premium varies between 0.7% and 0.99% per month
84
. 
An estimate of the value-weighted size premium that can be captured by a 
representative investor (100; 0.01%) is about 0.71% per month and it is not reliably 
greater then zero.  
If the price restriction is not enforced, the computed premia exhibit some 
peculiar properties. On the one hand, the equal-weighted estimates are exceedingly 
large, while the value-weighted results are barely different from zero. A likely 
explanation is that, when no price restriction is made, the sort takes into account a 
number of very tiny shares. By virtue of liquidly risk premium, these firms ought to 
yield very high returns and the equal-weighted sort captures them. However, when a 
value-weighted sort is performed, the returns on these tiny shares are swamped by the 
return of a few large firms that made their way into the portfolio of smallest shares. 
Actually, in unreported results, the value-weighted size effect is much larger if the 
portfolio containing slightly larger firms (than the smallest) is used to compute the 
premium.  Nonetheless, it is safe to say that not imposing price restrictions in the 
analysis of the size effect may severely bias the results.  
Nonetheless, the profitability of the size premium is robust to an explicit 
adjustment for trading costs, as its magnitude, computed under the most restrictive 
constraints, is relatively large. Actually, on the value-weighted basis, the premium is 
strongest if the harshest price restriction is applied. Also, these premia are less risky 
than the effects computed with more lax constraints. Actually, the standard deviation 
of the equally-weighted premium computed with the harshest restrictions is lower 
than others. A similar result is obtained with value-weighted portfolios. Consequently, 
it seems the profitability of the premium can be captured at a relatively low risk. 
The results here are similar to those documented in international estimates. For 
instance, Asness et al. (2000a), who use US data, find the size premium to be 0.95% 
per month and 0.51% per month on the equally-weighted and value-weighted basis, 
                                                 
84
 All cases where the restriction on price is not applied are excluded from the calculation. 
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respectively. The estimate of the size premium from the emerging markets, calculated 
by Rouwenhorst (1999), is 0.69% per month.  Also, the results are not markedly 
different from results obtained by van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b). A typical 
equally-weighted premium that enforces relatively stringent restrictions on liquidity is 
around 3% per month. The author‟s estimate 2.5% per month85.  
Panels B though to D of Table 5.2 show the value effect. The three types of 
value-growth indicators are individually investigated. Measuring the value anomaly 
with different attributes alters their magnitude and statistical persistence. The 
magnitude of the equally-weighted book-to-market premia varies between 1.83% and 
1.36% per month
86
. All of the estimates are different from zero at 1% level of 
significance. Curiously, the highest estimate corresponds to strict restrictions on price 
and the highest restriction on liquidity.  The equally-weighted cashflow effect is 
smaller: it varies 1.27% and 1.11% per month, but it reliably differs from zero at the 
1% level. The corresponding range for the earnings‟ yield effect falls between 0.93% 
and 0.77% per month and is greater than zero at the 5% level. 
The value-weighted estimate of the book-to-market effect varies between 1.61% 
and 1.32% per month, while the corresponding ranges for the C/P and the E/P effects 
are 0.82% and 0.88% per month and 1.12% and 1.00% per month, respectively. The 
premia computed without restrictions on price are excluded from the analysis. The 
statistical persistence of the value-weighted book-to-market effect is large, as only 
one of the 12 estimates is not different from zero at the 1% level, but at the 5% level. 
The estimates of the value-weighted C/P effect are significant only at the 10% level, 
while the value-weighted E/P effect is hardly significant, and only two of the 
estimates are reliably different from zero at the 10% level.   
The price and the liquidity sections have the largest impact on the effect 
measured with the BE/ME. Inclusion of the 50 cents restriction in the sort has a 
similar effect on the premia as it did in the size effect: the equal-weighted estimates 
are slashed, while the value-weighted premia are boosted. Nonetheless, the estimates 
of the BE/ME effect and the E/P effect attenuate as the sequential restrictions are 
applied. Curiously, the C/P effect is of a similar magnitude across the price and 
                                                 
85
 In fact, when an attempt to replicate the analysis in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) is made, 
the results are near-identical to theirs. 
86
 The estimates computed after excision of the premia that calculated without imposing restriction on 
price and liquidity.  
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liquidity restriction spectrum and it seems to increase marginally in the case where the 
harshest price restriction is imposed.  
The magnitude of the value effect presented in Table 5.2 is slightly larger than 
what is documented in international studies. For instance, with US data, Asness et al. 
(2000a) find that equally-weighted book-to-market effect is approximately 1.11%, 
while on the value-weighted basis it is 0.44% - much smaller than the estimate 
presented here.  Lakonishok et al. (1994) present similar results. They, however, 
document that the C/P effect is marginally larger than the BE/ME effect. Asness et al. 
(2000a) and Hogan et al. (2004) find the opposite, and they note that the C/P strategy 
was particularly unprofitable in the 1990s. In addition, Hogan et al. (2004) find, with 
the US data, that the E/P effect is puny. Lastly, the average of the equal-weighted 
value premia, calculated in the emerging markets and reported in Rouwenhorst 
(1999), is about 0.72% per month. Surprisingly, the results presented here are at odds 
with the findings of van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b), who, with a univariate sort, 
document an earnings yield premium of 3.3% per annum. There are a number of 
methodological differences that can account for the disparity: they re-balance their 
portfolios monthly 
87
, survival bias is present in their study
88
, and the sample periods 
are different
89
. Nonetheless, it is not the purpose of this thesis to explain any 
disparities in results between the two studies - thus this puzzle is left unresolved. 
 
                                                 
87
 This procedure may bias the results because it confounds the value premium with the short-term 
reversal of Jegadeesh (1990). In an unreported univariate random effects regression of returns on its 
lead, the coefficient is negative and eight standard deviations from zero, meaning that there is a 
negative auto-correlation between returns on a monthly interval. Thus, it is likely that van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2003b) capture this effect with their monthly re-balancing, as they include many stocks 
that fell sharply in price into a portfolio containing firms with high F/P ratios.  
88
 van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) obtain accounting data from the BFA/McGregor database. 
After a conversation with Professor Brummer, the academic director of the data-house, the author of 
this thesis has learned that the accounting data for firms that delisted prior to 1998 are not available in 
the database. Actually, Banz and Breen (1986) argue that such a sample selection has a profound 
impact on the value premium that is measured with the price-to-earnings ratio. It should be noted that 
even if there is no survival bias in the sample, the cross-section of returns used in this study is different 
to the one employed by van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) and thus the results may not be the same.   
89
 Their sample period starts in July 1990 and ends in July 2000, whereas the one sample period in this 
study begins in July 1992 and ends in July 2005. 
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5.1.2 Multivariate Results (Fama-MacBeth) 
 
It has been shown that the book-to-market ratio is a better predictor of returns 
than earnings yield and cashflow yield. There are two caveats, however. First, the 
one-way sorts in Table 5.2 exclude negative F/P ratios. There are few negative book-
to-market ratios, thus most available stocks are included in the sorts that use the 
BE/ME ratio. At the same time, there is an abundance of observations of negative E/P 
and C/P ratios. Consequently, if the omitted firms yield high returns, and in an 
unreported analysis it is found that they do, then value premium calculated with the 
BE/ME ratio is higher because, in its computation value, firms with high returns are 
omitted from the sort. Secondly, the large magnitude of the BE/ME premium may be 
a consequence of confounding this anomaly with the size effect, as book-to-market 
has a higher correlation with firm size than other F/P ratios.  
In order to alleviate the above-mentioned concerns, a multivariate analysis is 
performed with the Fama-MacBeth procedure. This test allows for negative F/P ratios 
and joint analysis of many variables. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 
5.3. Stocks that cost less than 100 cents and have an average twelve-month turnover 
of less than 0.1% are excluded from the analysis.  
The first four lines confirm the results from the previous sections. Regressions 
show that there is a negative relationship between size and return. The coefficient is 
negative and it is more than three standard deviations away from zero. On their own, 
the BE/ME and the C/P ratios can predict returns. Although both coefficients are 
reliably larger than zero, the BE/ME effect is stronger. Curiously, the relation between 
E/P ratio and returns is weak. The estimated coefficient is small in magnitude and is 
only marginally more than one standard deviation away from zero. In sum, the results 
from the portfolio sorts are confirmed with a cross-sectional test.  
The next three regressions (from four to seven) show the joint power of the size 
variable and a value-growth indicator in predicting returns. In general, the 
significance, in both statistical and economic terms, of all the indicators, abates. The 
coefficient on the size variable remains significant at least at the 5% level, regardless 
of the value-growth indicator used in the regressions. There are two points worth 
noting. First, the E/P effect disappears completely after size is included as an 
explanatory variable.  
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Table 5.3 
A Fama-MacBeth Regression Test of the Size and Value Effects  
Coefficients in the table are t ime-series averages of month-by-month cross-sectional OLS regressions 
of returns on firm characteristics between July  1992 and July  2005. Each month, only  stocks with 
liquid ity measure of more than 0.1% or cost more than 100c are included in the regression. Liquidity 
measure is a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled by end-month shares in issue.  
Size is the natural logarithm of stock‟s market cap italization, which is a product of the number of 
shares outstanding and the share price. E/P is earn ings per share scaled by a price. C/P is cash flow per 
share scaled by a price. BE/ME is the book value of equity scaled by market capitalization. A ll 
accounting data becomes effective five months after the financial year-end. All variab les are 
standardized and winzorised at 2.5% and 97.5%. If earnings are positive then E/P(+) is the earnings 
yield and E/P Dummy is 0, otherwise E/P(+) is set to zero and E/P Dummy is set to 1. Similar 
conventions pertain to the C/P ratio. The reported R
2
 is the average of individual R
2
 of each cross-
sectional regressions. Calculat ion of standard errors follows Cochrane (2001) and are adjusted for serial 
correlation with Newey-West (1987) method. All coefficients are multip lied by 1000, for clarity.  
    
Constant  Size   E/P(+)   C/P(+)   BE/ME   E/P 
Dummy  
 C/P 
Dummy  
Average 
R
2
  
 (1)  13.20
***
 -6.26
***
      0.02 
 t-stat  2.54 -3.23       
 (2)  10.08
**
  2.37   7.91
**
  0.02 
 t-stat  2.06  1.42   2.04   
 (3)  10.89
**
   3.67
***
   -3.17 0.01 
 t-stat  2.30   2.81   -0.77  
 (4)  11.76
***
    5.79
***
   0.02 
 t-stat  2.36    3.38    
 (5)  12.92
***
 -5.95
***
 0.54   4.14  0.03 
 t-stat  2.47 -3.00 0.33   1.04   
 (6)  13.74
***
 -5.93
***
  2.30
**
   -5.77 0.03 
 t-stat  2.71 -3.14  1.99   -1.46  
 (7)  13.39
***
 -4.80
***
   3.91
**
   0.03 
 t-stat  2.57 -2.41   2.25    
 (8)  11.38
**
  -1.27  6.54
***
 7.02  0.03 
 t-stat  2.28  -0.57  2.93 1.83   
 (9)  11.93
***
   0.96 5.08
***
  -2.49 0.03 
 t-stat  2.46   0.58 2.37  -0.66  
 (10)  10.67
**
  -1.49 4.71
***
  10.90
***
 -7.92 0.03 
 t-stat  2.23  -0.68 2.82  2.32 -1.63  
 (11)  13.73
***
 -4.87
***
  0.61 3.53  -4.08 0.04 
 t-stat  2.70 -2.50  0.39 1.62  -1.10  
 (12)  13.61
***
 -4.87
**
 -3.90 2.64 4.41
*
 6.57 -6.72 0.06 
 t-stat  2.64 -2.48 -1.65 1.41 1.87 1.33 -1.45  
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level 
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This attenuation is strongly at odds with the results presented in van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003a), who show that a two-attribute model with size and a P/E is a 
parsimonious representation of returns on the JSE. Second, the book-to-market ratio 
remains a strong predictor of returns after inclusion of size. In fact, the coefficients on 
the market equity and the BE/ME variables are both at least two standard deviations 
from zero. This is at odds with the results of Auret and Sinclaire (2006), who find that 
the book-to-market ratio subsumes the size effect on the JSE. This disparity is 
explained by the fact that the size effect was particularly strong between 2003 and 
2005, a time period omitted in their sample. The cashflow yield has a minor role to 
play after size is included in the regressions; its coefficient is significant only at the 
5% level.  
Regressions eight to ten seek to uncover the best value-growth indicator for the 
JSE. The book-to-market ratio seems to subsume the other F/P ratios. Curiously, the 
coefficient on the E/P ratio becomes negative after inclusion of the BE/ME variable, 
which coefficient increases marginally. The coefficient on the earnings‟ yield variable 
also turns negative when the C/P and the E/P ratio are both jointly tested.  
 The last two regressions jointly test the variables together. In both cases, in 
accordance with Auret and Sinclaire (2006), the book-to-market ratio is highly 
persistent. However, in a joint test of all the value-growth indicators the E/P effect has 
reversed its sign. This reversal of the E/P effect is not unusual. Actually, it is exactly 
what Chan et al. (1991) find in Japanese data. In addition, Davis (1994) finds similar 
results in US data in a period prior to 1963. Also, Lyn and Zychowicz (2004), who 
study the emerging markets in Eastern Europe and use a large sample, also document 
the reversal of the E/P effect after control for size, market beta, and turnover 
90
.  
The large power of the tests, in comparison with van Rensburg and Robertson 
(2003a; 2003b) are re-emphasized, as the sample applied here is larger. These authors 
use about 30,000 firm-month observations, while the tests in Table 5.3 use about 
45,000 observations. If the price restrictions are dropped, and the liquidity restrictions 
are made similar to the van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) study, then the sample 
                                                 
90
 It is believed that Chan et al. (1991) and Lyn and Zychowicz (2004) are similar to the tests in this 
thesis for two reasons. First, the size of the cross-sectional sample used in those studies is relatively 
close to the one employed here. Chan et al. (1991) use about four times as many stocks compared to 
Fama and French (1992), who use about twenty times as many; and samples in Lyn and Zychowicz 
(2004) and the one employed here are of comparable size. Second, both of those studies are likely to be 
conducted on less liquid markets, similar to the one used here. 
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increases to about 61,000 - more than twice as large as their study. The increase in 
sample size is attributed to a longer sample period and larger amount of firms used in 
the earlier parts of the 1990s.  
Lastly, it is noted that the coefficients of determinations are all very close to 
zero, reflecting the difficulty in predicting returns. The low R
2
s are not unusual, and, 
for instance, are found in Davis (1994). Also, the intercept is readily greater than zero 
and, on average, corresponds to about 2% per month. Since the average risk-free rate 
over the period was approximately 1%, there is much cross-sectional variation that is 
unexplained by the characteristics. 
 
5.1.3 Multivariate Results (Portfolio Sorts) 
 
In the regressions tests of Fama-MacBeth, the correlation between the variables, 
especially the size and the BE/ME ratio may bias the estimated coefficients (Gujarati, 
2002). In order to combat this problem, a two-way sorting procedure, advocated by 
Fama and French (1992) and Daniel and Titman (1997), is used to confirm the 
robustness of the results from the cross-sectional results in Table 5.3.   
Because it is believed that a sequential sort of two heavily correlated variables 
reduces power of the tests, the sorting procedure is independent, as in Fama and 
French (1993), and not sequential, as in van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b). Only 
12 portfolios are formed from an intersection of four size portfolios and three value-
growth portfolios, as the excessive correlation between the variables precludes a finer 
sort. In order to address the concern of Leiedakis and Davidson (2001) that value 
premium needs to be captured by more than one F/P ratio, an independent two-way 
sort of the C/P and the BE/ME is performed. Unfortunately, an independent two-way 
sort based on the C/P and the E/P ratios is impossible as some portfolios turn up 
empty. The unfortunate side-effect of using independent sorts is that some portfolios 
contain very few stocks, thus the power of the tests is low when a difference between 
two portfolios is measured. Luckily, tests that determine independence of each effect 
are linear combinations of few portfolios and thus, some of the noise may be 
diversified away, thus increasing the power of the test. 
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Table 5.4 
A Two-Way Portfolio Test of BE/ME and Size Effects 
This table aims to disentangle the size and BE/ME effects. The portfolios are constructed with an 
independent sort of four size portfolios and three F/P portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced annually; at 
the end of June. During rebalancing, stocks with liquid ity measure of less than 0.01% or cost less than 
100c and are not included in the portfolio (the restriction). All returns are adjusted for dividends and 
other payouts and the portfolio  returns are computed after adjustment for outliers. Liquidity measure is 
a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled by shares in issue. Size is the natural 
logarithm of stock‟s market capitalization, which is a product of the number of shares outstanding and 
the share price. BE/ME is the book value o f equity scaled by market cap italization. Independent size 
effect is measured as the average of within-group size effects in  each F/P group. Similarly, the 
independent BE/ME effect is measured as the mean of within-group value effects in each size group. 
Within-group size effect is measured as a mean difference in returns of portfolios containing smallest 
stocks and largest stocks, and within-group value effect is measured as a mean difference in returns of 
portfolios containing low BE/ME stocks and high BE/ME stocks. T is the number of months in the 
measurement period. N is the average amount of stocks that satisfy liquidity and price criteria at the end 
of each June. Average stocks is the average amount of stocks in portfolios after a second sort.  
  I   
(Large) 
II III IV 
 (Small) 
IV – I t -stat  
Panel A: Joint BE/ME and Size Sorts: Equal-Weighted      
I       (Value) 1.95% 1.83% 2.29% 2.56% 0.61% 0.911 T 
II           1.76% 1.72% 1.42% 2.32% 0.57% 1.186 156 
III    (Growth) 1.05% 1.05% 1.45% 1.92% 0.87%
*
 1.738  N  
I – III 0.90%* 0.78%* 0.84%** 0.64%   309 
t-stat 1.684 1.702 2.041 1.301   Ave. Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat 26 
Independent Size 
effect 0.68%
*
 1.662 
Independent 
BE/ME effect 0.79%
**
 2.481   
Panel B: Joint BE/ME and Size Sorts: Value-Weighted     
I       (Value) 1.83% 1.58% 2.13% 2.41% 0.59% 0.938  T 
II           1.67% 1.58% 1.40% 2.33% 0.67% 1.209  156 
III    (Growth) 1.01% 1.35% 1.35% 2.17% 1.17%
**
 2.009   N  
I – III 0.82% 0.23% 0.78%* 0.24%   309 
t-stat 1.606  0.546  1.742  0.481    Ave. Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat  26 
Independent Size 
effect 0.81%
*
 1.800  
Independent 
BE/ME effect 0.52%
*
 1.696    
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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Table 5.5 
A Two-Way Portfolio Test of C/P and Size Effects. 
This table aims to disentangle the size and C/P effects. The portfolios are constructed with an 
independent sort of four size portfolios and three F/P portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced annually; at 
the end of June. During rebalancing, stocks with liquid ity measure of less than 0.01% or cost less than 
100c and are not included in the portfolio (the restriction). All returns are adjusted for dividends and 
other payouts and the portfolio  returns are computed after adjustment for outliers. Liquidity measure is 
a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled by shares in issue. Size is the natural 
logarithm of stock‟s market capitalization, which is a product of the number of shares outstanding and 
the share price. C/P is cash flow per share scaled by a price.  Independent size effect is measured as the 
average of within -group size effects in each F/P group. Similarly, the independent C/P effect  is 
measured as the mean of within-group value effects in each size group. Within-group size effect is 
measured as a mean difference in returns of portfolios containing smallest stocks and largest stocks, 
and within-group value effect is measured as a mean difference in returns of portfolios containing low 
C/P stocks and high C/P stocks. T is the number of months in the measurement period. N  is the average 
amount of stocks that satisfy liquidity and price criteria at the end of each June. Average stocks is the 
average amount of stocks in portfolios after a second sort.  
  I 
(Large) 
II III 
IV 
(Small) 
IV – I t -stat 
 
Panel A: Joint C/P and Size Sorts: Restricted and Equal-Weighted   
I       (Value) 2.02% 2.11% 1.93% 2.64% 0.62% 1.177 T 
II           1.66% 1.49% 1.97% 2.33% 0.67% 1.376 156 
III    (Growth) 1.21% 1.34% 1.18% 1.72% 0.52% 1.113 N 
I – III 0.82%* 0.77%* 0.75%* 0.92%*   309 
t-stat 1.930 1.953 1.842 1.894 
  
Ave. 
Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat 26 
Independent Size 
effect 0.60%
*
 1.659 
Independent 
C/P effect 0.81%
***
 2.935 
 
Panel C: Joint C/P and Size Sorts: Restricted and Value-Weighted   
I       (Value) 2.05% 2.05% 1.88% 2.47% 0.42% 0.660  T 
II           1.60% 1.50% 1.82% 2.36% 0.76% 1.568  156 
III    (Growth) 1.25% 1.44% 1.23% 1.74% 0.49% 0.823  N 
I – III 0.81% 0.61% 0.65% 0.73%   309 
t-stat 1.618  1.595  1.410  1.271    Ave. 
Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat 26 
Independent Size 
effect 0.56% 1.290  
Independent C/P 
effect 0.70%
**
 2.325  
  
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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According to Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, the size and the value effect are 
independent of each other. On the equal-weighted basis, the size premia that are 
independent of the BE/ME and the C/P effects are 0.68% and 0.60% per month, 
respectively. Both estimates are greater than zero at the 10% level. On a value-
weighted basis, the size effect that is independent of the BE/ME effect is larger at 
0.81% per month (t-statistic of 1.800). The one independent of the C/P effect is lower 
at 0.56% per month, but it loses its statistical significance. 
The independent value premium is persistent. On an equal-value weighted basis, 
the effect, measured with the BE/ME ratio, is 0.79% per month, and if it is measured 
with the C/P ratio it is 0.81% per month. Both estimates are significant at the 1% 
level. If the portfolios are value-weighted, the independent BE/ME effect is 
substantially lower at 0.52% (t-statistic of 1.696). However, the value-weighted 
independent C/P effect is highly persistent at 0,70% per month and is different from 
zero at 5% level. It thus appears that some of the univariate size effect, captured by 
the value-weighting scheme, can be attributed to the C/P effect.  
Unlike studies done in the US (inter alia Fama and French, 2006; and 
Loughran, 1997), which documents weaker value premiums among larger stocks, 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that the value effect is strong among the largest firms. It is, 
however, meek in the quartile of smallest firms. On an equal-weighted basis, the value 
effect among the largest firms is reliably different from zero, whether it is measured 
with the BE/ME ratio or the C/P ratio. Among the smallest firms, the equal-weighted 
BE/ME effect is not reliably different from zero, but the C/P effect is. The value-
weighted BE/ME and C/P effect, measured within separate size groupings, are rarely 
significant in statistical terms. However, the premia measured among the largest firms 
are generally stronger than the ones measured among smallest firms. In fact, the 
BE/ME effect measured among the smallest firms is weak at 0.24% per month. The 
low rejection of the null is not surprising, as value-weighting induces more firm-
specific noise into the t-statistics.    
 The estimates of the size effect among various F/P groups are noisy. However, 
it does appear that the bulk of the size effect occurs among firms with low BE/ME 
ratios. In fact, the estimate of the size premium in that trecile is statistically different 
from zero, regardless of whether equal-weighted or value-weighted portfolios are 
used.  
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Table 5.6 
A Two-way Portfolio Test of BE/ME and C/P Effects. 
This table aims to d isentangle the BE/ME and C/P effects. The portfo lios are constructed with an 
independent sort of three BE/ME portfolios and three C/P portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced annually; 
at the end of June. During rebalancing, stocks with liquidity measure of less than 0.01% or cost less 
than 100c and are not included in the portfolio (the restriction). All returns are adjusted  for dividends 
and other payouts and the portfolio returns are computed after adjustment for outliers. Liquidity 
measure is a twelve-month average of monthly  trading volume scaled by shares in issue. BE/ME is the 
book value of equity scaled by market capitalizat ion. C/P is cash flow per share scaled by a price.  
Independent effect is measured as the average of within-group value effects in opposing F/P group. 
Within-group value effect is measured as a mean d ifference in returns of portfo lios containing low F/P 
stocks and high F/P stocks. T is the number of months in the measurement period. N is the average 
amount of stocks that satisfy liquidity and price criteria at the end of each June. Average stocks is the 
average amount of stocks in portfolios after a second sort.  
  I 
(high 
BE/ME) 
II III 
(low 
BE/ME) 
I – III t -stat   
Panel A: Joint BE/ME and C/P Sorts: Restricted and Equal-Weighted   
I      (high C/P) 2.50% 1.84% 1.25% 1.25%
**
 2.313  T 
II 2.49% 1.67% 1.51% 0.98%
**
 2.328  156 
III    (low C/P) 1.88% 1.30% 1.24% 0.64% 1.421  N 
I – III 0.62% 0.54% 0.01%    356 
t-stat 1.274 1.393 0.021 
   
Ave. 
Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat 30 
Independent 
BE/ME effect 0.96%
***
 2.910 
Independent C/P 
effect 0.39% 1.337 
 
Panel C: Joint BE/ME and C/P Sorts: Restricted and Value-Weighted   
I      (high C/P) 2.58% 2.21% 1.43% 1.15% 1.53   T 
II 2.32% 1.72% 1.21% 2.23%
***
 4.05   156 
III    (low C/P) 1.25% 1.65% 1.30% -0.05% -0.10   N 
I – III 1.33%** 0.56% 0.13%    356 
t-stat 2.385  1.151   0.239    
 
Ave. 
Stocks 
  Return  t-stat   Return  t-stat 38 
Independent 
BE/ME effect 0.74%
*
 
                   
1.738   
Independent C/P 
effect 0.68%
*
 
                                
1.877  
  
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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The size effect is never statistically significant in any of the C/P groups, but the 
estimates are somewhat larger in the neutral group.        
In Table 5.6 results of the two-way sort on the two value-growth indicators are 
shown. Evidence of an independent C/P effect of the BE/ME effect is mixed. On an 
equal-weighted basis, the estimate is 0.39% and it is not statistically different from 
zero. However, on the value-weighted basis, the computed C/P premium orthogonal 
of the BE/ME effect is 0.68% and it is different from zero at the 10% level. On a 
deeper look, it appears that the independent C/P effect is absent among low BE/ME 
firms. Actually, when the premium is calculated after exclusion of these stocks 
(results are unreported), it is significant in both economic and statistical terms. On an 
equal-weighted basis, the C/P effect, which is independent of the book-to-market ratio 
and calculated in the top two BE/ME treciles, is 0.58%, with a t-statistic of 1.847. 
However, on a value-weighted basis, it is strong at 0.95%, and a t-statistic of 2.312. 
Thus, the C/P may carry information about the value effect that is orthogonal to the 
information contained in the BE/ME ratio.  
Consequently, in spite of the BE/ME ratio being the better predictor of returns, 
the test assets in asset pricing tests will not only include size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios, but size and cashflow yield sorted assets as well. The tables show that there 
may be some information in the C/P ratio that the book-to-market ratio does not 
capture, or the superiority of BE/ME as a predictor of returns may be a result of data- 
mining. Also, Auret and Sinclaire (2006) show that in a multivariate regression of 
several value-growth indicators, it is the C/P ratio that retains its predictive power, 
even though the BE/ME is also included in the regressions. Thus, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
also provide a summary of the 24 assets that describe the size and the value 
anomalies. Unlike prior research, the earning‟s yield effect is found to be the weakest, 
and thus is dropped from the analysis. 
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5.2 Part II: The Size and the Value Effects on the JSE, Risk 
Adjustment  
 
The size effect and the value effect are now subjected to risk adjustment with 
the CAPM and the RS-APT. The philosophy behind the methodology employed in the 
study stems from arguments made in Lo and MacKinlay (1990a). On the one hand, 
the authors advocate use of characteristic-sorted portfolios as tests assets because they 
note that if the characteristic is correlated with the model‟s pricing errors then the 
power of the test is increased. On the other hand, they note that if the predictive 
ability of the characteristic for returns results from data-mining, the test will surely 
reject the asset pricing model in favour of the characteristic model, even if the asset 
pricing model is correct.  Consequently, tests are performed on 24 size and F/P sorted 
portfolios, which ought to capture CAPM‟s (or APT‟s) pricing errors (Berk, 1995), 
where the restrictive time-series test is augmented with the robust cross-sectional 
method.  
Since the time-series test makes implicit assumptions, which are violated in 
practice, a more powerful cross-sectional test of Cochrane (2001) is also performed. 
In order to test the validity of the assumption that the risk-free rate is equivalent to the 
zero-beta rate (Black, 1972), the cross-sectional regressions are run with and without 
the intercept. Because returns are calculated net of the risk-free rate, the statistical 
significance of the intercept is an implicit test of this restriction. Also, the Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS) regressions are performed as a robustness exercise. In all tests, 
the validity of the models is tested by examining the size of the pricing errors. In all 
tests, the computed factor loading is the sum of the contemporaneous beta and the 
lagged beta.  
In addition, in order to address the data-snooping concerns of Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990a), the tests of Brennan et al. (1998) are preformed. Although in 
those tests the time-series restrictions do apply, the method does not require grouping 
of data and circumvents the errors-in-variables problem.   
The results of the time-series test of the CAPM that uses the size and BE/ME, as 
well as size and C/P sorted portfolios as test assets are shown in Table 5.7. The results 
of the corresponding RS-APT test are shown in Table 5.8.  
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Interestingly, whether the equal-weighted and value-weighted scheme is used to 
contract the test assets, only seven (out of the 24) intercepts are different from zero in 
the CAPM tests. In the RS-APT test with the value-weighted assets, only seven 
pricing errors are different from zero, but the model is particularly worse than the 
CAPM at pricing the equal-weighted size and F/P sorted portfolios, as ten pricing 
errors are different from zero. In both models, however, the direction of the 
mispricing pans out according to the pattern predicted by the size and the value 
effects. In other words, intercepts of portfolios with small and value firms are 
generally positive and intercepts of portfolios with large and growth firms are 
generally negative.  
An important feature of the results, which damns the CAPM and the RS-APT, is 
the large spread in intercepts of the different portfolios. In all the tests, the pricing 
errors of the small firms are markedly greater than the ones of the large firms. 
Similarly, intercepts of the value assets are larger than the ones of the growth 
portfolios.  
Actually, a comparison of the intercepts in these tables, with raw returns shown 
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, provides a good indication of the power the two models have in 
pricing the size and the value effect. In the CAPM test, the spread in mean returns 
between small and large firms grows in magnitude after risk adjustment. In particular, 
raw returns show that the average outperformance of small stocks versus large stocks 
is 0.64% per month on an equal-weighted basis and 0.68% per month on a value-
weighted basis.  
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Table 5.7 
The Size and Value Effects after Adjustment for Risk: the CAPM Test  
The table shows results of time -series regressions 
, , , , , ( ) , 1 , 1 ,i t i i M M t f t i M lag M t f t i t
r b r r b r r  for t= 1,2,3…T and i = 1,2,3,…N 
The regressions are run between July 1992 and Ju ly 2005 and are estimated with a SURE system that is mapped into GMM. Spectral density  matrix estimated with four leads 
and lags. The rM is the return  on the market factor, which is the value-weighted return of all securities in  the dataset. All returns are adjusted for div idends and other payouts. 
The size and BE/ME portfolios are with an intersection of four size-sorted portfolios and three BE/ME-sorted portfolios. The size and C/P sorted portfolios are formed with 
an intersection of four size -sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted portfolios. The intercept terms are multiplied by 100 for clarity 
Panel A: Size and BE/ME sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.32 0.26 0.75
**
 1.07
***
 47.3% 57.7% 48.1% 41.6% 0.43 0.48 0.91
***
 1.32
***
 59.3% 53.1% 43.8% 27.0% 
I 
 (Value) 0.660 0.730 2.180 2.610     0.820 1.300 2.490 3.560     
0.20 0.25 0.03 1.04
**
 45.2% 86.7% 57.5% 49.7% 0.34 0.38 0.01 0.99
**
 81.1% 45.7% 50.1% 31.0% 
 II  
(Middle)  1.080 0.870 0.070 2.180     1.340 1.150 0.030 2.110     
-0.41
**
 0.02 0.04 1.02
*
 35.8% 88.0% 57.0% 52.2% -0.37 -0.29 0.11 0.76 81.4% 56.2% 50.5% 20.0% 
III  
(Growth) -2.390 0.050 0.080 1.800     -1.640 -0.610 0.240 1.420     
  bM bM(lag)   bM bM(lag) 
1.15
***
 0.71
***
 0.61
***
 0.51
***
 0.00 0.21
***
 0.27
***
 0.24
***
 1.16
***
 0.72
***
 0.61
***
 0.40
***
 0.03 0.21
***
 0.26
***
 0.23
***
 
I  
(Value) 9.650 12.500 8.750 9.230 -0.040 3.230 3.640 2.440 9.190 10.97 9.680 8.320 0.300 3.090 3.750 2.700 
1.04
***
 0.62
***
 0.62
***
 0.55
***
 -0.01 0.21
***
 0.23
***
 0.17
**
 0.89
***
 0.63
***
 0.62
***
 0.53
***
 0.06
**
 0.23
***
 0.25
***
 0.20
***
 
 II 
(Middle)  22.180 15.710 5.260 7.660 -0.410 4.540 4.370 1.990 17.840 9.920 9.040 8.900 2.020 4.660 3.720 2.460 
1.02
***
 0.69
***
 0.71
***
 0.50
***
 -0.07
***
 0.13
***
 0.25
**
 0.19
***
 0.97
***
 0.71
***
 0.71
***
 0.55
***
 -0.01 0.15
***
 0.27
***
 0.10 
III 
(Growth) 17.590 7.670 7.060 5.380 -2.220 2.610 3.310 2.590 14.620 8.680 7.510 6.310 -0.400 2.810 3.710 1.350 
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Table 5.7 (Continued) 
Panel B: Size and C/P sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.55 0.76
***
 0.57 1.24
***
 67.7% 50.7% 41.6% 27.5% 0.60
*
 0.77
**
 0.62 1.43
***
 61.5% 48.0% 43.9% 36.3% 
I 
 (Value) 1.300 2.380 1.400 2.940     1.720 2.240 1.380 3.830     
0.20 0.16 0.49 1.02
**
 82.4% 47.0% 52.7% 32.8% 0.25 0.15 0.59 1.00
**
 84.7% 59.2% 47.8% 26.2% 
 II  
(Middle)  1.060 0.530 1.360 2.140     1.080 0.480 1.610 2.030     
-0.18 0.10 -0.20 0.39 80.6% 59.5% 47.7% 35.9% -0.20 -0.03 -0.19 0.42 86.4% 59.8% 42.4% 32.7% 
III  
(Growth) -0.950 0.240 -0.360 0.770  
   
-0.920 -0.080 -0.380 1.130     
  bM bM(lag)   bM bM(lag) 
1.08
***
 0.58
***
 0.56
***
 0.39
***
 0.11
*
 0.24
***
 0.26
***
 0.25
***
 0.97
***
 0.63
***
 0.54
***
 0.36
***
 0.07 0.28
***
 0.28
***
 0.23
***
 
I  
(Value) 15.170 9.740 8.190 7.020 1.680 4.970 3.740 2.870 14.480 10.380 7.700 5.900 1.260 5.270 3.650 2.950 
0.93
***
 0.63
***
 0.63
***
 0.55
***
 -0.02 0.21
***
 0.19
***
 0.28
***
 0.90
***
 0.62
***
 0.67
***
 0.50
***
 0.05
**
 0.19
***
 0.23
***
 0.28
***
 
 II 
(Middle)  23.230 10.270 7.020 6.630 -0.510 4.280 2.750 2.990 20.570 8.050 7.920 7.200 1.940 4.200 3.840 3.440 
1.03
***
 0.71
***
 0.76
***
 0.65
***
 -0.06
***
 0.13
***
 0.27
***
 0.20
***
 0.95
***
 0.74
***
 0.68
***
 0.61
***
 -0.01 0.15
***
 0.25
***
 0.18
***
 
III 
(Growth) 15.010 7.860 6.240 6.590 -2.520 2.930 3.130 2.870 14.660 8.470 7.430 7.760 -0.450 3.000 3.330 2.450 
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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Table 5.8 
The Size and the Value Effect after Adjustment for Risk: the RS-APT Test  
The table shows results of time-series regressions 
, , , , , ( ) , 1 , 1
, , , , ( ) , 1 , 1 ,
i t i i R R t f t i R lag R t f t
i I I t f t i I lag I t f t i t
r b r r b r r
b r r b r r
 for t= 1,2,3…T and i = 1,2,3,…N 
The regressions are run between July 1992 and Ju ly 2005 and are estimated with a SURE system that is mapped into GMM. Spectral density matrix estimated with four leads 
and lags. The rR is return the Resi factor, which is the value-weighted return o f all min ing shares in the dataset. The rI  is the Findi factor, which is the value-weighted return 
of all Financial and Industrial shares in the dataset. All returns are adjusted for dividen ds and other payouts. The size and BE/ME portfolios are with an intersection of four 
size-sorted portfolios and three BE/ME-sorted portfolios. The size and C/P sorted portfolios are formed with an intersection of four size -sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted 
portfolios. The intercept terms are multip lied by 100 for clarity. 
Panel A: Size and BE/ME sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.40 0.32 0.83
***
 1.12
***
 48.9% 56.8% 54.5% 50.3% 0.51 0.54 0.98
***
 1.37
***
 62.8% 58.6% 49.4% 31.9% I  
(Value) 0.850 0.920 2.360 2.870     1.030 1.580 2.620 3.800     
0.31 0.29 0.07 1.07
**
 50.0% 79.4% 65.1% 57.4% 0.39
*
 0.41 0.05 1.03
***
 85.4% 57.6% 58.7% 31.1%  II 
(Middle)  1.200 1.060 0.170 2.320     1.800 1.430 0.130 2.230     
-0.33 0.03 0.08 1.04
*
 42.9% 81.4% 70.8% 62.2% -0.32
*
 -0.28 0.14 0.76 87.4% 68.0% 60.2% 27.6% III 
(Growth) -1.410 0.090 0.200 1.940     -1.720 -0.650 0.380 1.500     
  bR bR(lag)   bR bR(lag) 
0.39
***
 0.29
***
 0.31
***
 0.25
***
 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.41
***
 0.35
***
 0.25
***
 0.24
***
 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 I  
(Value) 5.090 5.040 4.840 3.920 -0.130 0.100 -0.860 0.070 4.600 6.010 3.940 4.550 -0.650 0.400 0.340 0.160 
0.33
***
 0.08
**
 0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.22
***
 0.08
**
 0.11
**
 0.13
***
 0.04 -0.05
**
 -0.04 -0.02  II 
(Middle)  10.390 2.260 1.510 0.810 -1.200 -1.250 -0.440 -0.380 5.780 1.940 2.200 2.230 1.290 -1.810 -0.780 -0.330 
0.17
***
 0.01 0.08
*
 0.19
*
 -0.01 0.00 -0.07
*
 -0.06 0.09
**
 0.00 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 III 
(Growth) 3.100 0.390 1.780 1.750 -0.240 0.040 -1.950 -0.710 2.350 -0.080 1.310 1.260 -1.140 0.180 -0.990 -0.240 
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Table 5.8 (Continued) 
  bI bI( lag)   bI bI( lag) 
0.85
***
 0.54
***
 0.39
***
 0.39
***
 0.00 0.16
***
 0.24
***
 0.19
***
 0.86
***
 0.52
***
 0.45
***
 0.28
***
 0.08 0.14
***
 0.21
***
 0.18
***
 I  
(Value) 6.880 7.940 5.860 5.780 0.040 3.360 3.640 2.860 7.210 7.220 8.040 4.680 0.790 2.910 3.460 3.020 
0.73
***
 0.59
***
 0.62
***
 0.55
***
 -0.02 0.24
***
 0.22
***
 0.18
**
 0.78
***
 0.62
***
 0.60
***
 0.46
***
 0.00 0.28
***
 0.25
***
 0.19
**
  II 
(Middle)  17.020 16.160 5.300 6.080 -0.440 5.460 4.590 2.000 19.060 13.15 9.860 6.520 0.060 6.010 5.040 2.090 
0.87
***
 0.76
***
 0.70
***
 0.41
***
 -0.09
**
 0.14
***
 0.30
***
 0.24
***
 0.95
***
 0.79
***
 0.72
***
 0.54
***
 -0.01 0.16
***
 0.31
***
 0.12 III 
(Growth) 16.170 11.100 7.760 4.870 -1.770 3.450 4.980 2.920 19.270 12.25 8.790 7.160 -0.240 4.200 5.440 1.580 
Panel B: Size and BE/ME sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.72 0.81
***
 0.62 1.28
***
 51.7% 51.0% 50.0% 31.9% 0.71
***
 0.84
**
 0.65 1.46
**
 61.8% 53.1% 47.5% 31.1% I  
(Value) 1.510 2.390 1.520 3.090     2.080 2.290 1.460 3.820     
0.27 0.20 0.54 1.05
**
 83.6% 69.6% 55.5% 43.7% 0.31 0.18 0.64
*
 1.04
**
 85.1% 61.1% 60.5% 36.2%  II 
(Middle)  1.320 0.690 1.560 2.310     1.360 0.630 1.830 2.150     
-0.10 0.12 -0.15 0.43 81.0% 70.2% 49.4% 37.3% -0.16 -0.01 -0.16 0.46 88.3% 69.6% 56.1% 39.3% III 
(Growth) -0.360 0.350 -0.280 0.930     -1.020 -0.030 -0.340 1.380     
  bR bR(lag)   bR bR(lag) 
0.45
***
 0.16
***
 0.13
***
 0.17
***
 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.37
***
 0.22
***
 0.10
**
 0.14
***
 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 I  
(Value) 4.160 3.230 2.650 3.170 0.660 -0.420 -1.400 0.170 4.910 4.540 1.900 3.060 0.320 -1.130 -0.410 0.090 
0.21
***
 0.08
**
 0.16
***
 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.16
**
 0.10
**
 0.15
**
 0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02  II 
(Middle)  5.720 2.250 3.130 1.130 0.410 -0.630 -1.630 -0.540 5.460 2.350 3.210 1.160 1.090 -0.670 -0.750 -0.310 
0.20
***
 0.06
*
 0.14
*
 0.15
*
 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.11
***
 0.06 0.13
**
 0.18
***
 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 III 
(Growth) 3.940 1.900 1.720 1.690 -0.920 -0.770 0.370 -0.810 3.180 1.480 2.100 3.240 -1.090 -0.800 -0.390 -0.700 
  bI bI( lag)   bI bI( lag) 
0.61
**
 0.48
***
 0.47
***
 0.32
***
 0.05 0.23
***
 0.32
***
 0.20
***
 0.63
***
 0.48
***
 0.50
***
 0.31
***
 0.05 0.28
***
 0.30
***
 0.17
***
 I  
(Value) 5.930 7.290 7.480 5.390 0.570 4.210 4.850 3.010 9.150 7.790 8.030 5.390 0.760 4.720 4.680 2.940 
0.79
***
 0.61
***
 0.56
***
 0.55
***
 -0.06
*
 0.22
***
 0.21
***
 0.28
***
 0.82
***
 0.62
***
 0.61
***
 0.47
***
 -0.01 0.20
***
 0.22
***
 0.30
***
  II 
(Middle)  17.520 13.12 6.840 7.830 -1.840 5.370 3.880 3.460 23.670 11.26 9.120 7.300 -0.150 5.230 5.320 3.840 
0.86
***
 0.72
*** 
0.71
***
 0.56
***
 -0.07
*
 0.16
***
 0.23
***
 0.26
***
 0.93
***
 0.75
***
 0.64
***
 0.49
***
 -0.01 0.20
***
 0.27
***
 0.21
***
 III 
(Growth) 16.650 9.400 5.660 4.710 -1.650 4.030 2.450 3.100 21.950 9.410 7.060 6.410 -0.300 5.020 4.040 3.150 
  
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level 
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Correspondingly, the average spread in CAPM intercepts between small and large 
firms has widened to 0.81% per month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.85% per 
month on the value-weighted basis. If the RS-APT is used to account for risk, the 
spread in intercepts grows to 0.79% per month on equal-weighted basis and 0.78% on 
a value-weighted basis.  
The increase in mispricing is a result of the fact that, contrary to the findings 
with US data, the Market, the Findi, and the Resource betas are lower for smaller 
firms than larger firms. It is believed that market microstructure effects account for 
the disparity, which is surprising given that firms included in the sample are already 
screened for liquidity, and market‟s lag is included as an explanatory variable.      
In addition, it seems that the models cannot account for the value effect. In 
particular, raw estimates of the average value effect across size groups are 0.8% per 
month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.61% per month on the value-weighted basis. 
Risk adjustment with the CAPM brings those spreads marginally down to 0.79% per 
month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.59% on the value-weighted basis. If the RS-
APT model is used to adjust for risk, the spreads marginally grow to 0.83% per month 
on the equal-weighted basis and 0.62% on the value-weighted basis.  
Lastly, the importance of including the lagged term in the regressions is once 
again shown. In the CAPM test, a vast majority of these loadings are greater than zero 
at conventional statistical levels. The loadings on the lagged Findi factor in the RS-
APT tests are also mostly different from zero. Although, the beta on the lag of the 
resource factor is scarcely different from zero, it is argued that omission of the lagged 
term is not advised. Since the lagged loadings on the lagged resource factor ought to 
be small a priori, it is unclear whether a low statistical significance of the lagged 
terms is a consequence of fast reaction of the mining firms to information or just a 
statistical noise. 
An array of statistical tests of the CAPM and the RS-APT are presented in Table 
5.9. The analysis, with the GRS test, of the pricing errors from the time-series 
regressions, rejects some specifications. But, the CAPM and the RS-APT tested on 
equally-weighted assets are not rejected at the 5% level of significance. Consequently, 
although it appears that the models do an adequate job of pricing size and F/P sorted 
assets, the intercepts seem to be close to zero. However, it is argued that this test has 
little power to accept or reject the CAPM or the RS-APT models. During the sample 
period the risk-free rate has been high and stock return have been low.  
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Table 5.9 
Cross-Sectional CAPM and RS-APT Tests with Size-Value Portfolios 
The table shows a summary of test of the CAPM and the RS-APT models. The test assets comprise of 
12 size-value portfo lios that are an intersection of four size sorted portfolios and three BE/ME sorted 
portfolios, and additional 12 test assets that are a intersection of four size sorted portfolios and three 
C/P sorted portfolios. The F statistic of overall asset pricing model fit of the time-series models follows 
Gibbons, Shanken and Ross (1989). The tests for the model fit for the cross -sectional regressions 
follow Cochrane (2001).  
The cross-sectional regressions of the CAPM test are run across 24 size-value portfolios with  
, 0 ,T i t M M i i
E r b  for i = 1,2,3… N    
The cross-sectional regressions of the APT test are run across 24 size -value portfolios with  
, 0 , ,T i t R R i I I i i
E r b b  for i = 1,2,3… N 
The cross-sectional regressions can be run with or without an intercept. The dependant variable is the 
time-series average excess return of an asset i. bM is sum of a slope of a t ime-series regressions of each 
asset‟s excess returns on to market factor and its lag. bR is the sum of slopes of time-series regressions 
of each asset‟s excess returns on to Resi factor and its lag. Similarly, bI is the sum of slopes of time-
series regressions of each asset‟s excess returns on to Findi factor and its lag. All returns are adjusted 
for div idends and other payouts.  
  CAPM RS-APT 
Method  
Value-
Weighted 
Equal-
Weighted 
Value-
Weighted 
Equal-
Weighted 
F  1.577
*
 1.613
*
 1.849
**
 1.774
*
 
p-value 0.097 0.087 0.041 0.052 
Time-Series OLS Premia Positive  Positive  Positive Positive 
      
χ2  54.685*** 42.888*** 51.456*** 48.195*** 
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 Cross-Sectional OLS 
without the intercept Premia Positive
*
 Positive
* 
  Positive
*
 Positive
*
 
      
χ2  39.475*** 36.315** 37.401** 40.262*** 
p-value 0.009 0.020 0.015 0.007 Cross-Sectional GLS 
without the intercept Premia Positive Positive Positive
*
 Positive
*
 
      
χ2  39.984*** 42.888*** 33.477** 27.293 
p-value 0.007 0.003 0.041 0.161 
Premia Negative Negative
*
 Negative
**
 Negative
***
 Cross-Sectional OLS 
with the intercept Intercept Positive
**
 Positive
**
 Positive
***
 Positive
***
 
      
χ2  34.560** 29.483 27.975 25.011 
p-value 0.032 0.103 0.141 0.247 
Premia Negative
*
 Negative
**
 Negative
**
 Negative
***
 Cross-Sectional GLS 
with the intercept Intercept Positive
***
 Positive
***
 Positive
**
 Positive
***
 
 
*
 at least one of the premia is significant at 10% level, 
**
 at least one of the premia is significant at 5% 
level, 
***
 at least one of the premia is significant at 1% level  
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Most of the test portfolios in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 do not yield statistically positive 
excess returns prior to risk adjustment. More importantly, the realisations on the 
Market, the Resource and the Findi factors have not been reliably different from zero 
during the sample period. As results, by construction, regression of dependant 
variable that has a mean close to zero onto an independent variable also with a mean 
close to zero, will yield small intercepts. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the 
pricing errors in the time-series tests are not statistically different from zero
91
. 
A series of the robust cross-sectional tests is also performed. For the sake of 
brevity, an abridged table of results from these tests is shown in Table 5.9
92
.  The 
table summarises sixteen cross-sectional specifications that test the CAPM and the 
RS-APT with various specifications.  
The cross-sectional tests reveal that the models do a poor job in pricing the size 
and F/P sorted portfolios and there is little, if any, evidence that the RS-APT is a 
better model than the CAPM. Specifically, when the models are tested in OLS 
specifications that assume equivalence between the risk-free and zero-beta rates, 
Cochrane‟s (2001) test rejects all models at the 1% level, and the premia are only 
weakly positive. The GLS robustness regression does recover one of the CAPM 
specifications and one of the RS-APT specifications, such that the formal test of the 
model does not reject it at the 1% level.  
When the zero-beta rate is treated as a free parameter, the models are strongly 
rejected. Although Cochrane‟s (2001) test does provide support for the four 
specifications, most of the estimated premia are negative. The anomalous result is an 
obvious consequence of the potential under-estimation of betas for small stocks, 
which stems from market microstructure effects. It is safe to say that, in this form, the 
CAPM and the RS-APT cannot price the size and F/P sorted portfolios.      
Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) show formally that grouping of shares into 
portfolios and then using these portfolios in tests may falsely reject even a correctly 
specified equilibrium model of risk and return. As a result, another set of tests is 
performed on ungrouped data. This luxury comes at a cost.  
                                                 
91
 The low estimates of the premia are just an example of the criticism of Elton (1999), who notes that 
time-series estimates of expected returns are highly imprecise, as realised returns can diverge from 
theoretical values for prolonged periods of time (10 years?, 50 years?). Actually, the cross-sectional 
tests in Section (X.X) have already shown that the market premium, drawn from industry assets, is 
large and reliably positive. 
92
 Detailed results are available on request.  
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Table 5.10 
Tests CAPM and RS-APT against Firm Characteristics  
Coefficients in the table are calcu lated with method in Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998),  
coefficients are the intercepts of time-series regressions the factors on month-by-month coefficients of 
cross-sectional OLS regressions of model‟s pricing e rrors. Model‟s pricing error of firm i in  time t  is a  
sum of a intercept of a time-series regression of firm‟s i excess return on model‟s factors and this 
regression‟s a residual at t ime t. t-statistics are calculated with the Newey-West (1987) standard errors. 
Full listing period was used in the time-series regressions. The regressions of top 20% largest firms do 
not include lagged factors. The regressions of smallest 20% of firms include two  lags of the factors. 
The remainder of regressions include one lag of the factor. Each month, only stocks with liquidity 
measure of more than 0.1% or cost more than 100c are included in the regression. Liquidity measure is 
a twelve-month average of monthly trading volume scaled by end-month shares in issue.  Size is the 
natural logarithm of stock‟s market capitalization, which is a product of the number of shares 
outstanding and the share price. E/P is earnings per share scaled by a price. C/P is cash flow per share 
scaled by a price. BE/ME is the book value of equity scaled by market capitalization. A ll accounting 
data becomes effective five months after the financial year-end. All variables are standardized and 
winzorised at 2.5% and 97.5%. If earnings are positive then E/P(+) is the earnings yield and E/P 
Dummy is 0, otherwise E/P(+) is set to zero and E/P Dummy is set to 1. Similar conventions pertain to 
the C/P rat io. The reported R
2
 is the average of indiv idual R
2
 of each cross-sectional regressions.  All 
coefficients are multip lied by 1000, for clarity.  
 Constant Size E/P(+) C/P(+) BE/ME E/P 
Dummy 
C/P 
Dummy 
Average 
R
2
 
 Panel A : CAPM-ad justed returns            
 (1)  8.37
***
 -5.94
***
      0.012 
 t-stat  2.49 -3.56       
 (2)  5.27
**
  1.69   6.31
*
  0.018 
 t-stat  2.00  1.04   1.71   
 (3)  6.15
***
   3.25
***
   -4.54 0.015 
 t-stat  2.47   2.63   -1.22   
 (4)  6.72
***
    4.82
***
   0.010 
 t-stat  2.49    2.98     
 (5)  8.59
***
 -4.86
***
   3.04
*
   0.021 
 t-stat  2.56 -2.76   1.81    
 (6)  9.13
***
 -5.74
***
  2.09
*
   -6.85
*
 0.051 
 t-stat  2.78 -3.53  1.87   -1.89  
 Panel B: APT-adjusted returns            
 (1)  7.54
***
 -5.69
***
      0.013 
 t-stat  2.50 -3.45       
 (2)  4.75
**
  2.13   5.68
*
  0.017 
 t-stat  2.10  1.33   1.65   
 (3)  5.54
***
   3.01
***
   -4.81 0.014 
 t-stat  2.55   2.46   -1.58  
 (4)  6.01
***
    4.51
***
   0.008 
 t-stat  2.54    3.06    
 (5)  7.83
***
 -4.84
***
   2.75
*
   0.020 
 t-stat  2.55 -2.77   1.80    
 (6)  8.42
***
 -5.64
***
  1.88
*
   -7.11
***
 0.047 
 t-stat  2.82 -3.52  1.74   -2.39   
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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The time-series restrictions of equivalence between the risk-free and the zero-beta 
rates, and correct estimation of each premium with time-series means of factors, need 
to be enforced. A robust cross-sectional test on ungrouped data is impractical, as it 
requires estimates of factor loadings for individual firms. One of the conclusions from 
the tests above is that it is difficult to estimate loadings on diversified portfolios. The 
imprecision of firm-level estimates of loadings would be prohibitively high. Although 
Fama and French (1992) use a portfolio technique to estimate firm level betas, the 
cross-section of assets listed on the JSE is not large enough to directly apply their 
technique.  
Consequently, the method advocated by Cochrane (2001), and applied by 
Brennan et al. (1998) and van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), is used to test the 
resilience to risk adjustment of the size and the value effects. This procedure employs 
Fama-MacBeth regressions of firm characteristics onto time-series estimates of 
models‟ pricing errors. The results of these tests are shown in Table 5.10 and differ 
from the analysis of van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) in two ways. The t-statistics 
are adjusted for serial correlation with the Newey and West (1987) method, and the 
coefficients are adjusted for bias, discussed in Brennan et al. (1998), which arises 
when the estimation error of the coefficients, computed in cross-sectional regressions 
of the Fama-MacBeth procedure, is correlated with the factors of the asset pricing 
model being tested.  
 Judging from the results in the table, the CAPM and the RS-APT do not “price 
out” firm characteristics. The results presented here are similar to the test show in 12,  
which is conducted on raw returns. Yet both the value and the size effects are 
marginally reduced after adjustment for risk. The RS-APT does a somewhat better job 
at pricing the effects, as the coefficients on all of the characteristics are smaller. The 
biggest impact occurs in the univariate coefficient on the BE/ME, which is slashed by 
one. More importantly, the coefficients on value-growth indicators, when tested 
jointly with the size effect, are no longer different from zero at the 5% level, but are 
reliably positive at the 10% level. On one hand, this attenuation indicates that the 
CAPM and the RS-APT can account for a portion of the size and the value effect. Yet 
it may be a consequence of the overly conservative econometric methods
93
. In fact, it 
                                                 
93
 To explain, In order to correct for this bias, discussed in Brennan et al. (1998), the authors propose 
that the time-series of coefficients from the cross-sectional regressions is regressed onto the factors of 
the asset pricing model. When the corrective procedure is employed on the coefficients on the value-
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can be shown that applying only the Newey and West (1987) adjustment restores 
significance, at the 5% level, of the coefficients on the BE/ME and the C/P.   
It is difficult to compare the results presented in Table 5.10 and the results in 
van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) because many of the value-growth indicators 
they employ are inverses of the F/P ratios. However, the coefficients on all variables, 
which are specified in the same way, can be compared, especially given the fact that 
the authors and the methodology employed in this thesis standardise the regressors. 
The coefficients on the size variable in the CAPM tests computed in van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2003a) and the ones presented here are almost identical. However, 
they fail to show a marked difference in coefficients on the value-growth indicators 
after control for risk is made and the strength of the value-effect seems to increase 
after the adjustment. The disparity in the results can arise from any of the differences 
in the methodologies. It is believed that inclusion of the lagged terms in estimation of 
the pricing errors, and the bias adjustment proposed in Brennan et al. (1998), are the 
chief culprits for the difference in the results.  
                                                                                                                                            
growth indicators none of the factors comes up significant. Gujarati (2002) does note that inclusion of 
useless regressors into a regression equation does not induce a bias in the coefficients, but it does lead 
to miscalculation of the residual variance and, consequently, the standard errors. Thus, the low t-
statistics associates with the coefficients on the size-value indicators may be a result of the over-
identified regressions. 
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5.3 Part III: Tests of the Fama and French Three factor Model on the 
JSE 
 
The results in the preceding two parts of the empirical results have provided 
evidence that allow for a formal construction of the three factor model for the JSE. 
The model is to be specified in two ways. The first format follows Fama and French 
(1993), where the market factor is augmented with the size and the value factors. The 
second format replaces the market factor in the three factor model with the Resource 
and the Findi factors proposed by van Rensburg and Slaney (1997). Subsequently, the 
two models are subjected to a series of formal tests. At first, their capacity for pricing 
the troublesome size and F/P sorted portfolios is investigated. Next, the models are 
jointly tested against firm characteristics, where their ability to subsume the predictive 
power of market equity and the value-growth indicators is ascertained. This test also 
serves as an indication as to whether rational or behavioural theory underpins the 
success of the three factor model. Lastly, a direct comparison of the two “traditional” 
models with the FF3F models is made. However, due to limitations in statistical 
methodology, this test abstracts from statistical rigor and serves only an indicative 
purpose.  
 
5.3.1 Tests of the Fama and French Models  
 
Since the CAPM and the RS-APT have trouble explaining the size and the value 
effect, at first, the FF3F and the RS-FF3F are applied to the 24 size and F/P sorted 
portfolios. As usual, a time-series test, which calculates the factor loadings, is 
followed by the robust cross-sectional regressions.     
The results of time-series tests for the FF3F and the RS-FF3F are shown in 
Table 5.11 and Table 5.12, respectively. Although, the time-series means of the SML 
and the VMG are 0.19% per month and 0.52% per month, respectively (none are 
significantly different from zero), the tests are hugely supportive of both models. The 
size and the value factors capture a considerable amount of return variation, as the R
2
 
of all regressions is large - much higher than in the test of the CAPM and the RS-
APT.  
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Table 5.11 
The Size and the Value Effect after Adjustment for Risk: the FF3F Test  
The table shows results of time-series regressions 
, , , , , ( ) , 1 , 1 , , , , , , ,i t i i M M t f t i M lag M t f t i SML SML t f t i VMG VMG t f t i t
r b r r b r r b r r b r r  for t= 1,2,3…T and i = 1,2,3,…N 
The regressions are run between July 1992 and Ju ly 2005 and are estimated with a SURE system that is mapped into GMM. Spectral density matrix estimated with four leads 
and lags. The rSML is a return on a zero-cost portfolio of small cap italization stocks financed with a short pos ition of large capitalizat ion stocks (SML, Small minus Large). 
Similarly, rVMG  is a return on a zero-cost portfolio with a long position in value stocks financed with a short position in growth stocks (VMG, Value minus Growth). SML and 
VMG are analogous to SMB and HML in  Fama and French (1993).  The rM is the return on   Market factor, which is the value-weighted return of all securities in  the dataset. 
All returns are adjusted for dividends and other payouts. The size and BE/ME portfolios are with an intersection of four size-sorted portfolios and three BE/ME-sorted 
portfolios. The size and C/P sorted portfolios are formed with an intersection of four size-sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted portfolios. The intercept terms are mult iplied 
by 100 fo r clarity. 
Panel A: The GRS test  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
 F p-value  F p-value 
 0.610 0.9577 0.552 0.9810 
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Table 5.11 (Continued) 
Panel B: Size and BE/ME sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.15 0.11 0.37 0.65
**
 59.5% 58.3% 52.4% 54.6% 0.25 0.31 0.54
*
 0.86
***
 60.5% 56.5% 60.3% 57.3% I  
(Value) 0.340 0.320 1.340 2.020     0.500 0.840 1.870 3.290     
0.24 0.02 -0.23 0.65
*
 46.9% 87.6% 71.8% 70.8% 0.28 0.10 -0.34 0.64
*
 81.4% 60.2% 72.0% 47.0%  II 
(Middle)  1.350 0.090 -0.870 1.890     1.050 0.410 -1.260 1.850     
-0.27
*
 -0.12 -0.16 0.78
*
 39.5% 89.0% 65.7% 72.9% -0.37
**
 -0.43 -0.12 0.48 84.6% 66.6% 71.2% 32.0% III 
(Growth) -1.740 -0.330 -0.600 1.720     -1.970 -1.000 -0.450 1.050     
  bM bM(lag)   bM bM(lag) 
1.22
***
 0.85
**
 0.89
***
 0.85
***
 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.07 1.25
***
 0.87
***
 0.91
***
 0.75
***
 -0.03 0.11 0.07
*
 0.01 I  
(Value) 10.480 11.590 11.710 14.850 0.920 1.640 0.920 -0.920 9.800 10.21 15.220 13.700 -0.260 1.440 1.790 0.240 
0.98
***
 0.85
***
 0.92
***
 0.93
***
 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.96
***
 0.89
***
 0.97
***
 0.84
***
 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.01  II 
(Middle)  15.290 15.640 9.350 10.080 -0.410 0.230 1.520 0.100 11.680 11.53 12.840 11.770 0.520 1.550 0.550 -0.100 
0.92
***
 0.87
***
 0.97
***
 0.78
***
 0.12 0.09
*
 0.02 0.04 1.03
***
 0.90
***
 0.98
***
 0.84
***
 -0.05 0.03 0.09
*
 -0.09 III 
(Growth) 17.160 10.450 10.110 6.940 1.530 1.820 0.410 0.720 15.080 10.76 11.000 7.280 -1.530 0.610 1.910 -1.190 
  bSML bVMG   bSML bVMG 
0.06 0.33
***
 0.58
***
 0.75
***
 0.26
**
 0.11 0.39
***
 0.40
***
 0.13 0.35
***
 0.63
***
 0.71
***
 0.24
**
 0.14 0.37
***
 0.48
***
 I  
(Value) 0.360 3.280 5.910 6.500 1.980 0.920 5.400 3.990 0.650 3.290 9.050 8.980 1.960 1.210 6.670 7.730 
-0.16
***
 0.57
***
 0.79
***
 0.92
***
 0.00 0.16
***
 0.10 0.27
***
 0.15 0.63
***
 0.83
***
 0.74
***
 0.04 0.20
***
 0.25
***
 0.28
***
  II 
(Middle)  -2.540 8.100 7.310 6.490 -0.010 2.780 1.360 2.470 1.550 7.620 8.940 6.490 0.500 2.570 3.820 3.050 
-0.16
***
 0.50
***
 0.71
***
 0.74
***
 -0.18
***
 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.21
***
 0.52
***
 0.74
***
 0.74
***
 -0.08 0.01 0.06 0.16 III 
(Growth) -3.950 5.960 9.010 5.320 -2.650 0.310 0.340 0.840 3.130 5.420 11.170 5.480 -1.220 0.110 0.680 1.510 
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Table 5.11 (Continued) 
Panel C: Size and C/P sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.42 0.49
*
 0.15 0.81
***
 75.0% 55.3% 65.0% 60.2% 0.40 0.46 0.13 1.00
***
 75.0% 58.8% 67.3% 57.8% I  
(Value) 1.450 1.800 0.580 2.590     1.400 1.560 0.470 4.070     
0.14 -0.03 0.10 0.63
*
 85.1% 72.9% 69.1% 61.5% 0.16 -0.07 0.24 0.60
*
 83.1% 59.6% 72.8% 54.0%  II 
(Middle)  0.820 -0.150 0.460 1.720     0.710 -0.300 1.020 1.570     
0.01 -0.02 -0.29 0.08 88.8% 67.1% 60.1% 46.9% -0.17 -0.13 -0.37 0.19 84.9% 69.3% 65.0% 47.3% III 
(Growth) 0.080 -0.060 -0.700 0.180     -1.090 -0.370 -1.090 0.540     
  bM bM(lag)   bM bM(lag) 
1.02
***
 0.76
***
 0.90
***
 0.74
***
 0.15
**
 0.12
**
 0.04 0.03 1.02
***
 0.85
***
 0.93
***
 0.69
***
 0.04 0.14
***
 0.03 0.02 I  
(Value) 12.420 11.040 12.740 14.110 2.020 2.230 0.890 0.550 13.420 11.71 12.800 12.250 0.720 2.610 0.750 0.530 
0.96
***
 0.84
***
 0.98
***
 0.91
***
 -0.03 0.07
*
 -0.04 0.04 0.99
***
 0.85
***
 1.01
***
 0.84
***
 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06  II 
(Middle)  15.430 13.340 12.110 13.600 -1.350 1.740 -0.610 0.870 14.940 10.10 12.560 13.680 -0.250 1.100 0.360 1.050 
0.92
***
 0.87
***
 0.98
***
 0.98
***
 0.00 0.02 0.12 -0.01 1.01
***
 0.90
***
 0.94
***
 0.84
***
 -0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 III 
(Growth) 15.460 9.890 12.260 6.860 0.150 0.590 1.990 -0.140 14.150 9.800 13.420 6.980 -1.220 1.050 1.700 0.320 
  bSML bVMG   bSML bVMG 
-0.39
***
 0.35
***
 0.78
***
 0.78
***
 0.40
***
 0.30
***
 0.38
***
 0.39
***
 -0.06 0.44
***
 0.85
***
 0.72
***
 0.37
***
 0.34
***
 0.46
***
 0.41
***
 I  
(Value) -3.940 4.570 15.070 9.070 2.720 3.640 7.170 4.840 -0.480 5.580 15.250 8.920 3.990 4.830 8.180 6.440 
0.03 0.55
***
 0.83
***
 0.85
***
 0.09 0.09 0.29
***
 0.29
***
 0.18
**
 0.58
***
 0.81
***
 0.80
***
 0.09 0.13
*
 0.25
***
 0.33
***
  II 
(Middle)  0.320 6.070 13.180 9.360 1.200 1.410 5.690 3.550 2.120 6.080 12.990 11.590 1.200 1.670 4.780 4.780 
-0.15
***
 0.44
***
 0.70
***
 0.84
***
 -0.26
***
 0.00 -0.15 0.15 0.22
***
 0.45
***
 0.73
***
 0.57
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 III 
(Growth) -3.110 5.030 7.590 4.040 -6.720 0.060 -1.600 1.000 3.120 4.510 10.100 3.660 -2.640 -0.410 -0.140 1.140 
 
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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Table 5.12 
Size and BE/ME Effect after Adjustment for Risk: the RS-FF3F Test  
The table shows results of time-series regressions 
, , , , , ( ) , 1 , 1 , , , , ( ) , 1 , 1
, , , , , , ,
i t i i R R t f t i R lag R t f t i I I t f t i I lag I t f t
i SML SML t f t i VMG VMG t f t i t
r b r r b r r b r r b r r
b r r b r r
 for t= 1,2,3…T and i = 1,2,3,…N 
The regressions are run between July 1992 and Ju ly 2005 and are estimated with a SURE system that is mapped into GMM. Spectral density matrix estimated with four leads 
and lags. The rSML is a return on a zero-cost portfolio of small cap italization stocks financed with a short position of large capitalizat ion stocks (SML, Small minus Large). 
Similarly, rVMG  is a return on a zero-cost portfolio with a long position in value stocks financed with a short position in growth stocks (VMG, Value minus Growth). SML and 
VMG are analogous to SMB and HML in Fama and French (1993).  The rR is return the Resi factor, which is the value-weighted return of all mining shares in the dataset. 
The rI is the Findi factor, which is the value-weighted return of all Financial and Industrial shares in the dataset.  All returns are adjusted for dividends and other payouts. The 
size and BE/ME portfo lios are with an intersection of four size-sorted portfolios and three BE/ME-sorted portfolios. The size and C/P sorted portfolios are formed with an  
intersection of four size-sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted portfolios. The intercept terms are multip lied by 100 for clarity. 
Panel A: The GRS test  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
 F p-value  F p-value 
 0.656 0.9286 0.610 0.9576 
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Table 5.12 (Continued) 
Panel B: Size and BE/ME sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.34 0.26 0.58
**
 0.81
***
 57.5% 59.7% 56.6% 59.7% 0.45 0.47 0.72
**
 1.01
***
 63.6% 59.7% 60.8% 58.5% I  
(Value) 0.790 0.760 2.010 2.840     0.920 1.380 2.390 4.160     
0.44 0.14 -0.07 0.81
**
 51.6% 84.2% 70.4% 70.3% 0.39 0.21 -0.19 0.80
**
 85.1% 64.2% 71.3% 41.1%  II 
(Middle)  1.820 0.590 -0.200 2.200     1.610 0.850 -0.590 2.120     
-0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.95
**
 44.9% 86.4% 71.9% 71.8% -0.27 -0.37 0.02 0.60 87.3% 69.8% 69.7% 34.1% III 
(Growth) -0.690 -0.170 -0.030 2.120     -1.480 -0.880 0.070 1.340     
  bR bR(lag)   bR bR(lag) 
0.29
***
 0.34
***
 0.33
***
 0.32
***
 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.33
***
 0.41
***
 0.29
***
 0.28
***
 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 I  
(Value) 5.070 5.850 6.420 5.650 -0.400 0.220 -0.980 0.140 4.870 6.710 5.380 7.070 -0.820 0.560 0.310 0.080 
0.26
***
 0.12
***
 0.19
***
 0.15
***
 -0.04
*
 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.20
***
 0.11
***
 0.20
***
 0.20
***
 0.04 -0.05
*
 -0.03 -0.01  II 
(Middle)  8.320 3.270 4.920 2.570 -1.700 -1.250 -0.090 -0.180 3.920 3.280 3.820 3.030 1.120 -1.840 -0.680 -0.240 
0.12
***
 0.06 0.18
***
 0.33
***
 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.08
***
 0.05 0.16
***
 0.22
***
 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 III 
(Growth) 3.240 1.590 4.400 3.460 -0.330 0.190 -1.400 -0.390 3.030 1.040 4.580 2.750 -1.030 0.340 -0.640 -0.010 
  bI bI( lag)   bI bI( lag) 
0.90
***
 0.57
***
 0.54
***
 0.57
***
 0.07 0.09
*
 0.13
*
 0.01 0.90
***
 0.55
***
 0.60
***
 0.49
***
 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.01 I  
(Value) 8.870 9.680 7.280 9.510 0.760 1.690 1.830 0.270 8.930 8.700 9.760 9.730 1.250 1.130 1.380 0.190 
0.66
***
 0.68
***
 0.69
***
 0.69
***
 0.09 0.14
***
 0.06 0.00 0.78
***
 0.74
***
 0.74
***
 0.60
***
 0.01 0.17 0.08
*
 0.04  II 
(Middle)  12.160 18.820 7.640 7.510 1.920 3.480 1.220 -0.040 14.280 13.970 15.460 7.090 0.340 3.740 1.670 0.430 
0.75
***
 0.81
***
 0.74
***
 0.45
***
 0.03 0.06 0.18
***
 0.08 0.92
***
 0.84
***
 0.78
***
 0.63
***
 0.01 0.08 0.17 -0.04 III 
(Growth) 17.290 12.280 10.540 4.910 0.610 1.500 3.340 0.990 20.460 12.410 11.740 7.110 0.280 1.950 3.380 -0.550 
  bSML bVMG   bSML bVMG 
-0.24 0.23
***
 0.40
***
 0.62
***
 0.17 0.03 0.29
***
 0.31
***
 -0.18 0.27
***
 0.45
***
 0.59
***
 0.15 0.04 0.28
***
 0.39
***
 I  
(Value) -1.500 2.360 3.780 4.600 1.560 0.280 3.220 3.000 -0.960 2.710 5.020 6.370 1.480 0.370 3.520 6.150 
-0.40
***
 0.32
***
 0.57
***
 0.65
***
 -0.09 0.15
***
 0.05 0.21
**
 -0.04 0.38
***
 0.59
***
 0.53
***
 0.02 0.21
***
 0.22
***
 0.22
***
  II 
(Middle)  -7.290 6.690 7.230 5.630 -1.250 3.150 0.730 2.020 -0.680 6.770 8.970 5.340 0.250 3.680 3.780 2.220 
-0.41
***
 0.26
***
 0.45
***
 0.59
***
 -0.19
**
 0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.27
***
 0.48
***
 0.56
***
 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 III 
(Growth) -4.590 5.710 5.930 4.460 -2.370 0.950 0.050 -0.330 -1.280 5.040 7.410 4.670 -0.770 0.700 0.610 0.850  
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Table 5.12 (Continued) 
Panel C: Size and C/P sorted portfolios  
 Value-Weighted Assets  Equal-Weighted Assets 
  α R2   α R2 
 I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I 
 (Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
I  
(Big) 
II III IV 
(Small) 
0.66
*
 0.60
**
 0.31 0.95
***
 71.3% 57.8% 64.7% 58.1% 0.58
**
 0.61
*
 0.27 1.12
***
 69.0% 55.7% 62.2% 61.7% I  
(Value) 1.860 2.080 1.040 3.190     2.000 1.860 0.890 4.310     
0.26 0.08 0.28 0.76
**
 85.4% 67.0% 71.8% 48.9% 0.26 0.03 0.41 0.75
*
 86.7% 74.8% 68.2% 60.8%  II 
(Middle)  1.320 0.340 1.080 2.010     1.160 0.120 1.530 1.850     
0.16 0.07 -0.09 0.30 88.9% 70.7% 65.1% 44.3% -0.07 -0.03 -0.20 0.35 86.4% 71.1% 61.4% 42.7% III 
(Growth) 0.770 0.220 -0.220 0.690     -0.510 -0.090 -0.570 1.080     
  bR bR(lag)   bR bR(lag) 
0.22
***
 0.13
***
 0.17
***
 0.24
***
 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.22
***
 0.21
***
 0.13
***
 0.19
***
 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 I  
(Value) 3.610 2.560 3.580 4.740 -0.120 -0.770 -1.490 0.240 3.520 4.430 2.910 4.660 -0.510 -1.470 -0.590 0.050 
0.14
***
 0.14
***
 0.24
***
 0.15
***
 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.13
***
 0.15
***
 0.24
***
 0.13
*
 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  II 
(Middle)  3.940 5.420 7.080 2.400 0.040 -0.430 -1.600 -0.430 3.480 4.530 7.220 1.880 0.760 -0.510 -0.600 -0.300 
0.18
***
 0.11
***
 0.32
***
 0.28
***
 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.14
***
 0.11
***
 0.27
***
 0.26
***
 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 III 
(Growth) 4.840 2.730 6.180 3.800 -0.750 -0.580 1.230 -0.500 5.030 2.650 6.750 4.650 -0.880 -0.540 0.080 -0.510 
  bI bI( lag)   bI bI( lag) 
0.67
***
 0.61
***
 0.65
***
 0.51
***
 0.24
***
 0.18
***
 0.17
***
 0.02 0.72
***
 0.62
***
 0.73
***
 0.51
***
 0.14
**
 0.21
***
 0.13
***
 0.00 I  
(Value) 6.670 8.280 10.310 8.790 3.000 2.840 2.630 0.360 10.900 9.100 12.010 8.480 2.440 3.040 2.560 0.050 
0.80
***
 0.68
***
 0.70
***
 0.72
***
 0.00 0.12
***
 0.04 0.10 0.86
***
 0.71
***
 0.74
***
 0.64
***
 0.01 0.09
***
 0.06
*
 0.14
*
  II 
(Middle)  19.600 16.210 10.220 9.370 -0.160 3.180 0.760 1.540 21.860 13.42 13.890 7.910 0.240 2.780 1.750 1.870 
0.71
***
 0.75
***
 0.66
***
 0.62
***
 0.04 0.10
***
 0.08 0.10 0.87
***
 0.76
***
 0.66
***
 0.55
***
 0.00 0.14 0.12
**
 0.11 III 
(Growth) 14.890 9.330 7.460 5.120 0.910 2.310 1.080 1.000 19.460 9.300 9.840 6.240 -0.050 3.230 2.160 1.270 
  bSML bVMG   bSML bVMG 
-0.69
***
 0.16
**
 0.51
***
 0.64
***
 0.30
**
 0.30
***
 0.33
***
 0.32
***
 -0.34
***
 0.23
***
 0.58
***
 0.59
***
 0.30
**
 0.31
***
 0.43
***
 0.37
***
 I  
(Value) -7.020 2.110 7.390 6.400 2.010 3.200 4.470 3.510 -3.460 3.060 9.290 6.160 2.930 3.930 6.440 4.520 
-0.21
***
 0.34
***
 0.59
***
 0.62
***
 0.08 0.08 0.22
***
 0.27
***
 -0.05 0.37
***
 0.58
***
 0.55
***
 0.10
*
 0.12
**
 0.19
***
 0.30
***
  II 
(Middle)  -3.990 6.230 8.370 5.190 1.420 1.540 3.610 2.670 -1.080 6.470 9.430 5.930 1.760 2.090 3.200 3.390 
-0.37
***
 0.20
***
 0.52
***
 0.58
***
 -0.30
***
 0.02 -0.25
**
 0.03 -0.02 0.20
***
 0.53
***
 0.37
***
 -0.13
***
 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 III 
(Growth) -4.030 4.060 5.430 3.500 -4.960 0.250 -2.380 0.240 -0.400 3.480 8.820 2.930 -2.720 -0.400 -1.100 0.530  
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level 
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More importantly, the GRS tests provide strong support for the FF3F, and its variant, 
as the p-values are all greater than 0.9.  
Generally, the magnitude and sign of the loadings on the FF3F factors 
corresponds to the size and value-growth indicator captured by each test asset. In 
other words, loadings on the SML are larger for portfolios containing smaller firms 
and loadings on the VMG are greater for portfolios containing firms with high value-
growth indicators. Curiously, only in the tests of the FF3F, not all of the assets that 
contain large firms load negatively on the size factor. In fact, in tests that use equal-
weighted assets, these loadings are positive and reliably different from zero. This 
result is an indication of the skewness in the distribution of market values on the JSE; 
there are few large firms and the rest of the firms are small. In addition, the same 
loadings on assets that include growth firms are not reliably negative, but are never 
significant. Could it be a consequence of there being few truly growth firms listed on 
the JSE
94
?  Interestingly, sorting assets with the C/P ratio produces a larger spread in 
betas on the value factor, perhaps indicating that this variable is a cleaner value-
growth indicator.  
The SML and the VMG are strongly significant in many of the time-series 
regressions. In the tests of the FF3F, with value-weighted assets, only two of the 24 
estimated loadings on the size factor are not significant; if assets are weighted equally, 
six of the loadings are not significant.  Interestingly, nearly all of the betas that are 
different from zero are more than three standard deviations from the mean, and some 
loadings yield t-statistics that are as high as those calculated for the market betas. The 
VMG is not as robust as the SML. In the value-weighted tests, twelve out of 24 
loadings on the value factor are not significant, while in the equal-weighted tests 10 
are not significant. However, many of the loadings are different from zero at the 1% 
level, indicating that the factor is important in capturing variations in returns. Also, 
not all firms must be exclusively value or growth; there are many neutral firms that 
ought to be uncorrelated with the value factor. In fact, in tests similar to the ones 
presented here, Fama and French (1996a) do show that about a quarter of the 
portfolios do not load on their value factor. Lastly, in tests on the RS-FF3F, the size 
and the significance of the factor loadings on the SML and the VMG are essentially 
the same as the tests on the FF3F. 
                                                 
94
 In general, technology-intensive stocks are more common in developed countries.    
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The pattern above can be contrasted with the results in Scher and Muller (2005), 
who also construct a version of the FF3F. Although they do not form portfolios with 
the same methods used here, they do show 14 assets that are similar to the 12 size and 
BE/ME sorted portfolios presented in Panel B of Table 5.11. In their case, 9 out of 14 
assets load significantly on the size factor and only six (less then half) are positive at 
the 1% level. In contrast, in tables presented here, all but one or two of the betas on 
the size factor are not different from zero at the 1% level. In addition, Scher and 
Muller (2005) find only 4 out of 14 assets (less than a third) load significantly on the 
value factor, but none of them at the 1% level. In the tests presented here, five or six 
(just less than half) of test assets load positively onto the value factor, and five are 
different from zero at the 1% level.      
The pricing errors of the FF3F and the RS-FF3F indicate that the model does 
not eradicate the size and the value effects. Small, and mostly value, firms continue to 
produce reliably positive intercepts, and in some specifications the portfolio of large 
growth firms is also mispriced. Interestingly some of the portfolios with high C/P 
ratios are also mispriced, suggesting that, given that the FF3F model is rational, some 
aspect of returns to firms with low cashflow yields is not captured by the model. 
Nonetheless, it is believed that the low time-series estimates of the premia are the 
reason behind significant standard errors.     
The models‟ pricing errors can be contrasted to the raw return computes in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5. It was shown that across value firms, small stocks, on average, 
outperformed large stocks by 0.64% per month on an equal-weighted basis and by 
0.68% per month on a value-weighted basis. The corresponding average spread in 
FF3F intercepts has narrowed significantly to 0.54% per month on the equal-weighted 
basis and to 0.49% per month on the value-weighted basis. If the RS-FF3F is used to 
account for risk, the average spread in intercepts between small and large portfolios 
markedly falls to 0.55% per month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.48% on the 
value-weighted basis. In must be noted that the CAPM and the RS-APT have 
increased the spread in intercepts, thus the FF3F models must act against that 
maladjustment.  The value effect has also decreased. For instance, raw estimates of 
the value effect across size groups, documented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, is 0.8% 
per month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.61% per month on the value-weighted 
basis. Risk adjustment with the FF3F brings those spreads significantly down to 
0.61% per month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.39% on the value-weighted basis. 
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If the RS-APT model is used to adjust for risk, the spreads narrow to 0.65% per 
month on the equal-weighted basis and 0.42% on the value-weighted basis.  
There are two marked differences between the pricing errors of the FF3F 
presented here and the one constructed with US data by Fama and French (1993). 
First, the three factor model seen here misprices different types of assets. In the US, it 
is the return on the portfolios of small and growth firms that is particularly badly 
predicted by the model; while it is the small and value firms that the South African 
models fails to price. Second, the difference is the direction of the mispricing. In the 
US, the model generally overpredicts the return on small firms and underpredicts the 
return on large firms an opposite pattern to the one observed here. Curiously, the 
magnitude of the size and the value premia estimated here are very similar to those in 
the US‟ thus the disparity in the results is most probably explained by the much larger 
spread in the loading on the size and the value loadings that is observed in the US. In 
fact, a typical spread between the loadings on the size factor is about 1.4, while in the 
South African data, a corresponding spread is about 1. More importantly, the spread 
between loadings on the value factor is about 1.1 in US data, while the corresponding 
estimate computed on South African data varies between 0.1 and 0.3
95
. Perhaps it is 
the non-synchronous trading, so omnipresent on the JSE, that biases down the 
estimates of value betas.  
The results of cross-sectional tests to the FF3F and the RS-FF3F are shown in 
Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, respectively. In sum, it can be said that the FF3F and the 
RS-FF3F do a much better job at pricing the size and F/P sorted portfolios than the 
“traditional” models, such as the CAPM or the RS-APT. Only one specification (out 
of 16) of the three factor model is rejected with Cochrane‟s (2001) test. In particular, 
the FF3F in an OLS, which includes the intercept and is run on equal-weighted assets, 
performs the worst, while the GLS specifications of the FF3F and the RS-FF3F do a 
particularly good job at pricing value-weighted portfolios. In contrast, when tested on 
this set of assets, the CAPM and the RS-APT were rejected in all of their forms. In 
general, the FF3F models capture the lion‟s share of the cross-sectional variation in 
returns, as the R
2‟
s are larger than 0.6 in all but three specifications.  
                                                 
95
 Consequently, given the US spread in value betas and the South African estimate of the value 
premium, the difference in pricing errors of value and growth firms would fall by 0.45% per month, 
which is about the average of the observed spread in the FF3F intercepts. 
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Table 5.13 
Cross-Sectional FF3F Test with Size-Value Portfolios 
The regressions are run across 24 size -value portfolios with  
, 0 , , ,T i t M M i SMB SMB i VMG VMG i i
E r b b b   for  i = 1,2,3… N 
The second set of regressions does not include an intercept. The dependant variable is the time-series 
average excess return of an asset i. The independent variables are obtained form t ime-series regression 
of asset‟s i return onto the Market factor, its lag, the SML factor and the VMG factor.  The SML (Small 
minus Large) factor is a zero -cost portfolio of small capitalizat ion stocks financed with a short position 
of large capitalization stocks. VMG (Value minus Growth) factor is a zero-cost portfolio with a long 
position in value stocks financed with a short position in growth  stocks. SML and VMG are analogous 
to SMB and HML in Fama and French (1993). bM is the sum of two coefficients on the Market factor. 
All returns are adjusted for div idends and other payouts. The test assets comprise of 12 size -value 
portfolios that are an intersection of four size sorted portfolios and three BE/ME sorted portfolios, and 
additional 12 test assets that are an intersection of four size sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted 
portfolios. The GMM t-statistics are obtained after the OLS regressions are mapped into a GMM 
system. Spectral density matrix is estimated with four leads and lags. The GLS coefficients and t-
statistics follow Cochrane (2001). The adjusted R
2
 fo llows Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and it  is 
adjusted with the method in Gujarati (2003). The tests for the model fit follows Cochrane (2001). 
Panel A: Value-Weighted Assets        
  OLS  GLS 
 λ0  1.58%
**
 n/a  λ0  1.39%
**
 n/a 
t-stat (OLS) 2.165 n/a t-stat  (GLS) 2.234 n/a 
 λM  -1.06% 0.49%  λM  -0.88% 0.52% 
t-stat  (GMM) -1.196 1.009 t-stat  (GLS) -1.114 1.076 
 λSML  -0.02% 0.19%  λSML  -0.07% 0.05% 
t-stat  (GMM) -0.049 0.437 t-stat  (GLS) -0.174 0.109 
 λVMG  1.79%
***
 1.73%
***
  λVMG  1.74%
***
 1.68%
***
 
t-stat  (GMM) 3.280 3.171 t-stat  (GLS) 3.485 3.368 
Adj. R
2
 0.708 0.578 Adj. R
2
 0.681 0.561 
χ2 19.837 25.495 χ2 21.551 26.510 
p-value 0.468 0.226 p-value 0.365 0.188 
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Assets        
 OLS  GLS 
 λ0  1.68%
**
 n/a  λ0  1.65%
***
 n/a 
t-stat  (GMM) 2.045 n/a t-stat  (GLS) 2.608 n/a 
 λM  -1.14% 0.40%  λM  -1.03% 0.57% 
t-stat  (GMM) -1.187 0.770 t-stat  (GLS) -1.302 1.150 
 λSML  -0.31% 0.05%  λSML  -0.20% -0.01% 
t-stat  (GMM) -0.614 0.089 t-stat  (GLS) -0.418 -0.016 
 λVMG  2.24%
***
 2.37%
***
  λVMG  1.71%
***
 1.80%
***
 
t-stat  (GMM) 3.635 3.876 t-stat  (GLS) 3.116 3.293 
Adj. R
2
 0.723 0.633 Adj. R
2
 0.692 0.568 
χ2 35.129** 23.242 χ2 20.122 26.879 
p-value 0.019 0.331 p-value 0.450 0.175 
 
* 
significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level (based on the GMM 
standard errors )  
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Table 5.14 
Cross-Sectional RS-FF3F Test with Size-Value Portfolios 
The regressions are run across 24 size -value portfolios with  
, 0 , , , ,T i t R R i I I i SMB SMB i VMG VMG i i
E r b b b b  for i = 1,2,3…N 
The second set of regressions does not include an intercept. The dependant variable is the time-series 
average excess return of an asset i. The independent variables are obtained form t ime-series regression 
of asset‟s i return onto the Resi factor, its lag, Findi factor, its lag, the SML factor and the VMG factor.  
The SML (Small minus Large) factor is a zero-cost portfolio of small cap italizat ion stocks financed 
with a short position of large capitalization stocks. VMG (Value minus Growth) factor is a  zero-cost 
portfolio with a long position in value stocks financed with a short position in growth stocks. SML and 
VMG are analogous to SMB and HML in  Fama and French (1993). bR  and  bI   are the sum of two 
coefficients on the Resi and Findi factors, respectively. All returns are adjusted for dividends and other 
payouts. The test assets comprise of 12 size-value portfolios that are an intersection of four size sorted 
portfolios and three BE/ME sorted portfolios, and additional 12 test assets that are an intersection of 
four size sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted portfolios. The GMM t-statistics are obtained after the 
OLS regressions are mapped into a GMM system. Spectral density matrix is estimated with four leads 
and lags. The GLS coefficients and t-statistics follow Cochrane (2001). The adjusted R
2
 follows 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and it is adjusted with the method in Gujarati (2003). The tests for the 
model fit fo llows Cochrane (2001). 
Panel A: Value-Weighted Assets        
 OLS  GLS 
λ0  1.64% n/a  λ0  1.38% n/a 
t-stat (GMM) 0.203 n/a t-stat  (GLS) 0.171 n/a 
 λR  0.63% 1.99%
***
  λR  0.98% 2.04%
***
 
t-stat (GMM) 0.596 2.323 t-stat  (GLS) 1.027 2.539 
 λI  -1.43% 0.30%  λI  -1.14% 0.36% 
t-stat (GMM) -1.522 0.578 t-stat  (GLS) -1.184 0.719 
 λSML  -0.06% 0.14%  λSML  -0.04% 0.06% 
t-stat (GMM) -0.134 0.321 t-stat  (GLS) -0.105 0.141 
 λVMG  1.75%
***
 1.75%
***
  λVMG  1.69%
***
 1.62%
***
 
t-stat (GMM) 3.169 3.163 t-stat  (GLS) 3.356 3.247 
Adj. R
2
 0.737 0.609 Adj. R
2
 0.730 0.588 
χ2 25.063 22.410 χ2 19.827 24.887 
p-value 0.199 0.319 p-value 0.469 0.206 
Panel B: Equal-Weighted Assets        
 OLS  GLS 
λ0  1.47%
*
 n/a  λ0  1.62%
***
 n/a 
t-stat (OLS) 1.674 n/a t-stat  (GLS) 2.301 n/a 
 λR  0.86% 2.21%
***
  λR  0.51% 2.08%
***
 
t-stat (OLS) 0.678 2.511 t-stat  (GLS) 0.472 2.720 
 λI  -1.26% 0.10%  λI  -1.33% 0.30% 
t-stat (OLS) -1.263 0.202 t-stat  (GLS) -1.541 0.593 
 λSML  -0.28% 0.05%  λSML  -0.17% 0.00% 
t-stat (OLS) -0.564 0.096 t-stat  (GLS) -0.371 -0.009 
 λVMG  2.09%
***
 2.31%
***
  λVMG  1.65%
***
 1.85%
***
 
t-stat (OLS) 3.303 3.792 t-stat  (GLS) 2.907 3.316 
Adj. R
2
 0.807 0.709 Adj. R
2
 0.785 0.701 
χ2 20.580 24.168 χ2 20.405 26.521 
p-value 0.422 0.235 p-value 0.433 0.149 
  
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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In comparison, the specifications of the “traditional” models that did not yield 
negative premia, produced negative coefficients of determination. It also appears that 
the RS-FF3F can capture more of the cross-sectional variation in returns than the 
FF3F.  
The value premium is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
the tests. Although the estimates of the value premium vary between specifications, 
the consensus is approximately 1.7%, especially if it is believed that the GLS 
coefficients are more efficient. Interestingly, the computed premia are virtually the 
same in regressions with, and without, the intercept; and, the estimates are nearly 
identical in all of the GLS specifications, regardless of the assumptions for the zero-
beta rate, type of weighting, and/or the assumption for the market factor. 
Generally, other factors are not priced. Curiously, the premium on the SML 
factor is never reliably different from zero. In fact, it is negative, though not 
significantly, in all the regressions that include the intercept. If the zero-beta rate is 
restricted, the computed premia do turn positive, but remain undistinguishable from 
zero. In addition, the premia of factors associated with the CAPM and the RS-APT 
are rarely, if ever, positive and different from zero. In fact, the Market factor and the 
Findi factor are never positive in specifications that include the intercept, but are 
never significantly negative. However, the Resource factor does yield a significant 
premium in the two models without the intercept. Lastly, the intercept remains 
reliably different from zero in most of the regressions that specify it, thus there is still 
a large amount of return that is unexplained by the FF3F models.   
The low price of Market and size risk documented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 is 
broadly consistent with the results found on US data that use size and BE/ME sorted 
portfolios as test assets. Examples of cross-sectional analysis of the FF3F appear in 
inter alia Petkova (2006) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). Both studies do not find 
reliably positive premia on the size and the market factors.  However, Brennan et al. 
(2004) do show that, in a cross-sectional regression without an intercept, the market 
risk is priced. Similarly, in the tests here, restricting the intercept does recover the 
Resource factor as a significant source of risk. 
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5.3.2 The Fama and French Models against the Firm Characteristics 
Model  
 
The three factor models are now tested directly against the characteristics 
model, for two reasons: the ability of the model to “price out” characteristics is a 
direct testament to its validity, and, in the case of the FF3F, the test can discern 
between rational and behavioural underpinnings for the model. The tests use Fama-
MacBeth regressions described in Brennan et al. (1998), which adjust coefficients for 
the bias stemming from correlation of individual cross-sectional coefficients and the 
asset pricing factors.  The results are shown in Table 5.15. 
The value effect dissipates after adjustment for risk is made. In particular, even 
in the univariate regressions, none of the value-growth yield coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level. Although, the coefficient on the BE/ME ratio is reliably 
positive at the 10% level, any return predictability associated with the ratio disappears 
after size is included as the explanatory variable. It has been noted that firm market 
equity and its BE/ME ratio are correlated; thus it is plausible that the coefficient on 
size captures some of the BE/ME premium. But such bias is likely to be small and, 
given the small coefficients, certainly not large enough to restore the BE/ME as a 
valid predictor of returns. The C/P effect is completely extinguished with the FF3F 
models. In short, the results are consistent with a hypothesis that the three factor 
model is a risk model and not a manifestation of mispricing.     
Although, the size premium remains strong, it is also believed that the 
persistence of the size effect can be explained within the rational framework of 
theory. In fact, very little, if any, behavioural models explicitly consider the size 
effect. In the portfolio time-series tests, it has been shown that the market (or 
Resource and Findi) betas may be understated for small stocks, even though a lag is 
included. This bias could be more severe in tests that use individual assets. Thus, the 
significance of the size coefficient is likely to be a manifestation of badly estimated 
loadings. In addition, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Stoll and Whaley (1983) 
show that market microstructure effects can explain the size premium and such 
adjustments (inclusion of a liquidity factor for example) have not been performed 
here. Thus, the size effect is expected to persist after risk adjustment with methods 
that do not consider the effects of illiquidity and trading costs. In fact, Brennan et al. 
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(1998) show that the size effect persists after a control for risk with the FF3F is made, 
but it dissipates after an adjustment for market microstructure effects.  In addition, it 
is possible that these results stem from the overly restrictive methodology of Brennan 
et al. (1998). A set of results, which addresses serial correlation in coefficients, but 
does not adjust for the bias of Brennan et al. (1998), is also performed, but not 
reported. Although these regressions are marginally more supportive for the BE/ME 
premium, the results obtained without the bias adjustment are quantitatively the same.   
The results presented in Table 5.15 are in stark contrast to the findings of van 
Rensburg and Robertson (2004). In their results, loadings on the FF3F factors have no 
power in forecasting returns and characteristics keep their power to forecast returns 
after control for factor loadings. A possible reason lays in the difference between the 
methodology empted here and the van Rensburg and Robertson (2004) study. First, 
the error-in-variables problem does not affect the results of this study because it 
impacts the dependent variable in the Fama-MacBeth regressions and thus it is 
captured by the disturbance term. Second, in loading estimation, van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2004) use a very short estimation period and a univariate regression. In 
this thesis, the full listing period of each asset is used to estimate the pricing errors in 
a multivariate regression. And since there is much evidence that the increased 
precision gained in full-period estimates more than offsets the error induced by failure 
to incorporate time-variability of loadings, mismeasurement of pricing errors, caused 
by poorly estimated betas, is kept to a minimum. Third, there are no sorts, thus the 
multicollinearity between factor loading and characteristics does not present a 
practical problem.  
The findings presented in Table 5.15 contradict one aspect of the results found 
in Brennan et al. (1998). The authors show that the value premium survives control 
for risk. However, in a longer period, Davis et al. (2000) show evidence that if the test 
employed here was to be used in a longer sample period than the one employed in 
Brennan et al. (1998), the value premium would be “priced out”. In effect, the 
findings presented here concur strongly with the argument of Davis et al. (2000) that 
the FF3F model is a better speciation for asset returns than the characteristic model.   
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Table 5.15 
Tests FF3F and RS-FF3F against Firm Characteristics  
Coefficients in the table are calcu lated with method in Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998),  
coefficients are the intercepts of time-series regressions the factors on month-by-month coefficients of 
cross-sectional OLS regressions of model‟s pricing errors. Model‟s pricing error of firm i in  time t  is a  
sum of a intercept of a time-series regression of firm‟s i excess return on model‟s factors and this 
regression‟s a residual at t ime t. t-statistics are calculated with the Newey-West (1987) standard errors.  
Full listing period was used in the time-series regressions. The regressions of smallest 20% of firms 
include one lag of the Market, Resi or Findi factors. The remainder of regressions include do not 
include a lag of the Market, Resi or Findi factors. Each month, only stocks with liquid ity measure of 
more than 0.1% or cost more than 100c are included in the regression. Liquidity measure is a twelve-
month average of monthly trading volume scaled by end-month shares in issue.  Size is the natural 
logarithm of stock‟s market capitalization, which is a product of the number of shares outstanding and 
the share price. E/P is earnings per share scaled by a price. C/P is cash flow per share scaled by a price. 
BE/ME is the book value of equity scaled by market capitalization. All accounting data becomes 
effective five months after the financial year-end. All variab les are standardized  and winzorised at 
2.5% and 97.5%. If earnings are positive then E/P(+) is the earnings yield and E/P Dummy is 0, 
otherwise E/P(+) is set to zero and E/P Dummy is set to 1. Similar conventions pertain to the C/P ratio. 
The reported R
2
 is the average of individual R
2
 of each cross-sectional regressions. All coefficients are 
multip lied by 1000, for clarity.  
 Constant Size E/P C/P BE/ME E/P 
Dummy 
C/P 
Dummy 
Average 
R
2
 
 Panel A : FF3F-ad justed returns              
 (1)  7.31
***
 -4.12
***
      0.007 
 t-stat  3.54 -2.89       
 (2)  4.25
***
  -0.40   0.40  0.013 
 t-stat  3.10  -0.26   0.67   
 (3)  4.60
***
   0.31   0.17 0.011 
 t-stat  3.83   0.24   0.03  
 (4)  5.11
***
    3.00
*
   0.006 
 t-stat  3.49    1.70    
 (5)  7.22
***
 -3.46
**
   1.52   0.012 
 t-stat  3.58 -2.30   0.82    
 (6)  7.74
***
 -4.14
***
  -0.68   -1.28 0.035 
 t-stat  4.05 -3.07  -0.55   -0.22   
 Panel B: RS-FF3F-ad justed returns        
 (1)  6.87
***
 -4.43
***
      0.007 
 t-stat  3.10 -3.24       
 (2)  3.67
***
  0.02   0.43  0.014 
 t-stat  2.70  0.01   0.64   
 (3)  3.95
***
   0.12   0.62 0.013 
 t-stat  2.93   0.10   0.11  
 (4)  4.56
***
    3.07
*
   0.007 
 t-stat  3.05    1.80    
 (5)  6.87
***
 -3.82
***
   1.57   0.014 
 t-stat  3.11 -2.54   0.86    
 (6)  7.35
***
 -4.57
***
  -0.96   -1.06 0.039 
 t-stat  3.37 -3.54  -0.86   -0.18   
*
 significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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5.3.3 Asset Pricing – A synthesis   
 
The evidence presented so far strongly supports the FF3F and its variant, the 
RS-FF3F. The models are now subjected to yet another test, which not only address 
the methodological concerns of Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) and the data-snooping 
concerns of Lo and MacKinlay (1990a), but also provide an illustration of how useful 
the models are for asset pricing on the JSE.  
Table 5.16 represents a series of cross-sectional tests. These are different from 
the ones set up previously, as the Fama-MacBeth regressions are used instead of the 
CCSR method, and a full set of 46 test assets forms the basis of the tests. There are 
the 24 size and F/P sorted portfolios and the 22 industry sorted portfolios. The table 
shows the different cross-sectional estimates of each factor premia. An average 
pricing error of each of the models is shown in the last column. Due to a large cross-
section of assets and a short data-series, statistical significance testing is not 
performed.    
The results clearly illustrate the argument of Kandel and Stambaugh (1995), i.e. 
that the estimated premium to a factor is a direct consequence of the test assets 
employed. The magnitude of the estimated premia of the various models differ from 
the ones obtained in the cross-sectional test presented above. Unsurprisingly, in 
comparison to tests conducted on the industry portfolios, the Market, the Resource 
and the Findi premia are lower in tests presented in the table. Similarly, the premia on 
the size and the value factors are smaller than the ones estimated with the size and F/P 
sorted portfolios. In fact, the market premium in the FF3F model and the Findi 
premium in the RS-FF3F model are the only two estimates that are different from zero 
at conventional levels. If the zero-beta rate is restricted, however, all of the premia 
associated with the univariate CAPM and the two-factor RS-APT are different from 
zero. Consequently, it appears that the FF3F model is not a silver bullet for asset 
pricing on the JSE, as its factor premia are insignificant and the pricing errors are only 
marginally lower than the CAPM and the RS-APT. Interestingly, judging from the 
size of the pricing errors, the FF3F, with the market premium as a factor, seems to 
outperform the RS-FF3F in all of the specifications. The difference is small, however, 
and it varies between 0,03% and 0.04% per month.   
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Table 5.16 
A Fama-MacBeth Regression Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Test of the FF3F and 
RS-FF3F Models  
Coefficients in the table are t ime-series averages of month-by-month cross-sectional OLS regressions 
of asset‟s lead returns on factor loadings between July-92 and Ju ly-05. The premiums are the estimated 
coefficients. Calculation of standard errors follows Newey-West (1987), which adjust for serial 
correlation  up to four lags.  The test assets comprise of 12 size-value portfolios that are an intersection 
of four size sorted portfolios and three BE/ME sorted portfolios, and addit ional 12 test assets that are a 
intersection of four size sorted portfolios and three C/P sorted portfolios. Also, the 22 industry 
portfolios are included. Firm‟s industry is determined from "Nature of Business” rubric in McGregor‟s 
Manuals. Firms cannot change industry if their name does not change. The R
2 
follows Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996) and the adjustment fo llows Gujarati (2003).   The pricing error is a  simple average of the 
absolute values of pricing erro rs. n/a is assigned to pricing erro rs that produced from specifications that 
yield negative premia.  
 λo λM λR λI λSML λVMG 
Adj. 
R-sq 
Pricing 
Error 
Panel A: Unrestricted Zero -beta Rate;Value-Weighting 
CAPM  0.36% 0.80%     0.0422 0.37% 
 t-stat  0.57 1.14       
 APT  0.15%  0.85% 1.01%   0.0809 0.40% 
 t-stat  0.27  0.85 1.56     
 FF3F  -0.15% 1.17%
**
   0.21% 0.29% 0.1795 0.36% 
 t-stat  -0.33 1.97   0.43 0.39   
 RS-FF3F  -0.14%  1.13% 1.22%
*
 0.19% 0.63% 0.2156 0.37% 
 t-stat  -0.28  1.13 1.89 0.34 0.77   
Panel B: Unrestricted Zero-beta Rate; Equal-Weighting 
CAPM  2.01%
**
 -0.84%      0.0398 0.51% 
 t-stat  3.62 -1.37       
 APT  1.96%
**
  -0.51% -0.77%   0.0457 0.48% 
 t-stat  3.41  -0.54 -1.27     
 FF3F  1.55%
**
 -0.69%   0.42% 0.80% 0.1506 0.38% 
 t-stat  3.02 -1.13   0.70 0.93   
 RS-FF3F  1.20%
**
  0.39% -0.39% 0.90% 0.17% 0.2272 0.42% 
 t-stat  2.61  0.44 -0.65 1.55 0.17   
 Panel C: Restricted Zero-beta Rate;Value-Weighting   
CAPM  n/a 1.19%
***
         0.0291 0.40% 
 t-stat  n/a 2.45       
 APT  n/a  1.01% 1.17%
***
   0.0786 0.38% 
 t-stat  n/a  1.17 2.40     
 FF3F  n/a 1.02%
**
   0.21% 0.29% 0.1772 0.36% 
 t-stat  n/a 2.17   0.42 0.40   
 RS-FF3F  n/a  0.97% 1.08%
**
 0.16% 0.62% 0.2133 0.38% 
 t-stat  n/a  1.16 2.32 0.31 0.77   
 Panel D: Restricted Zero-beta Rate; Equal-Weighting   
CAPM  n/a 1.46%
***
     -0.1768 0.52% 
 t-stat  n/a 2.74       
 APT  n/a  1.56%
**
 1.34%
***
   -0.1565 0.52% 
 t-stat  n/a  1.98 2.52     
 FF3F  n/a 0.90%
*
   0.48% 0.87% 0.0031 0.40% 
 t-stat  n/a 1.81   0.81 1.01   
 RS-FF3F  n/a  1.68%
**
 0.77%
*
 1.10%
*
 0.11% 0.1315 0.44% 
 t-stat  n/a   2.18 1.65 1.85 0.11     
 
*
significant at 10% level, 
**
 significant at 5% level, 
***
 significant at 1% level  
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However, it is argued that the FF3F and the RS-FF3F should not be scrapped. 
First, these models capture much more of the cross-sectional variation in returns than 
the CAPM or the RS-APT, meaning the FF3F loadings can predict returns better than 
the Market (or the Resource and the Findi) betas. Second, the pricing errors of the 
model are smaller in the tests that use equal-weighted assets. Actually, in those tests, 
the pricing errors of the FF3F and the RS-FF3F are about the same magnitude as the 
mispricing seen in the tests on value-weighted assets. Third, the estimates of the size 
and the value premia are of about the same magnitude as the ones computed in the US 
markets, and, more importantly, they are close to the time-series estimates. The low 
statistical significance for the factors could be a function of the nosiness in the data, as 
well as its short length. Specifically, the high standard of errors presented here are, in 
part, a consequence of low diversification of the test assets, which induces an error 
into the dependant variable. Gujarati (2002) shows that such mismeasurement results 
in an overstatement of the variance of the residuals and, hence, the standard errors. 
Fourth, the premiums on the Market (or the Resource and the Findi) are only reliably 
positive in regressions that include the FF3F factors.  
Lastly, the full set of assets is difficult to price in other markets too. The only 
instance of a test of the FF3F on a set of assets consisting of the size and BE/ME 
sorted portfolios and industry sorted portfolios in the surveyed literature appears in 
Brennan et al. (2004). Remarkably, their results are near identical to the ones 
presented in Table 5.16. Particularly, they show that the premia on the size and the 
value factor dissipate but the VMG premium is slightly larger than the SML premium. 
Also, the market factor, insignificant in tests on the size and the BE/ME sorted 
portfolios, becomes reliably different from zero at conventional levels. And the 
pricing errors in these tests are as large (if not larger) in cases where the industry or 
the size and BE/ME sorted sets are used in isolation. Perhaps it is the time-variability 
in factor loadings of industry sorted portfolios, documented by Fama and French 
(1997), that compounds the error-in-variables problem and biases down the premia on 
the FF3F factors. 
Interestingly, the analysis of the pricing errors does not indicate that the RS-
APT is a better model than the static CAPM. Although in one of the specifications, 
the APT marginally outperforms the CAPM by 0.02% per month, in another it does 
worse by the approximately the same amount. While in yet another specification, the 
models perform about the same, and in the test where assets are weighted equally and 
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the intercept is unrestricted, the premia are negative - thus a comparison between the 
models is not possible. In fact, in the test that is most robust statistically, where the 
test assets are value-weighted and the zero-beta rate is unrestricted, the CAPM seems 
to outperform the two-factor APT.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of the Empirical Results 
 
In the first empirical part of the thesis, the size and the value effect has been 
analysed, and the premia exist on the JSE. This finding is robust to various 
methodologies and, admittedly imperfect, adjustment for trading costs. As in Auret 
and Sinclaire (2006), the book-to-market has the strongest power to predict returns. 
Although the equal-weighted estimates of the BE/ME ratio effect are only slightly 
higher than those obtained with the E/P or the C/P, the value-weighted book-to-
market effect is more persistent than the other premia. The E/P effect is the weakest: it 
is not only small, but it is highly sensitive to trading costs and, on a value-weighted 
basis, it almost dissipates. This is surprising, as van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) 
show the E/P effect to be the strongest predictor of returns. In fact, all of the estimates 
of the premia are lower than leading prior South African research has shown.   
In addition, the value effect and the size effect have been found to be 
independent of each other. This fact is corroborated with cross-sectional regressions 
of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and the more powerful independent sorts of Daniel and 
Titman (1997).  The best measure of the value premium is the book-to-market ratio, 
which, in univariate and bivariate sorts, has produced the widest spread of returns and 
has been found to subsume all other value-growth indicators in multivariate 
regressions.  
In the second part of the empirical analysis, the static CAPM and the two-factor 
APT of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) have been tested. In sum, the models can not 
be seen as accurate equilibrium models of the risk-return relationship. Although a 
time-series test on grouped data does not yield strong rejection of the models, this 
result is seen as a consequence of overall low excess returns during the sample period. 
In addition, the magnitude of the size premium actually increases after risk adjustment 
in the time-series format. More importantly, the robust cross-sectional tests reject 
outright the static CAPM and the RS-APT. In specifications that do not enforce a 
restriction of equivalence between the risk-free rate and the zero-beta rate, the 
estimated Market (or Resource and Findi) premia are negative.     
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Subsequently, a concern that the poor performance of these models is a result of 
data-mining has been investigated, with an analysis performed on ungrouped data (Lo 
and MacKinlay, 1990a). It has been found that the CAPM and the RS-APT cannot 
completely “price out” firm characteristics such as size and value-growth indicators. 
However, in tests on ungrouped data, it has been found that the models do act in the 
right direction in explaining the value effect. This result has not been fully validated 
on a cross-sectional test that uses ungrouped data, as such specification, although 
most powerful in a statistical sense, is unpractical due to the problem associated with 
imprecision of estimated factor loadings.   
Once the size and the value premia have been confirmed and the two 
“traditional” models rejected in Table 5.9, the three factor model of Fama and French 
(1993), and its variant, have been constructed and tested. The tests in the third part of 
the empirical analysis have provided support for these models. The GRS test and  
Cochrane‟s (2001) χ2 tests have rarely, if ever, rejected the models. Specifically, in the 
time-series test, the spread in pricing errors between small and large firms, as well as 
value and growth, is reduced. The models perform well in the cross-sections test too. 
Although the size risk is not associated with a reliably positive risk premium, the 
value premium is positive, with the estimate usually falling three standard deviations 
from the mean. After inclusion of the FF3F factors, the premia to Market (or Resource 
and Findi) factors are not different from zero.  
 In a time-series test on ungrouped data, the FF3F and the RS-FF3F models 
have been able to account for the value effect. In particular, it has been found that 
none of the F/P ratios have power to predict the pricing errors of these models after 
size has been included as the explanatory variable. This is a marked success of the 
three factor model, especially given that the time-series in nature of the test, which is 
known to be restrictive, increases power. The time-series estimate of the value 
premium was much lower than the cross-sectional estimate. Thus, the risk-adjusted 
for value (growth) stocks would have been even lower (higher) if a larger estimate of 
the premium was used. 
In these tests, the size effect has attenuated, but has not been extinguished, as 
market equity has shown significant power, statistically speaking, to predict the 
pricing errors left behind by the FF3F and the RS-FF3F. It is believed that market 
microstructure effects are the main reason for presence of the size effect. In fact, very 
little, if any, behavioural models explicitly consider the size effect. However, the 
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liquidity story of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and the information story of Merton 
(1987) apply directly to the size effect. JSE is an illiquid market, where, in 
comparison to the US, little time and money is spent on equity research for smaller 
firms. In addition, the bias in computed betas for illiquid assets may be a substantial 
reason for the persistence of the size effect.   
 In a series of cross-sectional tests on industry and size and F/P question the 
validity of the FF3F models. However, these results are highly consistent with 
evidence in Brennan et al. (2004), who perform similar analysis on US data. Perhaps, 
as Fama and French (1993) note, the FF3F is just a model and, by construction, it is 
flawed and its poor performance in the test on a full set of assets is its weakness.  
Another important result that appears in the Table 21of the thesis is that the static 
CAPM is not significantly worse, and is, in some instances, better than the other 
models. Thus, as Black (1993) puts it, announcement of its death is premature.     
 
6.2 Results of the Hypothesis 
 
Formally, Hypothesis 1.1 has been rejected, as market equity and an array of 
value-growth indicators can predict returns.  Hypothesis 1.2 has also been rejected, as 
the size and the value effect have been found to be independent of one another. Lastly, 
Hypothesis 1.3 is also rejected, as the BE/ME effect has been found to subsume the 
other F/P effects.   
Broadly, Hypothesis 2.1 has been rejected. However, its rejection is not 
unequivocal. as the low t-statistics associated with the coefficients on value-growth 
indicators in the Fama-MacBeth tests, shown in Table 5.15, provide support to the 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3.1 is firmly rejected, as all the asset pricing tests on size and the 
F/P sorted portfolios yield statistically small pricing errors a feat the CAPM and the 
RS-APT have not achieved. However, Hypothesis 3.2 in not rejected, as the tests on 
the full set of assets indicates only marginal out-performance of the FF3F models.  
Lastly, although the value effect dissipates after risk adjustment with the three factor 
model, or its variant, Hypothesis 3.3 is not rejected outright because the size effect 
persists. 
 
 203 
6.3 Discussion on Endogeneity 
 
A valid criticism of the three factor model is that endogeneity is the sole reason 
for its successes. In other words, it should not be surprising that returns on a set of 
assets can be explained by factors computed with a similar method as the test 
portfolios. It is argued here that it is unlikely that endogeneity plays a major role in 
the tests shown above 
Firstly, the FF3F factors are computed with an intersection of size and BE/ME 
sorted portfolios. However, the FF3F models capture more variation (loadings on the 
FF3F factors are more dispersed and more significant) when the set of test assets are 
formed with the cashflow yield being used as the value-growth indicator. If 
endogeneity was driving the results, the C/P-sorted assets would load weakly on the 
value factor. Second, in the construction of the VMG, firms that are neither growth 
nor value are not included in the factor. However, the loadings on the value factor of 
portfolios that contain the neutral firms are often reliably different from zero. 
Third, it can be said that the “Small” portfolio in the SML (“Small minus 
Large”) is a combination of the two portfolios with the smallest firms (Portfolios III 
and IV in the tables 5.4 and 5.5). Since it is a value-weighted factor, stocks that 
constitute the three portfolios with smallest firms (portfolios marked IV in the tables) 
probably do not receive much weight in the factor, yet they have the highest loadings 
on the size factor.   
Fourth, it was found that some portfolios containing the largest firms load 
positively on the size factor, especially in tests that use equal-weighted assets. 
Because of the heavy skewness in the distribution of market equity on the JSE, it is 
likely that the portfolios of large firms will include some mid-sized firms. If these 
portfolios are equal-weighted, the mid-sized firms are given a relatively large weight. 
However, these firms will be in the “Large” part of the SML factor, and, since the 
portfolios in the factor are value-weighted, these mid-sized firms receive very little 
weight in the factor. Consequently, a positive SML beta for the portfolios containing 
large firms in equal-weighted tests implies that the returns of mid-sized firms co-vary 
with return of small stocks (in the “Small” part of the SML), despite the fact that these 
firms are themselves included, but with a small weight, in the “Large” part of the 
SML.  
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Fifth, it is argued here that the ability of the FF3F models to “price out” firm 
characteristics is another evidence that endogeneity is not driving the successes of the 
FF3F models. Because the value effect is predominantly found among the smaller 
firms, and the VMG factor is value-weighted, many of the individual shares would 
receive a very small weight in the factors.  
The last argument against endogeneity being the driver of FF3F‟s pricing 
ability appears in Freidman (2006), who, with the same data set to the one used in this 
thesis, constructs a variant of the three factor model. Although he excludes firms that 
constitute his test assets from the FF3F factors, his regressions show that the model 
can capture a large component of return variation. In fact, his results are quantitatively 
unchanged from tests that do not exclude constituents of the test assets from the FF3F 
factors.   
However, it is recognised that endogeneity must have an effect on the results 
of the asset pricing tests. Fama and French (1995) combat this problem by splitting 
the sample of firms in two; one is used to form the factors, while the other forms the 
assets. Because the cross-section of returns listed on the JSE is small relative to the 
markets in the US, such a powerful test not practical.      
 
6.4 Limitations of the Empirical Analysis 
 
The most salient limitation of any financial research on the JSE is the poor quality 
of the sample. It is short, contains few firms, and consists of assets that do not trade 
frequently.  Admittedly, the sample period is larger than many other studies of this 
type on the JSE, but it is tiny if compared to the research in the markets in the US. For 
example, Fama and French (2006) consider nearly 80 years‟ worth of data (as 
opposed to the 13 that is used here). The length of the sample impacts many of the 
tests that have been performed above. For example, the magnitude of the size and the 
value premia calculated in the thesis are of the same magnitude as the ones found in 
the markets in the US, but some of the associated t-statistics are often smaller. 
Therefore, it cannot be established whether some of the effects found in this research 
are real, yet noisy, and that the high standard of errors are a consequence of that noise; 
or, if the effects are simply not present on the JSE and the low level of significance 
supports this fact. In addition, the mismeasurement of expected returns with the time-
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series averages can be reduced with the length of the time-series (Elton, 1999). 
Consequently, the short sample limits the power of all time-series tests. It also 
increases standard errors of all coefficients in the cross-sectional tests, as the mean 
returns and dependant variables are often mismeasured in shorter samples. The length 
of the sample imparts on the cross-sectional tests too, as the precision of the second-
moment matrix of time-series residual increases in longer periods.  
The second limitation is the small cross-section of assets on the JSE. The number 
of sample firms in the US runs into thousands, while it is capped at about 500 here. 
The problem is particularly conspicuous in the tests that use independent portfolio 
sorts and it is compounded by the fact that size and the F/P ratios appear to be 
correlated. As a result, a fine independent sort is impossible and it is still believed that 
the course sort used in this thesis does not account for the co-linearity of the 
characteristics. A more serious problem of a limited cross-section of assets is that 
many of the test-assets are not well diversified. This problem impacts on virtually all 
tests. The means of portfolios are misstated, as firm-unique incidents are included in 
the measure. This induces an error in dependent variables in all regressions, which 
leads to misstated t-statistics. Also, variances of all portfolios are overstated and thus 
inference in the one-way and two-way sort tests is made difficult.  
       However, the largest problem of any financial research on the JSE is the non-
synchronous trading. For instance, it sharply reduces the cross-section of usable 
assets, exacerbating the problems discussed above. However, it is believed, following 
Dimson (1979), that the largest problem thin trading instigates is the bias in computed 
betas. An effort has been made to alleviate the problem by including a lag (sometimes 
two) in the computations of the factor loadings.  
It is believed that some of the results presented above are a direct consequence of 
incompleteness of the adjustment for this bias. In particular, in cross-sectional 
regressions the size effect is persistent after risk-control with the FF3F and the RS-
FF3F. Or, in some time-series tests, the intercepts in tests that use value-weighted 
assets are not different from zero at the conventional levels, while the ones that use 
equal-weighted assets are strongly positive. Since, according to Dimson (1979), non-
synchronous trading of shares shrinks the estimates of factor betas, by construction, 
the estimated intercept is biased upwards. Lastly, cross-sectional tests that use 
equally-weighted data yielded large intercepts. Certainly, an economy where the zero-
beta rate exceeds the risk-free rate by 2% per month is implausible.   
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Consequently, it can be argued that better measures should have been employed. 
The trade-to-trade method advocated by Bradfield (2003) could have been employed, 
or more than one lag of the factors is required to account for thin trading. The 
unavailability of data precluded the better, according to Bradfield (2003), method of 
beta estimation. And optimal lag structure for estimation of betas has not been 
investigated for two reasons.  
First, there is no theoretical underpinning as to how many lag (or lead) terms 
ought to be included in the time-series regressions. Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson 
(1997) use just one and they show that their structure is sufficient. If more lags are to 
be added, what is the optimal number? Maybe it is two, or ten, or twenty. It is 
conceivable that one can find an empirically derived lag structure that “works”, but 
such a procedure is akin to data-mining. Second, to the best knowledge of the author, 
most MBA and undergraduate courses in finance do not teach inclusion of a lagged 
term in beta estimations. Most likely, many practitioners also do not estimate betas in 
this extended way. It is the desire of this research report to test the CAPM as it is 
commonly applied and it is deemed that estimating betas with one additional lag is a 
sufficient approximation of the methods of most practitioners.  
  
6.5 Directions for Future Research 
 
A shortcoming of the study is that the robustness of the three factor model has 
not been adequately established. It is believed that the FF3F ought to be tested further. 
For instance, impact of endogeneity on the FF3F ought to be properly tested, the 
impact of trading costs assessed, and the effect of winzorising formally addressed. 
Most importantly, the impact of “segmentation” of the JSE into Resource and Findi 
“risks” needs to be addressed. Perhaps, construction of industry-neutral factors, as in 
Lewellen (1999), should be undertaken. However, it is believed a test that uses factors 
constructed only with Findi shares could serve as a robustness exercise. 
     The results also indicate that the value effect exists; illiquidity, proxies with 
size, is important; and that the static CAPM should not be scrapped. Therefore,  future 
research should explore these topics. In particular, the power of market betas, which 
are robust to the bias stemming from non-synchronous trading, to forecast returns, 
ought to be re-examined. Perhaps, the inclusion of a richer lead-lag structure in 
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estimations, or the use of the trade-to-trade method, advocated by Bradfield (2003), 
would recover CAPM pricing for the JSE. Next, the size and the value effects ought to 
be re-examined in the context of this improved model.     
In light of the strength of the size and the value effects and poor performance 
of the static CAPM, it is unlikely that a “fixed” model would explain the “anomalous” 
premia. Consequently, a richer specification of the model would be called for. 
Specifically, it is believed that the liquidity-adjusted CAPM of Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) would go far in explaining the effects, particularly the size premium. In 
addition, conditional versions of the model ought to be constructed, as it has been 
shown internationally that these specifications can, with varying degrees of success, 
explain the value premium.  
It is also believed that the two-factor APT of van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) 
ought to be constructed that incorporates illiquidity and time-variability in loadings. 
However, perhaps it is on the theoretical front that the model needs to be developed. It 
is unclear how intertemporal hedging concerns of Merton (1973) would apply to a 
“segmented” market like the JSE. Perhaps, the Resource factor, which is co-linear 
with the exchange rate, acts as state variable in the ICAPM, and the RS-APT model is 
the ICAPM.         
 However, before these improvements are made, the contention of Fama and 
French (2003) holds. In particular, “A multifactor (model), like that of Fama and 
French (1993), where the additional factors are portfolios of value and growth stocks, 
may nevertheless provide a good approximation to average returns.” (Fama and 
French, 2003, p12).  
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